
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



Chap.Wf.,.. Copyright No... 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 










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The Battles 



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CHANCELLORSVILLE 



AND 



GETTYSBURG 



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Copyriglit by 

CAF"r. iV. II. ISIEIaSOX, 

2518 Taylor SI., Minneapolis*, Minn. 

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PREFACE. 

In preparing this work, entitled "The Battles of Chancellors- 
ville and Gettysburg," I have made free use of material fur- 
nished by my own recollections, memoranda an''' correspond- 
ence. Being an active participant in the two great battles, 
which are taken as the basis of this narrative, makes much of 
what I say my own story. That is, I mean to say T had 
ideas of my own. They were as follows: When the Union 
army took up its position that forced the enemy to come out of 
its strong fortifications and fight the Union army on its own 
chosen entrenched grounds, I wondered why the Union army, 
the rank and file of which, it is generally conceded, was among 
the bravest, most patriotic, gallant soldiers of which any army 
was composed since civilization began, was defeated in one of 
the great battles, and the other could hardly be called a very 
creditable victory. The persistent investigation on my part has 
unearthed positive evidence showing who was responsible for 
the defeat at Chancellorsville and why Hooker's anticipations 
were not realized at Gettysburg, namely, the.- jiestructio.n of the 
Confederate army. To aid me in arriving at this conclusion I 
quote such prominent names and numerous authorities that it 
will not leave any room, after perusing this work, for the most" 
skeptical persons to doubt the correctness of my conclusions. 
The reader will wonder why someone did not possess the cour- 
age to present these plain facts to the publicjears ^o in order 



to arrive at a more correct solution of the questions that are 
involved in this inquiry. 

As to the responsibility for the failure to accomplish all that 
was anticipated by General Hooker, the army commander who 
planned the battles of Chancellorsvilfe and Gettysburg. In my 
opinion it .is necessary to consider two questions in advance. 
First, the political conditions that brought on the war, and 
second, the reason the war did not end sooner. In my opinion 
a correct solution of why those two great battles did not end 
more successfully to the Union army and meet the most san- 
guine expectation of General Hooker cannot be correctly solved 
and justice be done the rank and file of army without first con- 
sidering the weak elements that were constantly undermining 
the army's best efforts. The questions are plainly answered in 
this work, why the war did not end sooner and why the battles 
of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were not great Union vic- 
tories. 

This work will correct the history of one of the most mag- 
nificently planned battles, by the Union commander, that was 
ever fought on this continent. No one has ever pretended to 
say that the plans of the battle of Chancellorsville and their exe- 
cution under the immediate supervision of General Joseph 
Hooker up to 6:30 p. m., Thursday, April 30, 1863, were not the 
most magnificent in the world's history. From this point each 
writer flies off on a tangent to find a flaw in Hooker's manage- 
ment of the battle later that resulted in the final defeat of the 
Union army. They have done this because of a misapprehen- 
sion of facts that were covered up by the most wily tricks of 
conspirators, which I propose to unearth. Many of these writer? 
have passed away, but their works live on and are being read, 
studied, commented upon and will be, if not corrected, to the 



end of time. They were written during and soon after the cam- 
paign, when history was largely made from newspaper reports 
of correspondents who were unrehable. Here the errors crept 
into their works and for lack of thorough investigation have 
been perpetuated. Over 35 years have passed since the great 
battle of Chancellorsville. which started oft so magnificently, 
but ended so barren of good results. As to the cause of the 
defeat of the Union army, public opinion has been divided. I 
propose to correct the errors that have led to this division and 
make the cause of their defeat so plain that there will not be 
any doubt in the future of the justification of my conclusions. 
That there was treachery and the most wicked conspiracy on 
the part of men high in rank and power to defeat the Union 
army and drive General Hooker from his command will be 
shown by such authorities that no one will question the correct- 
ness of the above statements after reading this work. All I ask 
is a fair, unprejudiced consideration of all the facts presented 
The story is a sad one, but sad as it appears, the evidences of 
its truthfulness are so abundant, as the work progresses, that no 
fair-minded person will doubt my conclusions. A. H. X. 



COKTEINTS. 



Part 1. 

CHAPTER I. PACE. 
The Political Conditions That Brought on the "War 1 

CHAPTER II. 
Gen. Joseph Hooker Appointed to Command Army of tlie Potomac.. 15 

CHAPTER III. 

Hooker's Movement on Chancellorsville 19 

CHAPTER IV. 
Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1 26 

CHAPTER V. 
Battle of Chancellorsville, May 3 64 

Part 2. 

CHAPTER I. PACt. 
Back to Camp Near Falmouth, Va. 83 

CHAPTER IT. 
Lee's Northern Invasion 65 

CHAPTER III. 
Union Army Changes Its Base, June 13 8R 

CHAPTER IV. 
OfficialOrders <J2 

CHAPTER V. 

Hooker Planned to Fight at Gettysburg, but is Relieved Before the 

Battle 98 

CHAPTER VI. 
Meade Opposed to Fighting at Gettysburg 123 

'CHAPTER VII. 
The Battle of Gettysburg, First Day. Gen. Reynolds Killed 125 

CHAPTER VIII. 
Battle of the Second Day 137 

CHAPTER IX. 
Battle of the Third Day 160 

CHAPTER X. 
The Confederate Army Retreats to Virginia 173 



THE. BATTIaB. 



OK 



GHANGRLaLaORSVILaLaEI. 



ERRATA. 

Papc 101, eierhth line, fifth word should re.id Frederick instead of 
Fredericksburg-, 

Page 79— The First Corps, killed and wounded should be 192, missing. 
100; total. 292. The Third Corps, killed and wounded, 3,439; missing, 600: 
total 4,039 The Twelfth Corps, killed and wounded, 2.383; missing 500; 
total 2,883. Total Cavalry killed and wounded, l.'SO. Total LTniou losses at 
Chancellorsville, killed and wounded, 12.197, missing .5.000: total. 17,197. 



THR BATTLaR 



OK 



GHANGRLAlAORSVILiLAR. 



Part I. 
CHAPTER I. 



The Political Condition that Brought On the War of Rebellion, 
the Cause of so ]\Iany Defeats of the Union Army, and the 
Reason the Rebellion Was Not Put Down Sooner. 

A few words as to the cause of the war will not be out of 
place here, for this is in the line of our study and should precede 
the description ot the battle of Chanccllorsville. When our fore- 
fathers had struggled through seven long years of war with the 
mother country, then the most powerful nation on earth, suffer- 
ing greater privations than had ever been the lot of human be- 
ings to endure in the same length of time, and forced that great 
nation to acknowledge their independence, they then discovered 
that their troubles were by no means ended, they were left 
without a national organization, each colony was independent of 
the rest, so a petition was circulated asking each colony to elect 
and send delegates to a convention, to be held at Philadelphia, 
May, 1787. When the delegates came together they found 
great trouble in drafting a Constitution that would be adopted 



2 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

by the convention, principally on account of the institution of 
slavery, that had been introduced while the colonies were a 
province of Great Britain. The question, after a long struggle, 
was compromised, so the word slave or involuntary servitude or 
servant did not appear in that document. Therefore it was 
adopted by the convention, and finally, after much time had 
elapsed, was ratified by all the colonies, and they became the 
United States; thus this vexed question of slavery was thought 
to be settled. Many thought the institution would die a natural 
death, but in this institution was sown the seeds that resulted 
in one of the most cruel, obstinate sectional wars that ever 
cursed any nation. " 

War is a cruel manner of adjusting differences among nations 
at the best, but is far more malignant when the war is between 
states of the same nationality as a revolution, or a rebellion, of 
one section of the same nation against the laws of that nation. 
This was our condition in the War of Rebellion, the Southern 
leaders claimed that they had a grievance, and that was that 
the Northern states were about to despoil them of their institu- 
tions and slaves, and the only way to save them was to dissolve 
the union of states and set up a government for themselves. 
The threat to do this had been made many years before any 
move by the Southern secessionists, or overt act on their part 
had been committed. They were constantly demanding further 
concessions, in the way of special sectional laws that would in- 
sure the perpetuation of their pet institutions. The last degree 
of endurance by the Northern people was the passage of and 
attempt to enforce the fugitive slave law, which made every 
citizen of the Northern states a slave catcher, and compelled 
them to return the escaped slaves to their masters at their own 
expense, under pain and penalty of fine and imprisonment. Pec- 



THE BATTLE OF CIIANCELLORSVILLE. 3 

pie outside of congress in the Northern states became indignant 
at this attempt to force them against their sense of reason and 
better judgment, to become negro catchers and be forced to 
take them back into a condition they abhorred as cruel and worse 
than death; and they revolted against the law. In their several 
states they passed laws relieving their citizens from tltis hu- 
miliating obligation; by this means the fugitive slave law became 
a dead letter, and for that reason the Southern "fire-eaters," 
so-called, exerted all their energies to bring on a collision at 
arms between the states. As a means to accomplish this they 
began to force their institutions into the territories. That 
brought on the issue. 

The Southern agitators claimed they had the same right un- 
der the Constitution to take their slaves into the territories, or 
free states for that matter, and hold them there temporarily as 
property, as Northern men had to take their horse, ox or other 
property into a Southern state or territory. The people in the 
free states said that property in slaves was different from other 
property, the right of property in slaves was not recognized by 
any state or nation outside of the state where the special local 
laws of that state legalized the institution. On this issue po- 
litical parties began to agitate and were divided as to what 
should be the political status of the slave states and slavery. 
There was no political party that could be united upon that 
question until the organization of the Republican party. That 
party came together in convention by an informal call of states 
at Pittsburgh, Pa., Feb. 22, 1856, and organized by adopt- 
ing a platform which declared that it was not the 
purpose of the party to interfere with the institution 
of slavery in states where it then existed, but that 
no territory, then free, should ever tliercaftcr be ad- 



4 THE BATTLE OF CIIANCELLORSVILLE. 

mitted as a slave state. This informal convention completed 
the organization of the party, and called a national convention, 
to meet at Philadelphia, June 17th, 1856, for the purpose of nom- 
inating candidates for president and vice-president, and this is 
the manner of proceedings which gave the present Republican 
party a legal national existence. From the above date began the 
disintegration of the Whig and Democratic parties in the North- 
ern and border states, and their final dissolution was a ques- 
tion of but a short time. Not one state in the North would have 
been left to the Democratic party any more than there was to 
the Whigs at the election in 1856, if a portion of the Democratic 
party, led by Stephen A. Douglas, had not resorted to the subter- 
fuge of squatter sovereignty. When ]\Ir. Douglas and his fol- 
lowers went on the stump and explained their platform and that 
what squatter soverignty meant was, that when the people in a 
territory desired to be admitted as a state of the Union, they would 
ask congress for an enabling act to admit them, though it was 
left for the inhabitants of the territory to decide by a majority 
vote whether it should be a free or a slave state. This dodging of 
the real issue by Mr. Douglas enabled him to save the party in 
1856, electing James Buchanan president, on his modified plat- 
form, but in i860 the Democratic party split, the pro slavery 
wing nominated Breckenridge and the squatter sovereignty wing 
nominated Stephen A. Douglas as their candidate for president. 
Mr. Douglas made a brilliant campaign .and received a large 
popular vote in every Northern state. While he did not get but 
seventy-two electors, his popular vote was nearly as large as "Sir. 
Lincoln's, who was elected president, getting 180 electoral votes, 
but when the War of Rebellion broke out and the rebels fired on 
Fort Sumter, Mr. Douglas became a strong Union man, and his 
party in the Northern states followed his example. 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYlLLE. 5 

This made them very popular with the administration, who 
favored them by appointments of the liighest rank m the army. 
Soon they were known as war Democrats, and became as staunch 
and radical Union men as the most radical Republicans. The 
loyal action of the Douglas Democrats during the War of Rebel- 
lion made it possible to perpetuate the Democratic party in the 
Northern states. People seemed to soon forget that if the policy 
of squatter sovereignty had prevailed slavery would have been 
perpetuated and the country kept in a constant turmoil as long 
as there were any territories to be admitted as states. Eighteen 
hundred and fifty-six and i860 was an epoch in the history of the 
United States that thoroughly tested the durability of a Demo- 
cratic-Republican government. It would seem that elements 
could not be devised to test the question of, are the American 
people capable of self-government, more thoroughly than this 
rebellion and the manner in which it was finally crushed out. 
No monarchial government ever did or could have accomplished 
this great work. The sections North and South were soon 
organized for the election of 1856 and i860; the contest was a 
heated one in both campaigns, on both sides. On the Southern 
side some of their congressmen were very aggressive and abu- 
sive in the halls of congress, and were not at all choice in the 
language they used toward the Northern people. They called 
them small-fistcd farmers, greasy mechanics, filthy operatives, 
mudsills of society, and added to this insult that capital should 
own the labor of the country no matter whether the laborer was 
black or white. On this issue the Northern free states people 
won in i860, electing Abraham Lincoln president, and for this 
and no other cause the South began to arrange for war, and set 
up an independent government, and on April 12th. 1861, Gen. 
Beauregard with a Confederate army of 6.000 men, by order of 



6 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 

the president of the Southern Confederacy, fired on the flag and 
captured Fort Sumter. Then the war began in earnest. The 
Northern men, under the President's call for soldiers, volunteer- 
ed their services, regardless of party, faster than the government 
could arm them, determined to crush out the rebellion and re- 
store the union of states; they were fighting for a principle that 
was near and dear to them. Their hearts were in the cause, 
the rank and file being more intelligent than the Southern sol- 
diers, ought to, and would have beaten them, all things else being 
equal, man for man, but unequal as they were in numbers, should 
have crushed them in one year. This is not said in a spirit of brag 
or unfairness, but in a desire to be fair and to transmit the facts 
as they existed down in truthful history to coming generations. 
This was not because nature had done more for the North than 
the Southern soldiers, but it was the curse of their institutions 
that degraded the poor whites. They did not have any free 
school system in the Southern slave states and the facilities for 
educating the young in border slave states was very limited. 
On the other hand the rank and file of the Northern soldiers 
had the advantage of a free school system for many years, and 
it was a very rare thing to find a soldier in the Union army that 
did not have a fair business education, and it is a well known, 
admitted fact that the more intelligent the rank and file of an 
army is, the better soldiers they make. Weighing the men by 
this standard, it will not be regarded an exaggeration to say that 
the rank and file of the Union army were more than equal to the 
Confederate, man for man, and being so much superior to them 
in numbers, ought to have conquered the rebellion in 
one year. I propose to show why they did not do it. 
There are several potent reasons why the war did not end 
sooner. In the first place, the Confederate army, especially in 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 7 

East Virginia, being poorly fed, clothed and armed, won victory 
after victory over the Union army. The reasons are: First, 
Jefferson Davis, president of the Southern Confederacy, was not 
only a great statesman, but was one of the best educated soldiers, 
practically and theoretically, of his day and age in the United 
States, and being president of the Confederacy, made him 
commander-in-chief, with power to appoint, as well as direct 
his generals. He was familiarly acquainted with every officer 
in the regular army in the United States, knew them for all they 
were worth. In selecting his generals for important commands, 
he put the best men forward, men of military experience and edu- 
cation, and never made a mistake. He w^as absolute monarch 
in the Confederacy, their congress as well as their army was 
ruled by him; thus his great abilities were available during the 
war. 

The Confederates of eastern Virginia were led by one of the 
most clear headed, careful, cautious strategist this country ever 
knew. His corps, division and brigade commanders never 
failed to carry out promptly orders they received from him. If 
an impartial history is ever written of the War of Rebellion, 
General Robert E. Lee will rank as one of the greatest captains 
the world ever knew. And his lieutenants, always prompt to obey 
orders of their superiors, brave, intelligent soldiers, without 
which no general could succeed, w^ere all worthy of a better 
cause. General Lee planned to give his army the advantage of 
the grounds, its conformation to the surrounding country, and 
fortified them, which made one man, inside, equal to three or 
four outside their works. This was like setting traps, and the 
Union generals had no better judgment than to lead their men 
straight into them instead of leading them on the flanks and rear, 
which would render the enemy's intrenchments useless to them. 



8 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 

If the Union army could have exchanged army commanders and 
General Lee's heart had been in the Union cause, and the Con- 
federates been led by our first army commanders, we could have 
crushed the Confederate army of Virginia in less than one year. 
General Lee never found his match as a strategist but once in the 
history of the war, and that was in General Joseph Hooker, in 
his movement of the army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville. 
On the other hand, President Lincoln, when he was first elected 
president, was a stranger to almost everybody outside of Illinois. 
It is true, he was one term in congress, but did not become 
much noted as a congressman, and while he was strange to the 
public, he was a greater stranger to the army. He was influ- 
enced in the appointment of his generals to command armies by 
politicians who knew nothing of their merits as military men, 
but recommended their personal friends for promotion, and re- 
tained them in important commands, regardless of their qualifi- 
cations. This practice was kept up to that extent that our best 
generals were not known until near the close of the war. An- 
other thing that weakened the Union army was the passage of 
the $300 exemption and substitute law when the time came to 
draft. This gave to the army foreign recruits who had no inter- 
est in the country, and a great many of them deserted every 
chance they got. Another reason was the accepting of ignorant 
negroes as substitutes for intelligent white men, whose duty it 
was to stand by the draft, and fight side by side with their honest, 
intelligent neighbor who volunteered with the first 300,000, 
which they pledged themselves to do when these soldiers 
left their homes. These exemption and substitute laws were the 
fault of our vacillating congress, not so much the President, 
but he was at fault later on for making General Halleck, who 
had never won a victory or fought a battle, commander-in-chief 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 9 

of all the armies, with headquarters at Washington. No more 
incompetent military man could have been selected for that posi- 
tion, and the President ought to have known it. Halleck was 
in the way of every progressive general during the war. Of all 
others, he was the least competent major-general for the Presi- 
dent's chief adviser. For these mistakes, brave officers and men 
of the army, especially the army of the Potomac, had to suffer 
to the extent of years of time, and thousands of lives were sacri- 
ficed on' the battlefield. 

I have always wondered why the President appointed Halleck 
major-general so early in the war as to make him rank all other 
major-generals in the army of the President's appointments. And 
why, after he had appointed him and given him the command of 
the department of ^Missouri, where he failed in every movement 
of that army of which he was in immediate command, that he 
should, with all his failures, and knowing his faults, promote 
him to the command of all the armies in the War of the Rebel- 
lion, with headquarters at Washington, D. C, and retain him 
there, is a mystery I am not able to solve; and I have searched 
all authorities I could get hold of, to see if I could find some 
redeeming trait of character or military qualifications that 
would influence the President to (ib this, but have failed. 

The War of the Rebellion in the United States, from 1861 to 
1865, was the most bitter partisan contest that has ever been 
waged since civilization began. So intense and bitter was this 
contest that the reports of the commanders on both sides in many 
instances, that were made of battles were a tissue of falsehoods. 
Each party to the action tried to magnify a defeat or drawn bat- 
tle into a victory for their side, and the partisan spirit ran so 
high that it was considered good politics of all, from the Presi- 
dent down to the lowest politician, to encourage these false re- 



10 THE BATTLE OF CHAN(]ELLORSVILLE. 

ports. If any officer was ever punished for making a false re- 
port of battles he fought, the instance has escaped us. It seems 
as though political rings were formed by officers high in rank, 
who were possessed of low, selfish political cunning. So thor- 
oughly dishonest and depraved were they that they would use 
their rank and power in the army to defeat the Union army 
for no other purpose than to cause the removal of the com- 
manding officer, so as to get him out of their way, or pull one 
down who was high in order to climb up on his ruin. Regard- 
less of the lives of the troops engaged if they could accomplish 
the disgrace of the general in command, they seemed happy. 
Many of the defeats and drawn battles in the War of the Re- 
bellion, on the side of the Union army, are directly chargeable to 
the intrigues of under officers in the command, and in many in- 
stances the hand of Gen. Halleck can be traced; and in no in- 
stance does this vicious disposition crop out more than in Gen. 
Halleck'<s conduct toward Gen. Hooker, from the time Hooker 
took command of the Army of the Potomac until he was re- 
lieved from that command. Halleck's olDJect, it seems to us, was 
to destroy Hooker's influence as a military man so as to keep 
himself at the head in rank in the army. The loss of life and the 
disgrace of the army's defeat seemed to be a matter of small con- 
sequence to him. This language, I am fully aware, is too strong 
for a humble person like myself to use without high authority. 
After giving a short biographical sketch of Halleck I will give 
authorities to prove he was capable of the low, contemptible acts 
I charge him with. 

I give so much space here to Gen. Halleck because of his 
interference with Gen. Hooker's movements while he com- 
manded the Army of the Potomac. I believe him to have been 
at the head of the conspiracy that defeated the army at Chan- 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 1] 

cellorsville, and that his intentions were to drive Hooker from 
command of the Army of the Potomac in disgrace, which he 
accomplished before the battle of Gettysburg was fought. 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL HAL- 

LECK. 

Henry W. Halleck— Born in Oneida county, N. Y., Jan. 15. 
1816. Graduated at West Point, in 1839. Third in his class. 
Classmates were Gens. Rickets, Ord and Canby. Made second 
lieutenant of engineers in 1839. Served a short time in the Mexi- 
can War. Was sent to CaHfornia and promoted to first lieu- 
tenant of engineers in 1846. To captain in 1853. Resigned and 
mustered out of service Aug. i, 1854. Formed the law partner- 
ship of Halleck, Peachey & Billings at San Francisco, Cal., and 
became very wealthy because of their being appointed agents 
to settle the Spanish-Mexican land claims the United States 
assumed with the annexation of California Territory. 

Engaged in quicksilver mining. Became president of the 
Pacific & Atlantic R. R.— from San Francisco to San Jose, Cal. 
Was appointed major-general of state militia of California in 
i860. Appointed major-general of the United States volun- 
teers Aug. 19, 1861. Ordered to relieve Gen. Fremont at St. 
Louis, and took command of that department Nov. 18, 1861. 
Commanded that department until July 23,, 1862, when he was 
made commander-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, 
with headquarters at Washington, by order of tiie President. 
Held that position until July i. 1865. Took command of the 
Army of the Potomac Aug. 30. 1865, with headquarters at Rich- 
mond, Va. Appointed to the military division of the Pacific 
March 16, 1869. Died while he was on duty in that department. 
Now let us see what leading military men say about Halleck: 



12 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 

In his book, entitled "His Own Story," p. 137, Gen. Mc- 
Clellan says of Halleck; "A day or two before he arrived in 
Washington to take command as commander-in-chief, Secretary 
Stanton cautioned me against trusting Halleck, who was, he 
says, probably the greatest scoundrel and most barefaced vil- 
lain in America. That he was totally destitute of principle and 
that he (Stanton) had in the Almaden quicksilver case con- 
victed Halleck of perjury in open court." 

Gen. Butler, in his book, p. 871, says of Halleck: "I have 
learned his character, which I find to be that of a lying, treach- 
erous, hypocritical scoundrel, with no moral sense." 

Gen. McClellan says, in his book, p. 539: "Halleck perjured 
himself before the committee on the conduct of the war when 
called in relation to his (McClellan's) campaigns. 

McClellan's book, p. 216, says: "Halleck stole dispatches 
from the office of the general-in-chief and destroyed them. That 
Halleck, while he was in command of the Department of ]\Iis- 
souri had sent to Gen. McClellan, who was then commander-in- 
chief of all the armies, a dispatch relative to the conduct of Gen. 
Grant, who was in Halleck's department. Halleck charged 
Grant with being absent without leave, refusing to make reports 
of his command, as ordered, and gave as a reason for this in- 
subordination that he had learned that Grant had resumed his 
former bad habits." This and much more of a similar nature 
passed from Halleck to McClellan. McClellan answered, if 
he (Halleck) thought it for the best interest of the service to 
not hesitate to place Grant under arrest. Grant did not know 
Halleck had made these charges against him until 1866. He 
then asked McClellan for a copy, and for the first time learned 
the facts, which had not appeared among the regular orders 
when Grant came to Washington. After he had been appointed 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 13 

lieutenant-general and had access to headquarters' books, the 
above communications from Halleck to McClellan had disap- 
peared. This fixes their abstraction from the records upon Hal- 
leck. 

Gen. Grant, in his ]\Iemoirs, Vol. i, p. 325, says that he did 
not know until 1866 that Halleck had reported him absent with- 
out leave and made other unfavorable reports about him. He 
learned through a private source. He then asked Gen. McClel- 
lan for, and obtained, a cop}' of the dispatches. He, in his book, 
on page 325, as above stated, explains that he was not absent 
without leave; that Halleck had never asked him for a report, 

etc. See Gen. Grant's statement. 

Butler's book, p. 872, says the records show that Halleck 
misrepresented and betrayed Sherman, Butler, Grant and Mc- 
Clellan, With such a record is it not strange that any power 
on earth would be able to keep such a man at the head of the 
army. We close our eyes and shudder when we reflect upon 
how many noble men were sacrificed for no higher purpose than 
the payment of political debts or the military destruction of gen- 
erals who were in the way of an ambitious, incompetent, wicked 
man, who had succeeded in being promoted to a position he 
never should have received. 

The rank and file of the Army of the Potomac won prodigys 
of valor in spite of the political conditions that would have 
demoralized any other than the truest patriots, such as com- 
posed this army. 

Generals ]\IcDowell, ]\IcClellan and Burnsides. three com- 
manders of the Army of the Potomac during a period of over 
two years. No one of them ever won a victory or showed their 
competency as strategists at any period in their military history, 
although they directed that noble army in many hard-fought bat- 



14 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 

ties, where they developed their want of skill. Yet the army 
never failed them, but fought on bravely, each and every time, 
as though they never had been whipped. Why put these men 
forward instead of Wool, Thomas, Hooker, Kerney, Hancock 
and many others who had seen service. But after the useless 
slaughter at Fredericksburg the rank and file of the army be- 
came terribly demoralized, desertions were taking place at tlu 
rate of 200 daily; 2,922 commissioned officers and 81.964 men in 
rhe Union army were reported absent without leave. 



CHAPTER 11. 

General Joseph Hooker, Appointed by the President to 
Supersede General Ambros Burnside. How the Army Was 
Demoralized After the Battle of Fredericksburg. Hooker's 
Success as an Organizer and Restoring the Confidence of 
the Army. 

January 25, 1863, Gen. Hooker was appointed to supersede 
Burnside, in command of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker 
was a West Point graduate, was in the ^Mexican war, but soon 
after that was ended resigned his commission in the regular 
army and became a private citizen in California. Soon after 
the breaking out of the War of the Rebellion he went to Wash- 
ington, offered his services and was appointed brigadier, and 
later major-general, by President Lincoln. He was a very pre- 
possessing gentleman. A dashing, daring corps commander, 
and earned justly in the Army of the Potomac the title of "Fight- 
ing Joe Hooker." He handled his corps with great skill and 
success and was a great favorite with his under officers and men, 
but was never a favorite with Hallec 

When General ]\IcClellan was relieved from command of the 
army, Hooker's skill and claim to the promotion was passed 
over and Burnsides, not belonging to the Army of the Poto- 
mac, was appointed to the command. After Burnside's dis- 
asterous failure at Fredericksburg Gen. Hooker was grudgingly 
given the command of the army, as above stated. 

Gen. Hooker had some enemies among the generals com- 



16 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. ^^ 

manding brigades, divisions and corps. He went to work to 
reorganize the army and soon brought it under better discipline 
than it had ever been since its first organization. The deser- 
tions stopped and the officers and men that were absent returned 
to their commands, and before the first day of April the rank and 
file was the most confident, proud, patriotic army that ever 
shouldered a musket. And if they had not been mismanaged by 
some of the corps commanders the battle of ChancelForsville 
would have resulted in one of the greatest victories ever won. 
Gen. Hooker had been in command but a few days before he 
got a letter from President Lincoln informing him that strange 
stories were rumored about him, such as an ambition to play 
the role of dictator, and warned him w^hat would happen if he 
allowed disaster to befall the Army of the Potomac. This would 
indicate, as above stated, the fact that some of the officers of the 
army that were his enemies had been complaining to the Presi- 
dent. One reason was that some of the officers could never for- 
give Gen. Hooker for the answer he made the Congressional 
Committee on the conduct of the war, when they summoned him 
before them and asked him why the army on the Peninsula under 
Gen. McClellan did not succeed. His reply was: The incom- 
petency of the commander. Gen. AlcClellan had many staunch 
friends among the officers of that army, and for this answer some 
of the officers could never forgive him. But it was thought by 
Gen. Hooker's friends that time and the brilliant services he had 
rendered the cause had obliterated this feeling among the offi- 
cers. But what follows will prove their mistake. 

When Gen. Hooker took command, I repeat, the outlook for 
ever putting down the rebellion was indeed gloomy. This feel- 
ing was pretty general throughout the whole army. It was no 
uncommon thing to hear, as you were passing the camps, soldiers 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 17 

using the most insurrectionary language. One day as I was 
passing through a strange camp, about Feb. i6, 1863, I heard 
men cursing the President and the commanding generals, and 
boasted that they intended to desert the first opportunity. The 
officers standing by did not attempt to rebuke them. This, in 
view of the fact that we were soon to meet the enemy again 
in battle, I must confess, made me feel very serious. When I 
got to my own camp I reported what I had heard to our chap- 
lain, :\IcAdams, and Dr. Lyman, regimental surgeon. After a 
short consultation, we concluded that there ought to be some 
resolutions drafted, and see if our regiment, the 57th Pennsyl- 
vania Volunteers, would not adopt them, believing this would 
be an example the whole army would pretty generally follow, 
and thus crush out the insurrectionary element that was then 
present in the army. We vv-ent to Lieutenant-Colonel Peter 
Sydes, then commanding the regiment, and told him what we 
had been discussing. He at once appointed us to draft resolu- 
tions, which were soon prepared. The colonel called out the 
regiment, formed in hollow square. Chaplain McAdams read 
the resolutions, expressing confidence in the President and Gen. 
Hooker, pledging ourselves to stand by them and our glorious 
flag to the last man, or the war ended. With the restoration 
of the union, as soon as they were read, a motion was made to 
adopt them, which was carried unanimously. A sergeant then 
stepped to the front and called for three cheers for the President, 
three cheers for General Hooker, and three for the flag. And 
three times three were given with a will. We then adjourned 
to our quarters. Soon orderlies came galloping from division 
and brigade headquarters to ascertain what so much noise 
meant, thinking (I learned afterwards) that an insurrection had 
already broken out. But this patriotic action was soon followed 



18 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 

by other commands all over the army, and that army, under the 
inspiration and discipline of General Hookef, soon became 
stronger and more efficient than it had ever been since its or- 
ganization. The cavalry up to this time were of little or no use. 
They won their spurs and fought their first battle at Kelly's 
Ford April 17, 1863. From that time on it became one of the 
strongest armes of our service. It owes all its splendid and 
efficient record in historv to Gen. Hooker. 



CHAPTER III. 

Gen. Hooker Prepares to ^lovc on the Enemy. The Movement 
of the Several Corps to Gain Their Position at Chancellors- 
ville. 

Settled spring weather was now rapidly approaching and it 
was apparent to all a great battle was soon to be fought. The 
time came. ♦ 

General Hooker's plans for that battle was scientific in all 
its details. The cavalry was to detach itself from the infantry 
ten days in advance of the general movement, pass to the rear 
of the enemy, cut and destroy all his communications with 
Richmond. Destroy all supplies in reach, then hold themselves 
behind some of the rivers to prevent a re-establishment of com- 
munications and check the retreat of the enemy on Richmond. 
It was known General Lee had not at any time been able to 
keep more than four days' supply of rations on account of his 
limited transportation. When that was exhausted he would have 
to retreat from his intrenched camp to his base of supplies. 

The infantry was to make the famous flank movement. It 
executed as soon as the effect on Gen. Lee's commissary had 
time to take effect caused by the cavalry raid. In the planning 
of the battle the movements of the Union army and the final 
points of the enemy's lines to be attacked by the Union army, 
General Lee was completely deceived. In all our previous move- 
ments the enemy knew when, where and how we were to move 
and attack. The result was that they were always on the ground 



20 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

in advance of us, entrenched and waiting our approach. Before 
the battle of Chancellorsville began we had gained our position, 
and our plans were not known to the enemy until General 
Hooker proclaimed to the army his position by publication cf 
orders — not even in Washington. As proof of this the royal 
bloods of France (Prince de Joneville and Count de Paris), at- 
taches in previous campaigns to headquarters, were in Wash- 
ington and came to the army the second day. When they ap- 
proached the Union lines they inquired for General Hooker's 
headquarters. A noted v;ag stepped out and said to them: Keep 
right on this road to the second line of intrenchments, pass that 
line about a half a mile and you will come to another line of in- 
trenchments; you pass that about a half mile and you will come 
to the picket line; you pass that line about sixty rods, there 
you will find General Hooker's headquarters. This shows the 
opinion the army had of "Fighting Joe Hooker." He was al- 
ways on the front line, in the thickest of the firing, encouraging 
his men and ready to take advantage of weak points in the 
enemy's lines. 

I never knew how unreliable the history of the late War ot 
Rebellion was, especially the history of the battle of Chancellors- 
ville, until I began to search histories to aid me in preparing 
this work. 

I was an attache of the Army of the Potomac for three years, 
and desire to correct the history of that magnificent, patriotic 
army, and to some extent place its failure to crush the enemy 
when and where it came in contact with them, where it belongs. 
From the first battle of Bull Run down to the surrender of 
General Lee and his army, it fought like old, well drilled, battle 
scarred veterans, but was cursed with the most incompetent army 
commanders known in history. 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 21 

They were led against an army that were poorly armed, clad 
and fed, and fewer in number, and yet they were nearly always 
defeated by that ragamuffin army. Before the battle of Chan- 
cellorsville began the Union army was composed of about 
124.000 of all arms, 11,500 cavalfy, while General Lee's re- 
ports show that they had but 62,000, 3,000 of which was cavalry. 
With this disparity in numbers, when the enemy were dislodged 
from their strong intrenched camp, forced to come out in open 
field, they must have been defeated, if not totally destroyed, had 
all moved and acted in concert, but General Stoneman, com- 
manding the cavalry, did not cross the river as ordered April 13. 
The order was repeated by General Hooker, but he got this for 
reply: "The rivers and creeks are so high that we cannot pass 
them." Finally, April 27, Gen. Hooker became impatient at the 
delay of the cavalry and ordered the movement to begin of all 
^ arms at once. One reason Gen. Hooker rushed the movement 
of his army was, he had learned that Gen. Lee had detached 
Long-street with 24,000 soldiers to another department, and he 
hoped to crush Gen. Lee before his army could be reunited. 
Gen. Lee still had 62,000 soldiers present for duty. See his 

report. 

April 28th the Sixth corps (General Sedgwick's), the First 
corps (General Reynolds'), moved down the river about four 
miles below Fredericksburg, followed by the Third corps (Gen- 
eral Sickels'), all under the immediate command of Gen. Sedg- 
wick. Their mxOvement was in plain view of the enemy, which 
led them to believe the whole army was moving to attack their 
right flank. This made operations on the other flank easy. 

April 28th two pontoon bridges were built at Franklin's old 
crossing for the Sixth corps, and two more were laid one mile 
below for the First corps to cross. Brooks' division of the Sixth 



22 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

corirs crossed the river with but little opposition, a few skir- 
mishers along the banks of the river and firing of artillery from 
the enemy's fortifications, which was at long range and did 
but little damage, the valley at this point being wide. General 
Wadsworth's division of the First corps crossed with equal suc- 
cess below. 

On the 27th General Hooker set three corps, the 5th, nth and 
I2th, in motion to the right, under the immediate command of 
Gen. Slocum, accompanied by three batteries to each corps. 
This column's course was so far north of the river that its move- 
ments could not be observed by the enemy, and they crossed the 
Rappahannock river at Kelley's and Germania fords. On the 
night of the 28th the cavalry crossed at the same place and pre- 
ceded the infantry so as to cover their movements from the 
enemy's cavalry. On the morning of the 29th the infantry was 
on their way to the Rappidan and crossed that river at Morton* 
and Racoon fords and proceeded to Chancellorsville, preceded 
by a brigade of cavalry commanded by Gen. Pleasanton, wherp 
they arrived at 6 p. m., April 30, and were joined by two divi- 
sions of the 2d corps. The other division of the 2d corps was 
left in camp at Falmouth, it being in plain view of the enemy, on 
high ground, and was not moved, it having the appearance, to 
the enemy leaving this division, that most of the Union army 
was still in camp. So on the 30th Hooker found himself at 
Chancellorsville with four corps, a movement he had made with- 
out any loss. The cavalry under Stoneman proceeded on their 
mission of destroying of public property and cutting communi- 
cation between the enemy and Richmond, which they had been 
ordered to do ten days earlier. 

April 30th a circular order from General Hooker was read 
to Sedgwick's command, informing them that the 5th, nth, 12th 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 



23 



and two divisions of the 2d corps had successfully crossed the 
rivers and taken up a strong position at Chancellorsville, which 
was on the right and rear of the enemy's intrenched camp 
without the loss of a man, which would make the enemy come 
out and fight the Union army on their own chosen ground, or 
ignominously fly. 

April 30th, late in the afternoon, General Sickle's 3rd corps 
was ordered to Chancellorsville. On that night they camped on 
the north bank of the Rappahannock river, near the 
United. States ford. The mud was deep and that night 
froze so it bore a horse. Think of it, the soldiers w^th 
their underclothes wet with perspiration, with a thin blanket in 
open fields, lying all night on this frozen ground! The writer 
will give his experience of that night, which doubtless is the 
same as many others on such occasions. The soldiers slept in 
'groups of three and four, to make the blankets cover as many 
as possible. So the outside ones are more or less exposed. On 
this occasion I was one of the outside of our group. I awoke 
some time in the night, and found my whole right side was para- 
lyzed. I had no control of my right arm or limb. I reached 
over and seized my right wrist with the left hand, drew it over 
my body as far as I could, and working my left limb under my 
right one as far as I could and by using all the force I possessed 
was able to roll my frozen side to the comrade on my left. I 
was a long time thawing out, but by turning often I got through 
the night, but was not much rested. 

May ist the 3rd corps arrived at Chancellorsville at about 
II o'clock, and was posted in the rear and west of Chancellor 
House. Fredericksburg is distant from Richmond about 50 or 
60 miles east of south, Washington 40 miles east of north. Chan- 
cellorsville is about 10 or 11 miles west of Fredericksburg. The 
Rappahannock here runs in an easterly direction. The Confed- 



24 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESVILLE. 

erate fortifications extended along the crest of the hill three or 
four lines deep, two miles above and four miles below Freder- 
icksburg, with irregular redouts at intervals near all the fords 
for twenty-five or thirty miles above and many miles below 
the city. In a front attack Fredericksburg could not be 
carried by six times their number if a" determined re- 
sistance was made. Chancellorsville was a city of one 
house, a country tavern. It is situated at the junction of 
three roads that pass through and lead to Fredericksburg east. 
Gordonsville and Culpepper west. One of these roads lead to 
and down the river to Fredericksburg, and one, known as the 
turnpike, passing along the higher grounds, and the other, 
known as the plank road, passing along on lower ground and still 
farther south. There were two other roads running parallel to 
the plank and passing near the furnace, with cross or intersect- 
ing roads at intervals, leading into the plank, both east and west 
at Chancellorsville. Therefore our army at Chancellorsville took 
the Fredericksburg intrenched camp in reverse. The enemy 
were not only flanked but we were in their rear. This point of 
advantage was gained before the enemy was aware of or had 
any idea where the Union army were going to strike, and before 
it had time to interpose any force to impede their progress. 

On the evening of April 30th Stewart's cavalry had been 
skirmishing with the Union cavalry in the direction of Gordons- 
ville, and learned that there was a heavy column of infantry ap- 
proaching Chancellorsville, and reported to General Lee the 
Union army was coming down the river on the south side. 
They were at Chancellorsville before this report reached Lee, 
but this report satisfied him that their crossing below the city 
was only a feint and the real attack would be on his left. 
That night he ordered General Jackson, who was on his 



THE I5ATTLE OF CHANGELLORSVILLE. 25 

extreme right, fifteen or twenty miles from Chancellors- 
ville, and the rest of his army, except about 9,000 men 
under General Early, to leave their intrenchments and 
march out and check the army of the Potomac. On the night of 
April 30th Gen. Hooker's line was advanced about one mile on 
the road to Fredericksburg, on the plank and turnpike, and 
on the river road still fartlier and near Bank's Ford. All that 
night the enemy was forming and intrenching their new line. 
General Jackson came up at 8 a, m.. May ist, and advanced 
V-.heir lines still farther toward Chancellorsville, and at some 
points into the thick timber and awaited developments. 



CHAPTER IV. 

Battle of Chancellorsville, May ist — The Formation of the 
Union Lines Around Chancellorsville at Night, May ist — 
Jackson's Movement and Attack of the nth Corps — Gen. 
Howard's Incredulity and Defeat, May 2d. 

About II a. m., May ist. General Hooker ordered an attack 
on General Lee's lines, in the following order: General Slo- 
cum's I2th corps, followed up by General Howard's nth corps, 
took the plank road. Sikes' division of the 5th corps, General 
Hancock's division of the 2d corps on the turnpike in the center, 
the remainder of the 5th corps took the river road. Frenche's 
division of the 2d corps turned to the right, crossed the plank 
and advanced on a road about two miles south of the plank to 
Todd's tavern. Each column was preceded by a detachment of 
Pleasanton's cavalry. Sickels' 3rd corps, in reserve west of 
the Chancellor House, except General Graham's brigade, which 
was advanced to Dowdle's Tavern, on the plank, facing west. 
This is sometimes called the Melzy Chancellor House. 

General Hooker expected to advance rapidly in this order, 
drive the enemy before him and establish his line, with his 
right resting on Tabernacle church, about four miles east of 
Chancellorsville, and his left covering Bank's Ford. But it was 
soon found that the whole country, from the river south, a long 
distance below the plank road, was an impenetrable thicket 
through which troops could not be moved in concert. Every at- 
tempt to deploy from the road to connect the moving columns 



28 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 

resulted in a broken mass. The more they attempted to estab- 
lish communications with the advancing columns the more 
broken and disorganized they became. Aides trying to communi- 
cate with the advancing columns got lost, not knowing where 
they were going. The advance of such a line with any accuracy 
is impossible. The more it advances, the more disorganized it 
becomes. In this condition it met the enemy at rest, with a 
fixed, well organized line. The contest was unequal. 

(General Doubleday says it was like moving in a dense fog.) 
Here the struggle was terrible. When night came on no one 
knew whether friends or enemies were on their right or left 
fiank, so Hooker ordered the Union army to fall back to a line 
he had ordered laid out by Gen. Warren, of Hooker's staff, and 
Capt. Pain, of the engineer corps, which they were able to 
hold on the left flank with but little trouble as long as the army 
remained on the south side of the river. 

To show the density of the forest and the impossibility to 
advance a line of battle in such a forest in face of the enemy, 
when the order was given to fall back one of the Union brigades 
got lost and floundered around and did not reach its place in 
line assigned it until morning, May 2d. 

The decision of Gen. Hooker to fall back and take up the 
position on which the Union army rested on the morning of 
May 2d was a wise and a humane thing to do. The Confederates 
had taken up a strong position, with a force equal, if not greater, 
at this point than that of the Union army, and many lives would 
have been sacrificed, and the result was at best doubtful. It 
was always Gen. Hooker's policy to never attack the enemy's 
intrenched lines in front, and in this change of position the 
enemy would have to attack him in his intrenched lines, or re- 
tire within forty-eight hours. And he chose to fall back, in- 
trench around Chancellorsville and await results. 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 29 

The Union line as now formed was in the shape of a U, bot- 
tomside up, the left 5th corps resting on the river near Scott's 
Dam, the 2d and uth corps east and south of the Chancellor 
House, part of the 12th and 3d corps south and southwest of the 
house. The nth corps crossed the plank about two miles west of 
the Chancellor House, at the junction of the plank with the pike. 
then turned west along the pike about one-half or three-fourths 
of a mile, then made a slight turn to the right. But its right 
did not rest upon 'tiny object, and as Shurtz told Howard, his 
right was in the air. This was formed with the view of a front 
attack on the plank or pike. Then in the rear of Hunting Creek 
and right of the nth corps was Barrie's division of the 3rd 
corps, which was soon relieved by the ist corps. And this 
division was placed in reserve near the Chancellor House. About 
one mile west of where General Howard's line crossed the plank 
road forks, one branch runs northwest to Culpepper, the other 
southwest to Orange Court House, about one mile west of the 
forks of the plank road, the two roads passing the furnace and 
running parallel to each other, crosses the plank and pike. The 
prospects of Gen. Lee as darkness closed in on the engagement 
of Alay ist was not very encouraging. He had carefully ex- 
amined the position of the Union army and satisfied himself 
that so far as the left and center was concerned it was unassail- 
able with any prospect of success. But before giving up the 
contest he ordered Gen. Stewart, commanding the Confeder3*c 
cavalry to reconnoitre to the right. Stewart took the road*. 
south of the finmace. which pass through a dense forest m 
which a moving column could not be seen from the Union lines, 
except at one or two short intervals where the road passed over 
high ground. The timber stands thinner here, covered wagon? 
and infantry columns could be seen plainly if they were moving. 



30 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

It was on these roads that Stewart passed to view^ the Eleventh 
corps lines to the right and reported to Gen. Lee and Gen. 
Jackson, about daylight on the morning of May 2d the result of 
his reconnoissance. His report was that the right of Gen. How- 
ard's line did not rest on any object, was unsupported and easily 
turned. On this report General Jackson asked permission to 
take his corps, 26.000 strong, and make a detour on the same 
roads Gen. Stewart had passed, believing he could do so unob- 
served by the enemy, and gain the right of Gen. Howard's line, 
and with the help of the cavalry, unexpectedly fall upon and 
crush Howard's force before reinforcements could reach him. 
Is it possible that Stewart met Howard that night and arranged 
with him to maintain this position until he returned with Jackson 
and attacked him next day? Watch and see how it looks. 

It is not my purpose to say that such a conference ever took 
place, but I do say if it had, and Howard had pledged himself 
to Gen. Stewart that the eleventh corps lines should not be 
changed until Stewart should return with Jackson and his army 
of twenty-six thousand and place them on the right flank and 
rear of the nth corps and that no pickets or grand guard should 
be sent out to give notice of their approach, nor should any de- 
fense be thrown up for the protection of the eleventh corps on 
that flank, and a written contract had been entered into by the 
contracting parties for a consideration, I do say that neither 
Generals Stewart, Jackson or Lee could ever complain that 
there had been any breach of contract on Howard's part. This 
position occupied by the eleventh corps became the key to the 
battle field as soon as Jackson's movement began. If Jackson 
failed in his attack the Confederate army v.as doomed to de- 
struction. If he succeeded he would capture many prisoners and 
possess himself of a commanding position which would ma- 



THE BATTLE OF CIIANCELLORSYILLE. 31 

terially increase the Confederates' chance of success. It was 
the Confederates' belief if this move succeeded they could de- 
stroy the Union army before they could recross the river or be 
reinforced from their left. 

Gen. Hooker has been censured because he did not pass 
through the tliicket on the night of April 30th instead of stop- 
ping over night at. Chancellorsville as he did. Doubtless this 
course would have been the better one, from the fact that he 
intended to finally take up his position three or four miles nearer 
Fredericksburg, his right resting on Tabernacle church. He 
could have reached that point tliat night before Gen. Jackson 
could have reinforced Anderson's division, which was all that 
was in his front. He would thus have easily pushed Anderson 
out of the way. His position would have then been far better, 
for two reason: His army would have been on open country, 
which would have enabled him to use all his artillery to great 
advantage, and left him four or five miles nearer his base of 
supplies. And the second reason is. he would have been nearer 
the 6th. 3rd and ist corps, which he had left to make the dem- 
onstration on the enemy's right, while he with the other wing 
of the army made this wonderfully successful flank movement 
on Gen. Lee's left. But this, although it may have been a mis- 
take and a disappointment, it was not necessarily fatal. The 
position at Chancellorsville was on high ground, naturally strong 
for defensive operations. The Union army's communication 
with their base of supplies was perfect. Their formation was 
strong for defensive operations, and. if the cavalry accomplished 
their work of destroying all communications of the enemy with 
their base of supplies, as directed by Gen. Hooker, the enemy 
would have soon been compelled to retreat. This alone would 
have l)ecn a victf>ry. All the Union army had to do was to 



32 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORS VILLE. 

hang on to this position and win, while, on the other side, the 
successful flank movement of Gen. Jackson, or retreat, was all 
that was left for the Confederates. If Gen. Lee's exeprience with 
our former army commanders had not led him to place such im- 
plicit confidence in Jackson and led him to hold our army com- 
manders in such utter contempt, he would never have consented 
to have thus divided his army in the face of this powerful enemy. 
This move was what General Hooker desired. Nothing could 
have pleased him better, and he proceeded to distribute his 
corps to ma'ke sure of the enemy's destruction and to notify and 
warn Howard of Jackson's movement on his right flank. (This 
movement of Gen. Jackson was a bold, hazardous and reckless 
move. Gen. Doubleday says: "It was a startling proposition 
and contrary to all the principles of strategy." For when Jack- 
son was gone Lee would be left with but few men to withstand 
the shock of Gen. Hooker's entire army, and might be crushed 
while Jackson would be powerless to render him any assistance.) 
Jackson's position was equally as critical. If Gen. Howard had 
prepared for Gen. Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified 
and turned the right of his line to rest on Big Hunting Creek, 
then his right could not have been turned by Jackson, and with 
felled timber in front, tops out, and his artillery placed at the 
angles of his breastworks, he could have held Gen. Jackson 
for an indefinite period. But the failure of Gen. Howard to do 
his duty and obey orders turned the scale and lost the battle, and 
gave the victory to the Confederates, not only of May 2d, but 
turned the tide by giving them an advantageous position and 
making our position almost unattainable on that flank. That was 
one of the most potent reasons that made the Union army 
yield the field to the enemy and recross the river and go back to 
their old camping grounds. Early in the morning of May 26. 



TPIE BATTLE OF CITANCELLORSYILLE. 



33 



Gen. Graham's brigade of the 3rd corps, to which I belonged, 
was ordered to report to Gen. Howard for duty with a battery of 
artillery. The order was promptly obeyed and when we arrived 
at nth corps headquarters Gen. Howard told Gen. Graham he 
had no use for him, that his lines were so strong he could hold 
the whole Confederate army, and desired them to attack him. I 
was standing within twenty feet of Howard and heard every 
word. He ordered us to report to Gen. Hooker and be placed 
where we could be of some use, as we could be of none th re. 
When we returned Gen. Sickles got permission to advance two 
divisions of the 3d corps, which included Graham's brigade, to 
the furnace, which was on the right center of our line, near 
the two roads on which Gen. Jackson was seen to pass. This 
movement of Jackson was reported by Gen. Birney in the morn- 
ing at headquarters. We moved out and took possession of the 
roads, capturing one entire regiment and other prisoners, cut- 
ting all communicatons between Gen. Jackson and Gen. Lee. 
Thus moving on Jackson's right flank and rear, expecting Gen. 
Howard to hold him in front. The 3rd corps would then attack 
his right, the ist corps being in echelon to the right of the nth 
corps, and rear of Big Hunting Creek, and extending to the 
river, would be able to strike Gen. Jackson in rear and on his 
left flank. He would thus be held and it would be difficult for 
him to escape us. Long before the 3rd corps took this advanced 
position the following order was issued: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Chancellors- 
ville. Va.. :May 2nd. 1863. 9:30 a. m. Major-Generals 
Slocum and Howard: I am directed by the major-general com- 
manding to say the disposition you have made with your corps 
has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he 
should throw himself upon your flanks, he wishes you to ex- 



34 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 

amine the grounds and determine upon the position you will 
take in that event. In order that you may be prepared for him 
in whatever direction he advances, he suggests that you have 
heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right 
of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No arti- 
ficial defense worth mentioning has been thrown up, and there 
appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not in the gen- 
eral's opinion, as favorably posted as might be. We have good 
reasons to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please 
advance your pickets as far as may be safe, in order to obtain 
timely information of their approach. 

(Signed) MMES H. VAN ALLEN, 

Brig.-Gen. and Aide de Camp. 

General Howard, in the Century Bound Volume, from May 
to October 1886, denies that this order ever reached him or his 
adjutant general. Col. T. A. Meysenburg, Century, page 766. 
If this was true, as Gen. Howard says, that this order never came 
to his headquarters, to his or to his adjutant general's knowledge, 
there was some little excuse for his being surprised when Gen. 
Jackson attacked his corps at 6 o'clock p. m., provided he had 
not got any other notice of Jackson's movements. Men who 
served in the War of Rebellion know that if the order was ever 
issued and sent from headquarters it was delivered to Gen. How- 
ard or some one at his headquarters who receipted for it, the or- 
derly or aide who carried it would never dare to return to head- 
quarters without some one having receipted for that important 
order. So that point was settled at headquarters, they knew that 
order had been delivered at its proper destination. Now the only 
question is did Howard see this order. Major General Schurz, 
who commanded a division of the nth corps, and was second in 



THE BATTLE OF CFIANCELLORSYILLE. 35 

rank to Howard, says he was at Howard's headquarters when 
Gen. How^ard came in and laid down to rest, and asked him 
(Schurz)to open and read letters and dispatches that had accum- 
ulated, and among the dispatches was the order above referred 
to. Gen. Howard got up and they sat down and discussed the or- 
der, but Howard did not act upon it. No change of front was or- 
dered or defense thrown up, but he (Schurz), without orders, 
faced some of his regiment to the right. He further says that 
while Howard and I were discussing this order another order of 
similar purport came from Gen. Hooker. I am not sure whether 
Gen. Steinware was present or not. This happened about 12 
o'clock m.. May 2nd, as near as I can remember. (Century bound 
volume, May to October, 1886, page 780.) In further contradic- 
tion of Howard's statements relative to this order from Hooker, 
I will ofYer the affidavit of H. M. Kellogg which is a valuable 
acquisition for the reason that it show^s a disposition not only 
to tell a williul falsehood on the part of Howard and a disposition 
to be treacherous to his superior, but to the army and his coun- 
try; the hiding away of this important order for so long a time 
until Gen. Hooker was relieved from his command, to our mind 
shows a premeditated disposition to be false. It looks as though 
the disappearance of this order from the files of the war depart- 
ment was by Howard's hands or some one in his interest and 
with his knowledge. That he has made a mistake is disproved 
by his article in the Century of 1886, on page 766 — 23 years after 
the occurrence he denies all knowledge of this important order. 
Does it require more evidence to prove that Howard's very 
singular conduct in the management of the 11th corps was pre- 
meditated. It has that appearance. 
Kelloug savs on oath: 



36 THE BATTLE OF CITANCELLORSVILLE. 

AFFIDAVIT. 

State of New York, County of Cortland — ss. 

Before me, F. J. Peck, a Notary Public in and for the County 
of ^Cortland and State of New York, came Henry ]\I. Kellogg, 
of No. 25 Main street, Cortland, New York, who. being by me 
duly sworn according to law, deposes and says, that he is 56 
years of age, a resident, and business man, of Cortland, New 
York, where he has resided, and been engaged in business con- 
tinuously, for the past 26 years. That on the 20th day of April, 
1861, eight days after the attack upon Fort Sumter, S. C, he 
enlisted and was mustered into the 5th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, 
Company "G," at Cincinnati, Ohio. That at the expiration of 
his term of service, he was honorably discharged and mustered 
out. That on the 5th day of August, 1862, he re-enlisted, in 
Company "G," 55th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, at Upper San- 
dusky, Wyandot County, Ohio, and served continuously until 
May 31st, 1865, when he was honorably discharged and mustered 
out, at the close of the war. That after the Fredericksburg 
campaign, and while his regiment (the 55th Ohio, Col. John 
C. Lee) lay, camped in the woods, at Brooks Station, Va., at 
the rerj^uest and on the recommendation of his Colonel, he ac- 
cepted a detail for duty at headquarters of the nth army corps 
and reported to Col. T. A. Meysenburg, assistant adjutant gen- 
eral, at said headquarters at Stafford Court House, Va., on Feb- 
ruary 28th, 1863: and remained on duty, in the adjutant general's 
department, of said nth army corps, until the 31st. day o* 
August, 1863, when by order of General Howard he was trans- 
ferred to another department at his headquarters. That from 
the 28th day of February, 1863, to August 31st, 1863, while con- 
nected with the adjutant general's office, as stated above, he had 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 37 

charge of the records and files of letters, telegrams, and orders 
received at said ofticc. During that time, the two great cam- 
paigns and terrible battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg 
occurred. The tirst (the Chancellorsville) campaign began in 
April and ended, by the nth army corps returning to its former 
camping grounds, near Brooks Station, Va., the first week in 
May, 1863. While in this camp during May, 1863. after the battle 
of Chancellorsville. he tiled, endorsed and copied into the rec- 
ord books of said adjutant general's department of the said 
nth corps, all the papers and documents which came into his 
possession in relation to said campaign. That he was ordered 
by Col. Meysenburg, assistant adjutant general, to also make a 
complete duplicate set of official copies of all said records ready 
for use in Washington, if they should be called for. That he 
prepared as directed the duplicate "official copies." that there 
was not among these papers the famous and all important order 
of May 2d, 9:30 a. m., from headquarters of the Army of the 
Potomac at the Chancellorsville House, from General Joseph 
Hooker to General O. O. Howard, commanding said corps.^ 
directing him to be prepared for the enemy upon his right Hank. 
Neither was the existence of such an order known to the affiant 
at that time. That on the 13th day of June following, the nth 
army corps began its march on what proved to be the Gettys- 
burg campaign. The corps marched north to the Orange & 
Alexandria railroad through Manassas, Centerville, Goose 
Creek, to the Potomac, at- Edwards Ferry, crossing a pontoon 
bridge into Maryland, thence via Jefferson and Middleton to 
Frederick, Md., which place was reached at sundown, June 2Sih, 
1863. That during the night of 28th, General Hooker was re- 
lieved of the command of the army. The nth corps moved at 
daylight (29th) and marched 30 miles that day to Emmettsburg. 



38 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSA'ILLE. 

]\Id., and during the day learned that General Meade, and not 
Hooker, was then in command. The corps remained in camp 
on the 30th of June (the day before Gettysburg battle began) 
at Emmettsburg. Md.. 10 miles distant from Gettysburg. Pa.. 
across the state line. During the day (June 30th) headquarter 
tents were put up and he began work upon the accumulated 
papers in his possession relating to the campaign of Gettysburg, 
the accumulation of over two weeks. While seated at his desk 
that 30th day of June, within 48 hours following the departure 
of General Joseph Hooker from the said army as its commander. 
Col. T. A. Meysenburg. assistant adjutant general, entered the 
tent and handed him a field order, saying, "There is a very im- 
portant order relating to the Chancellorsvillc campaign; you 
will file it in its proper place, among the papers of that cam- 
paign, and record it in your book, giving it its proper date, 
]\Iay 2d." He passed out of the tent, leaving it in affiant's pos- 
session for record. That af^ant read it with amazement and 
astonishment and immediately made a copy of the order from 
the original field order, which for two months had been con- 
cealed and kept from the files until General Hooker had been 
relieved from his command. That said afhant filed said paper 
in its proper place. That he is now credibly informed that it 
has disappeared from the files in the War Department; that he 
copied same in record book on that day arid that the said order 
dated May 2d. "63, is official No. 78, and is recorded after other 
orders dated June 12th. 1863, relating to another (the Gettys- 
burg) campaign, in said record and is now in the vaults of the 
War Department at Washington. D. C. in the handwriting of 
said^ affiant. That the following is an exact copy of said order: 
Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Saturday, May 2d, 9:30 a. m., 1863. 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 39 

To General Howard: 

General— I am directed by the Major General commanding 
to say the disposition you have made of your corps has been 
with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw 
himself upon your flank he wishes you to examine the -round 
and determine upon the position you will take in that event ni 
order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction 
he advances. 

He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to 

meet this contingency. 

Your ob'dt servant. 

(Signed) J. H. VAN ALLEN. 

Brig. Genl. and A. D. C. 

We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving 
to our .right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of 
observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely in- 
formation of their approach. 

H. M. KELLOGG. 

Subscribed and sworn before me this 30th day of November. 

1897. 

(Notarial Seal.) F. J. PECK, 

^Notary Public. 

The two orders, copies of which I have produced, 
proves that Howard had knowledge of their existence, 
read and talked the matter over with Gen. Schurz, thus estab- 
lishing two facts which were as patent to the mind of Gen. How- 
ard at that time, as they are to us now that Jackson was sure to 
attack his corps on their right very soon. This places him in the 
position of willfully disobeying orders of his superior in the face 
of the enemy. The nth corps did not have any advance pickets 



40 THE BATTLE OF CHANCIELLORSVILLE. 

in their right flank, yet Howard was frequently told the enemy 
was moving to attack that flank. His disobeying Gen. Hooker's 
orders at that time was one of the highest crimes known in mil- 
itary law. The penalty is death. 

Gen. Howard had no concern about Gen. Jackson and the 
position of his army. Gen. Pleasanton sent rcconnoitering squads 
who reported the position of the enemy to Gen. Howard; Sickles 
and others did the same thing. To all he replied they were mis- 
taken, but made no move to counteract the movements of the 
enemy, or ascertain the facts of which he claimed to be in doubt. 
Scouts repeatedly reported to Gen. Howard. He ignored them 
all and scoffed at the idea of such a thing, and charged them 
with telling a story, the offspring of their imagination or fears. 

The colonel of the 157th N. Y. Volunteers of the nth corps 
and another oflicer of the regiment went out beyond their line 
and returned at 2 o'clock p. m. without orders from Howard and 
reported to him. They distinctly heard the enemy massing their 
troops on the right and rear of the nth corps line. Howard's 
answer was: "You are new troops more scared than necessary." 
Other officers of the corps reported to Gen. Howard the ap- 
proach of the enemy. To all he turned a deaf ear. At the same 
time Gen. Jackson rode forward close to the Union lines, 
climbed a large hill about 2 p. m., from which he could have a 
clear view that enabled him to inspect the nth corps lines, and 
he took bearings that enabled him to form his corps on their 
right flank and rear where there were no defenses or obstruction 
save the natural forest and when this large force did strike the 
exposed flank of the nth corps they were as helpless as little 
children. Some of the regimental officers on the right of the nth 
corps, requested Gen. Howard the privilege to change front and 
asked for tools to intrench, to meet the enemy they knew was 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 41 

soon coming down on them like an avalanche, but their requests 
were refused. He told them he would look after the nth corps 
formation. Gen. Howard was not surprised, Gen. Hooker had 
warned him over eight hours before the enemy attacked. j\Iany 
oilicers and scouts who had been out and viewed the enemy 
forming for the attack, reported all their movements to him. 

To show that the officers, and enlisted men of the nth corps 
knew that Jackson was preparing to attack their right flank and 
rear and his attack was no surprise, we will give an account of 
Jackson's attack by Corporal Charles Stacy, of Co. D, 55th Ohio 
regiment. Corporal Stacy was awarded a beautiful bronze medal 
for gallantry at the battle of Gettysburg, July 2d, 1863. This is 
what he has to say about the battle of Chancellorsville: 

On the second day of May we took a position in line of bat- 
tle along a road, being on the extreme right, with the exception 
of a brigade of Germans. Col. John C. Lee, of the 55th Ohio, ob- 
tained a map of a resident, a Union man, showing how the rebels 
were massing troops on our right and sent it to Gen. Howard. 
No notice was taken of it by Howard. 

Col. Lee sent an orderly to Gen. Howard asking him if he 
could change front, also saying "If you will furnish my regiment 
with axes, I will soon make an impassible barrier to the enemy." 
He received in reply an order to attend to his regiment and he, 
Howard, would attend to the rest. At this time, 4 o'clock p. m., 
May 2, 1863, says Stacy, the silence was ominous and the men 
were. getting uneasy, for not one of us but knew we would soon 
be attacked and we knew we were in a position in which we 
could do nothing. Col. Lee at this time told our band to go to 
the rear, the course of which was along our line to the left and 
past Gen. Howard's headquarters. Howard halted the band and 
wanted to know where thev were going. Thev told him Col. Lee 



42 THE BATTLE OF CIIANCELLORSAILLE. 

had ordered them to the rear, as there would be fighting inside 
of twenty minutes. Turning to one of his staff Howard said, 
I guess the colonel is getting scared and he ordered the band to 
play; they played one tune and then began to play a piece called 
Dixie ]\Iedley, the last part of which was, get out of the wilder- 
ness, and while the band was playing this piece the battle began. 
Just previous to this time two deers ran along in front of our 
line. This satisfied all that they had been driven up by the ad- 
vance of the enemy. Our position can be no better described 
than by using a bow and arrow : the rebels were the bow, and the 
55th Ohio was the arrow. Suddenly the rebels broke out from 
the thick woods on our right, front and rear, and the firing be- 
gan. The brigade to our right could make no resistance, and 
were taken prisoners. This left the 55th Ohio on the extreme 
right of the line. We were attacked from three sides. Oh! how 
can I describe this terrible scene. Officers and men were doing 
their best. It appears that I can now see our grand lieutenant, 
F. H. Bolt, as he stood in the road, swinging his sword over his 
head, saying, "give it to them, boys, give it to them." We took 
the best position we could on such short notice, and with delib- 
erate aim sent our shot crashing through the enemy's ranks in 
our front, but it was found we were being surrounded and fell 
back. I have made the claim that, for our numbers who were 
engaged here, we lost the most men, for the length of time en- 
gaged, of any command during the war.* This shows that the 
rank and file of the nth corps would fight, and were as good and 
brave soldiers as any army ever possessed. They actually 



*We have been informed that the way Col. Lee obtained the 
map from a citizen referred to by Corporal Stacy, was, the oM 
resident marked it out in the sand, giving position and location 
of the enemy, and Col. Lee drew the map on paper and sent it 
to Gen. Howard. 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 43 

checked the enemy in their front, but seeing heavy columns \ 
passing to their right and left flanks, knowing they would soon [ 
be surrounded and all captured, fell back, the same as any other j 
soldiers would under like circumstances. 

It will be seen by the statements of Corporal Stacy regard- 
ing the attack of Jackson on the nth corps' right, that the rank 
and file of that corps were fully aware that the enemy was 
crawling up on their right flank and rear, and that they were 
liable to burst forth from the dense forest any moment. It must 
have been a trying ordeal that these intelligent men passed 
through for the six or eight hours that these soldiers were held 
by the arbitrary orders of Gen. Howard. The wonder of citizens, 
who have never been soldiers, will ahva3S be why such bright 
men as Generals Carl Schurz, Steinwher, Ames, ■McLane, and 
other military men of that corps, could have been held in such a 
helpless position until the enemy attacked; but those who have 
b:'en soldiers know the first thing they learned was to obey or- 
ders and ask no questions. Does anybody believe Howard was 
surprised? 

While Corporal Stacy and all the of^cers and men of his 
regiment knew Jackson was soon going to attack, that belief was 
not shared by many others. It is reported that on the right of 
Devens' division the men had stacked arms, and some were 
cooking supper, others playing cards, others straggling around 
their camp in various pursuits, far away from their arms, and 
Confederate prisoners whom the 3d corps captured that night 
in their midnight charge, said that when they struck and captured 
the right of the nth corps line, that they captured whole rows 
of guns whose stacks had not beerf broken. This would be nat- 
ural, for Gen. Dcvcns did not seem to be much disturbed, and 
was not. inclined to believe the report that Jackson was moving 



44 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 

on his right, and it was natural the men would partake more or 
less of the confidence of their corps and division commanders. 
The strangest thing to account for is Howard's refusing rein- 
forcements sent to him by Gen. Hooker. It is further evidence 
of his incompetency, or premeditated treachery to the army of the 
Potomac, and his denying that Gen. Hooker ever notified him 
of the enemy's moving to his right. In view of the fact that 
Gen. Schurz read to, and discussed the order with him, and, then, 
who but he was interested in hiding that order for two months, 
fearing court martial (sec Kelk;gg's affidavit), was there more 
and better evidence of the treachery of Benedict Arnold, or Hull, 
than this of Gen. Howard's? It is true the country surrounding 
Chancellorsville is a dense forest, with here and there small 
cleared farms, so that troops moving or at rest could not be ob- 
served any distance if proper precaution was exercised by their 
commanders. For this reason it was more necessary for corps 
commanders to have their pickets stationed as far out in front of 
their main line as was safe, supported by grand guards, so as to 
give timely warning to the main lines to enable them to prepare 
to meet the enemy, no matter in what direction they would ap- 
proach. It was the duty of Gen. Howard to take this precaution 
without waiting for orders from Gen. Hooker or anybody else. 
And in addition to sending out pickets, he should have sent 
scouts in every direction to ascertain the facts relative to reports 
and the position of the enemy. This should have been done 
immediately after learning from any source that the enemy was 
moving in his direction. But if we believe that the evidence was 
furnished Gen. Howard of the approach of the enemy, which 
we have cited in the preceding pages, then we must look for 
some cause other than a surprise, to account for General How- 
ard's conduct on May 2nd. It seems that there was some sort 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 45 

of investigation of this affair later by the congressional commit- 
tee on the conduct of the war, but it was a farce and necessarily 
unreliable. It could not very well be otherwise. Gen. Hooker 
claimed that he had taken all the precaution necessary in the 
formation of his lines and had given Gen. Howard timely notice 
of Jackson's approach and Howard had been negligent, and 
instead of making preparation to meet the enemy, refused to 
believe the enemy was moving to his right and rear, although the 
source of his information as to the enemy's movements ought 
to have been considered the most reliable a general could obtain 
even outside of the two orders issued at headquarters, apprising 
him of all the facts as appears in full in the foregoing pages. I 
desire to say a word here in explanation of the two orders of 
the same date, May 2nd, 9:30 a. m., in almost the exact words: 
My idea is, it happened this way: When the Union lines around 
Chancellorsville was formed on the night of May ist, the for- 
mation from left to right by corps, was beginning at the Rap- 
pahannock river, as follows: The 5th corps on the extreme left; 
next came the 2d corps; next came the 12th corps, facing south- 
east and south of the Chancellor House; then came the nth 
corps, which was west and southwest of the Chancellor House; 
on their right was a division of the 3d corps and cavalry, which 
held the right to the Rapidan river when Gen Hooker inspected 
his lines. Early in the morning of I\Iay 2nd, he discovered 
that the space between the nth and 12th corps was too broad 
and that space was ordered filled up with Gen. Birney's division 
of the 3d corps and immediately Birney, on taking this position, 
discovered Jackson's movement to our right and reported it to 
headquarters and this report caused the order of 9:30 a. m.. May 
2nd, to be issued and in the haste of Gen, Van Allen to give 
:ioticc, and knowing the weak point and open space that had 



46 THE BA.TTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

existed between the nth and 12th corps, addressed his first note 
of warning and order to :Maj. Gen. Slocum and Maj. Gen. 
Howard. Immediately alter this another order of a similar pur- 
port was sent from headquarters, dated 9:30 a. m., and addressed 
to !Maj. Gen. Howard. The first of these orders is the one 
Howard calls the confused order, which he could not under- 
stand, but it must have been discovered by Gen. Van Allen im- 
mediately that the nth and 12th corps did not, at that time, join 
Cirney. having filled up the gap. and that the enemy had passed 
the aforementioned weak point and that it was the right of the 
nth corps that was in danger of an attack by the enemy and 
immediately issued the second order, same date, 9:30 a. m., May 
2d, and directed it to Maj. Gen. Howard individually, which 
speaks for itself. It is the second order that Gen. Schurz speaks 
of as of the same import, coming while he and Howard were 
discussing the first one and was smuggled away, but finally 
recorded and filed nearly two months after the battle, and would 
not now be known to exist had not ]\Ir. Kellogg carefully copied 
the original (see affidavit in foregoing page), but Mr. Kellogg 
tells me that at his request a gentleman searched the records 
of the war department and found that the original order he 
filed away has disappeared from the files, but in the record 
book of the nth corps they found the order recorded. But 
the order had disappeared from the files in the vaults of the war 
department. 

It would appear as though this very important order has been 
stolen from the vaults of the war department. Who are the 
thieves that would be interested in the removal of this order? 
But inasmuch as a true copy has been preserved, and the afifidavit 
of H. M. Kellogg, as to its authenticity published, it would seem 
as though the abstractor of the original order might as well 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 47 

return it to the vaults. The fact that it once existed has been 
proven beyond a doubt, and the evidence fully shows that in the 
order book of the nth corps they found a record of the order 
and its official number in the book is 78. Now to the question 
again, who stole that order and why did they do it, we leave this 
for others to decide, and here we leave the matter. 

Now let us return to the second day's battle, May 2d, and 
the nth corps, and I want to say here and now, being an active 
participant adjacent to that corps from start to finish, when 
Jackson drove them out of the position they occupied in the 
evening of ]\Iay 2d, that what I knew of the movements of the 
enemy at that time, and have since learned, I want to go on 
record and be understood that the attempt of General Howard 
to charge the defeat of that corps to the cowardice of the rank 
and file of his command, is the most unjust, wicked attempt to 
shirk responsibility ever attempted by a human being. 

There was not a corps in the army if they had been placed 
in the same position, but what would have retreated, and prob- 
ably in no better order than the nth corps did. The fact is, 
all the officers and most of the enlisted men of the nth corps 
knew it was reported that the enemy was massing in great force 
on their right and rear. Some of their own command had been 
so near as to satisfy them that the reports were true. They 
heard the command of the enemy as they went into position. 
The forest was so thick that it would not be safe for a man or 
squad of men to crawl up to see their movements or count their 
numbers, for they were liable to have pickets or scouts in ad- 
vance that would capture the squad or individual that would 
attempt to make close scrutiny. No one could see far in this 
thick forest, but they could hear the commands for a long ways, 
and know its meaning, and I no\er heard of an officer refusing 



48 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

the report of a scout who reported what he heard, if darkness 
or other causes prevented a perfect ocular demonstration. Be- 
fore Howard raised the objection at Chancellorsville, his course 
here was to bluff everybody that talked that the enemy was 
massing on their right and rear. Then when the enemy did 
rush in in such heavy columns from the forest on the flank and 
rear, every man realized that Howard's judgment w^as not to be 
relied upon, or else he had willfully betrayed them and his ap- 
pearance among the men so soon after he had made this great 
blunder did not restore their confidence, but w'ould naturally 
increase the panic that had possession of them. They had lost 
confidence in their commander. The facts that appear as this 
narrative procee'ds are quite enough to cause this corps to lose 
confidence in Howard. Any corps treated as the nth corps 
was by Howard would have lost confidence in him and would 
not have halted under the pressure of Jackson's heavy column 
and changed front under their fire and stopped the enemy, and 
I now repeat that no troops, not even Napoleon's old guards, 
had they been placed under Howard and handled and deceived 
as he did the nth corps, would have done any better. 

About 6:30 p. m., two divisions of the 3rd corps being far in 
advance of the right center of our lines, heard a little sharp firr 
ing on our right, and in the direction of the nth corps. At 
once all the men along the line began to discuss the probable 
battle. "The skirmishing has begun," they said. All were 
looking upon this as the great turning point of the war, in our 
favor. All the men in ranks understood we were advanced out 
so far front to cut all communications between Generals Lee 
and Jackson, and knew our position had accomplished that ob- 
ject, and also knew our army was in a position to crush either 
wing in detail and were anxiously waiting for General Jackson 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 49 

to bring on an engagement which would enable us to locate and 
then attack their right and rear, drive them in a huddle on the 
ist and nth corps, and crush them. This !«= no idle boast or 
delusion. If General Howard had made the stand it was rea- 
sonable to expect he would, General Jackson's army would have 
been destroyed, but judge our surprise when we heard no sound 
of battle save the light skirmishing before referred to, and while 
we were resting on our arms waiting for the order to advance, 
to win a great victory that would soon end the war, firing 
again broke out afresh, and more rapidly, and soon after we saw- 
General Sickles coming down the road in the direction of arm^- 
headquarters, his hat in his hand and horse on the dead run, 
and ordered us to fall in immediately, telling us the nth corps 
had broke and run, and General Jackson had captured many 
prisoners and was in possession of the road we came out on, and 
had established communication with General Lee, and w-e were 
shut oil from the rest of our army, and had to cut our way 
through the enemy's lines to join them, or be captured. \\"e 
were soon in motion, retracing our steps and about ii o'clock 
p. m. found the enemy, and in a grand bayonet charge of the 
first brigade of Birney's division, commanded by Col. Eagans. 
with uncapped guns established communicaiion with our army 
and laid down on the ground on hazel grove hill, tired, and were 
soon asleep thinking little and caring less, what was in store 
for us the next day. 

\\'hen it was about time for Jackson's attack on the nth 
corps to begin, Lee caused an atiack all along the left of the 
Union line from the river to the 12th corps. Of course this 
was only a feint, intended to divert attention from Jackson's 
movements, and was so regarded as appears in the foregoinjj'. 
Even the men in ranks were discussing the result of Jackson's 



50 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 

attack on the nth corps and the Union officer in the 3rd, nth, 
and the right of the 12th corps who was on duty with his com- 
mand, and could not locate the real attacking column to be 
Jackson's, and the point of the Union lines to be attacked was 
the right of the nth corps, was so stupid that he was unfit to 
fill the position of eighth corporal. I say this advisedly, be- 
cause of the general discussion among the men in the ranks in 
my own command, and others I have conversed with, of other 
commands. Gen. Howard could have learned all the facts to 
his entire satisfaction if he had gone out with, or sent a strong 
rcconnoitering party, preceded by a skirmish line. This would 
have developed the enemy's movements and given him timely 
warning, and by taking advantage of defensive positions, he could 
have delayed the enemy's movements so as to have given time 
to throw up defenses and prepare for the enemy's attack and the 
firing of the reconnoisance would have given notice to General 
Hooker of the position of the enemy, who would, in that event, 
been able to have placed his reserve troops in position to support 
the nth corps and counteract the movements of the enemy, but 
no firing was heard until the crash cf Jackson's whole force 
came like thunder, from a clear sky. 

Let us now return to General Jackson and the nth corps. 
General Jackson came down on the right flank and rear of the 
nth corps, doubling them up and meeting little or no resistance, 
so sudden and unexpected was his attack. At headquarters all 
were surprised, for they had l:eard no firing. General Hooker 
had ordered General Howard to change front, fortify, send out 
pickets and locate the enemy, and well might he expect long 
and continued firing on our right when General Jackson did at- 
tack. Judge of the utter surprise of everybody when little or 
no firincr had been heard along the line of the nth corps. To 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 



51 



see thousands of them stringing past headquarters, many hat- 
less, coatless, and without arms, a wreck, a mob stampeding to 
the rear. General Hooker rushed out and tried to stop them. 
Two regiments of cavah-y charged on them. It was soon dis- 
covered they were of no use and were permitted to pass on. 
These were men on the extreme right of the nth corps, and the 
first to receive the shock of General Jackson's attack. Farther 
along down the line an attempt was made to resist this mad at- 
tack, but they soon found they were without defenses, overlaped 
in rear, on their right flank, and front in heavy column, which 
doubled them up in a heap. Their only alternative was to flv 
or be captured. Thus General Howard's wdiole line were 
nearly all swept into a helpless flying mob. The only available 
troops to stay the victorious army of General Jackson was 
Berry's division of infantry which was near headquarters, and 
three small regiments of cavalry, about 4.000 in all. These 
troops went forward in great haste,, all the reserve artillery was 
put into position soon as possible. It was thought the artillerv 
would not have time to load their guns before the enemy, who 
was emerging from the woods, would be upon them. Some- 
thing desperate had to be done quickly. General Pleasanton 
ordered }iIajor Peter Kcrnan. commanding the 8th Pennsylvania 
cavalry, 400 strong, to charge, which was promptly done. The 
major and most of his men went down. Brave, noble men. 
they knew they w^ere riding to sure death, but with drawn sabers 
and a cheer, they rushed into the timber and at the enemy, mak- 
ing noise enough for ten thousand for a time. The enemy did 
not know if their number was 400 or 40.000, while the enemy was 
not less than ten thousand strong at, this point, and this small 
regiment actually checked that overwhelming force, which en- 
abled the Union artillery to load and aim, and when they fired 



52 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 

double canister into the enemy's ranks, it fairly blew them 
back into a whirling mass. All the reserve artillery soon got to 
work, and with the small infantry reserve stopped General Jack- 
son one-half or three-fourths of a mile west of the Chancellor 
House. Darkness came on. Each side began to adjust their 
line, preparatory for the next day's operations. This brought 
on several collisions, and m one of them General Jackson got 
his death wound. The Confederates claim it was his own men 
fired on him and his escort, when they were returning from rec- 
onnoitering. in front of flieir own lines. That may or may not 
have been true, more than likely it was not true, for it is known 
a few minutes later General A. P. Hill was severely wounded 
while leaning over and sympathizing with General Jackson, by 
shot coming from the Union men. Again, while Jackson was 
being carried to the rear. General Pender recognized him and 
complained of the demoralizing efifect of the artillery firing on 
his men, but Jackson replied sharp and sternly: "You must hold 
your ground, General Pender." This was General Jackson's last 
command. Now, with all this terrible firing of infantry and ar- 
tillery, who could tell in the night. v.hose shot made the fatal 
wound, even though one might be between the lines, and what 
is the difference. If theenemy insist they killed their own gen- 
eral, they are welcome to all the honor there is in it; but after the 
3rd corps had cut its way back and formed on General Berry's 
left, with their left resting on an open field beyond Hazel Grove, 
firing soon ceased, and all was quiet. General Hooker or- 
dered the 3rd corps, at daylight, to swing their left east and con- 
nect with the I2th corps. At 9 o'clock p. m., when General 
Jackson's attack had been checked and a new line established. 
General Hooker began to plan what could be done to counter- 
act the advantage the Confederates had gained on ,our right by 



THE BATTLE OF CnANCELLORSYILLE. 53 

the rout of the nth corps. Hooker knew that General Lef 
would order every man from his right who could be spared, 
leaving a very thin line there in his defense, in order to aid 
General Jackson's old corps, that had gained the advantageous, 
commanding position, to strike a crushing blow to the Union 
army the next day at this broken, weakened point of the Union 
lines. 



CHAPTER V. 

The Battle on May Third — General Hooker Orders General 
Sedgwick to Cross the River at Falmouth and Attack Lee 
in Reverse at Daylight — Sedgwick's Failure and Re-crosses 
the River — Hooker Wounded — Meade Refuses to Re-cniorce 
Sickles — Union Army Driven Back of the Chancellor House 
Council of War May 4th — That Night Re-crossed the River, 
Went Into Camp, Near Falmouth, Va. 

General Hooker sent an order to General Sedgwick, who 
was below Fredericksburg, to move on Lee's right and rear 
with a force, when united with General Gibbons' Division of 
the 2nd corps, which was resting at Falmouth, that would give 
him at least 30,000 men. W^ith this large force Hooker ordered 
Sedgwick to cross the river at Falmouth, three or four miles 
above where his command was stationed, during the night, and 
fall upon the thin line of Gen. Early at ^Nlarys Hill, and crush 
them. Of course, this movement would have struck the left of 
the enemy's line of entrenchments, which was held by a light 
force, and could not have been but little stronger, at any one 
point, than a very thin line of battle, for the reason that Early's 
command consisted of only nine thousand men, and they had to 
guard a line of not less than eight miles long. With Sedgwick's 
heavy force secretly concentrated at any point, and moved for- 
ward in successive columns in a night attack, would easily have 
brushed the enemy's thin line out of the way and hurled them 
back in the direction of Richmond In disorder, and left Sedg- 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 55 




/ 



li.vT'ri^ii: OK TiiJ- 
THIRD OF MAY 



Ftdifal Lines 



Onjiderat* Liiut i:Z^ 



SCALE OF MILES 



^ I 



56 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

wick's command free to execute Gen. Hooker's orders to attack 
Lee in the rear at daylight, while Early would have been power- 
less to resist his onslaught. Sedgwick would have been in pos- 
session of all the direct roads to Chancellorsville and could have 
reached Lee's line, attacked them in reverse, and driven him 
away from the left of the Union army's formation and united 
the Union forces long before Early could have come to Lee's 
support. 

It is strange that most writers of this campaign and this 
movement seek to find some means by which .they can fix the 
responsibility for its failure on Gen. Hooker. Gen. Doubleday 
in his memoirs, says, "doubtless when Gen. Hooker issued the 
order to Sedgwick to cross the river at Falmouth, and attack 
the enemy, he had forgotten that he had ordered Sedgwick 
three miles below Fredericksburg and supposed none but 
Howe's division had crossed the river." I say this was not at all 
probable. Gen. Hooker ordered this movement to the enemy's 
right by three corps, the sixth, third and first, all under the 
personal command of Gen. Sedgwick. He was constantly in 
communication with the commander of that movement and at 
different times had ordered Sedgwick to detach corps from his 
command to join him at Chancellorsville. First, Sedgwick de- 
tached the 3d corps April 30th, which joined Hooker at Chan- 
cellorsville, May ist. Then the ist corps was ordered to join 
Hooker at Chancellorsville, and arrived on the evening of May 
2d. This shows' that Sedgwick and Hooker were in constant 
communication and that Gen. Hooker knew perfectly well at 9 
o'clock p. m.. May 2d, where Sedgwick's whole command was 
located, and knew it would not require any great exertion on 
the part of the 6th corps to recross the river and march three 
or four miles to Falmouth, cross again and brush the enemy out 



THE BATTLE OF CHAN(^ELLORSVILLE. 57 

of the way, and attack Lee in rear at daylight. Gen. Sedgwick 
need not have halted his corps until he struck the enemy. After 
he had crossed the river at Falmouth, Gen. Benham was with 
Sedgwick, with his engineer corps and would have taken up and 
laid all the bridges necessary, so there need not have been any 
waiting of the troops at the fords if the movement had been 
made by crossing at Falmouth, all in the night time, the enemy 
would have been surprised on account of the heavy fog that 
settles here in the valley this time of the year. The movement 
of armies cannot be seen until late in the morning. This was 
demonstrated many times during the war at this point, but when 
Sedgwick moved up on the Bowling Green road on the south 
side of the river, close under the enemy's fortified lines, he en- 
countered the enemy's pickets frequently and at Hazel Run met 
a considerable force, where a sharp skirmish took place^ and 
the position finally had to be carried by a charge. This skir- 
mish and picket firing gave the enemy notice of Sedgwick's 
movement and enabled them to reinforce their left and be in 
their works in force ready and waiting the final attack. For this 
reason the first attack of Sedgwick was unsuccessful and if 
some of the division commanders can be credited, if the enemy 
could have had three hundred more men, Sedgwick's army 
could never have carried the heights. 

It is strange that an officer of Gen. Sedgwick's experience 
and military education would make the mistake to march his 
corps up the Bowling Green road when his order was to cross 
at Falmouth. This order meant a heavy column of Union 
soldiers striking a thin line of Confederates, surprise them" in 
the night time in a heavy fog, and easily brush them out of 
the way. Gen. Hooker always claimed that if Sedgwick had 
obeyed his order in spirit, the movement would have been a 



58 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORS YILLE. 

great success, and I fully agree with him; in fact, I cannot see 
how the movement could have failed, except it was made in 
the manner in which Sedgwick executed it. The movement on 
the south side of the river was ill advised and poorly executed 
by Sedgwick, and was a great misfortune to the army, for 
which Gen. Hooker was not responsible. If Sedgwick had 
ordered a brass band to play at the head of each of his brig- 
ades, it would not have been a surer indication of his move- 
ment to the enemy than the picket firings was along Bowling 
Green road. He must have known he would encounter the 
enemy's pickets along this road, and to avoid these pickets and 
surprise the enemy and insure success, Gen. Hooker ordered 
him to cross at Falmouth. All the forenoon of the third day 
Gen. Hooker waited to hear Sedgwick's charge on Gen. Lee's 
thin lines in reverse, that would stampede the enemy, but he 
heard no sound, and wondered why his order that had been 
issued at 9 o'clock the night before had not brought the re- 
sults he had anticipated. Gen. Sedgwick started soon after 12 
o'clock p. m. with two divisions of his corps by the way of the 
Bowling Green road and reached Fredericksburg about 3 o'clock 
a. m. Gen. Gibbons' division of the second corps laid pontoon 
bridges, crossed over the river at Falmouth and reported to 
Gen. Sedgwick at daylight. They attacked and carried the 
heights about 10 o'clock a. m. and scattered the enemy toward 
Richmond. Now, all that remained was for Gen. Sedgwick to 
move immediately along the plank and attack Lee in the rear, 
for all the force that was opposing him. Gen. Early's 9,000, was 
scattered towards Richmond, and was not in his way, but he 
waited to reorganize and send back for Gen. Brook's division 
he had left behind, and it was 3 o'clock p. m. before he moved 
on Gen. Lee. During this delay Lee was reinforced by Early's 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 59 

scattered army, which had passed around Sedgwick's flank and 
found Gen. Lee, and were faced about with reinforcements to 
meet the 6th corps. If Gen. Sedgwick had marched with his 
whole corps at 12 o'clock p. m., even though he marched via 
Bowling Green road, his force would have been strong and he 
could have moved straight out on the plank road, after capturing 
the heights, and not met anything to prevent his striking Lee in 
reverse, defeating him and uniting with Gen. Hooker, and saved 
the third day at Chancellorsville; there is no doubt of this. 

The failure of Gen. Sedgwick to move his whole force to the 
attack of the heights and cross the river at Falmouth, instead 
of marching on Bowling Green pike, was a bad mistake, which 
caused many hours' delay and was fatal to the success of his 
movement in aiding Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville. When 
he did move he met Gen. Lee's united force and was defeated, 
and instead of joining Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville at day- 
light, May 3d, he was eight or ten miles away, and did not 
move to attack until fifteen hours later. He then met the enemy's 
forces he had scattered in his morning attack, reunited and rein- 
forced, standing between him and Gen. Hooker strong enough 
to assume the offensive; in fact, the enemy had become so 
strong in Sedgwick's front that on the night of the 3rd he 
thought it advisable to fall back, which he accomplished during 
the night, and on the morning of May 4 he had taken a position 
covering Bank's ford, where he assumed the defensive. This 
was a very strong position, and Gen. Benham, class mate of 
Sedgwick at West Point, advised him not to leave this position 
unless Gen. Hooker ordered him to do so. He was able to, 
and did, hold this position and repel all the force Gen. Lee was 
able to bring against him on the evening of May 4; but that 
night Sedgwick crossed the river without waiting for orders 



60 THE BATTLE OF CHxiNCELLOESVILLE. 

from Gen. Hooker. There is evidence that Gen. Butterfield, 
chief of staff, did send on his own responsibility an order to 
Sedgwick, after urgent request from him for reinforcements or 
the privilege to recross the river, giving him privilege to cross. 
Gen. Hooker later sent an order to Sedgwick to hold his 
ground, but Sedgwick deemed it too late, as all his command 
but one brigade had then crossed. So the balance was crossed 
over and the bridges taken up. Seems to us that if Sedgwick 
had possessed the ambition a commander ought to, when Hook- 
er sent the order for him to hold his ground, he would have 
turned his men and marched back instead of completing the 
crossing. We know the reserve artillery had been placed on 
the high ground on the north side of the river; that would 
sweep the ground of rebels if they attacked him. This crossing 
of Sedgwick's was unnecessary and ought not to have been 
done. His position was a strong, commanding one, and the 
one Hooker started for May ist, when he got tangled up in 
the thicket; it commanded the enemy's intrenchments in rear 
of Fredericksburg, and if it had been held by Sedgwick it would 
have accomplished all the results that Hooker's flank move- 
ment was expected to do, and resulted in a great victory for the 
Union army. 

At this epoch in the battle at Chancellorsville Gen. Hooker 
was undecided what to do. Sedgwick's movement had been a 
failure. And while Gen. Hooker was paralyzed from the wound 
on the third day the enemy had driven the Union army back and 
got possession, not only of Chancellorsville, but all the main 
roads leading to Fredericksburg. The question was: Shall the 
Union army be concentrated at Chancellorsville, or with Sedg- 
wick at Banksford? At the same time Sedgwick was pleading 
for reinforcement or to be permitted to cross the river. Gen. 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 61 

Butterfield, chief of stafif, sent the order for him to cross, but 
later Gen. Hooker countermanded the order, with the resuh 
as before stated. Gen. Hooker then decided to take the whole 
army back to camp, which, under the circumstances, was the 
proper thing to do. 

Gen. Howe, one of Sedgwick's division commanders, says 
they could and ought to have held their position and not re- 
crossed the river. Now, I venture the assertion that there never 
was a more scientific, better planned battle than that of Gen, 
Hooker's at Chancellorsville in the world's history, and none 
better executed (barring the tardiness of the cavalry in starting 
as ordered) up to April 30th, when the army arrived at Chan- 
cellorsville. There is no doubt but what, if the army had con- 
tinued their march that night, they could have reached Taber- 
nacle church and taken up their position there with slight loss, 
and their position would have been better, as before stated. 
But a lack of energy on the part of some of the Union corps 
commanders, such as was exhibited at Chancellorsville, and dis- 
obedience of orders would defeat any army in any position. 
Strategy of the world's best general could not save an army from 
the wiles of some of the corps commanders of the Union army 
at Chancellorsville. History will fail to produce such a combi- 
nation of adverse conditions of an army over w-hich the com- 
manding general was powerless to control. That these condi- 
tions existed must be patent to all and cause the blush of shame 
to creep over the countenance of every honest American citizen. 

We will return to Chancellorsville and to the position of the 
Union army on the morning of the third day. The point Gen. 
Birney's division occupied the night of the second day was a 
great strategic point, high grounds with large clearing, excel- 
lent point to operate artillery, which would enfiladed both our 



62 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 

own and the enemy's lines. So aides were posted to Gen. 
Hooker's headquarters before daylight to get permission to 
change the proposed line for the purpose of taking in this 
high and commanding position. When the aide arrived at 
headquarters Gen. Hooker was asleep, and nothing that could 
be said or done would persuade the aide in charge to wake 
him up, and while this parleying was going on Birney's divi- 
sion, being in line of columns of regiments, by brigades, closed 
en masse. Gen. Graham's brigade on the left and nearest to 
the woods, in which we had reason to believe the enemy was in 
force. The pickets in that direction began firing. It -was appar- 
ent we were soon to be attacked from that point. !Mine was the 
left company of my regiment; therefore I was on the left of 
our brigade. I began to be uneasy and went to Gen. Graham 
and asked him why we i-emained bunched up in a heap so. I 
said I believed we would be attacked within ten minutes and 
told him if we were deployed facing west and the woods we 
could make it lively for the enemy. To this he agreed, but 
replied he had been told by Gen. Birney we were going to 
move, and every minute he was expecting the order — in what 
direction he did not know — and did not dare to take the respon- 
sibility. I then went to Col. Sides, commander of the 57th 
Pennsylvania regiment, to which my company belonged, and 
which was the outside regiment, facing north. I begged of him 
to change front on my company; that would face us west on 
the point the enemy was expected, had he changed front_for- 
ward on my company the whole brigade, I believe, would have 
followed, impelled by their natural instinct. No duty ever 
seemed more plain, and, instead of running oft the field without 
firing a gun, we would have met and driven the enemy back 
and held that strategic point that, in a few minutes, we got 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 63 

orders to hold, but it was too late; we were running off like 
sheep, not able to fire a gun, without being in danger of shoot- 
ing our own men. The brigade continued the retreat over the 
low and swampy grounds to the ridge beyond, which was called 
Fair\iew, and higher ground than Hazel Grove hill. Hazel hill 
was soon covered with artillery by the enemy; that was very 
annoying. The brigade faced about and formed a line of 
battle. While we were forming, a man from Company B, as I 
now remember him, of the 57th regiment came to me and said, 
"I am going in with you, captain." I said, "Fall in," and I 
supposed he went to the left of the company. Immediately the 
order came down the line, "'Forward, " and we moved for- 
ward for Hazel Grove hill, where the enemy had batteries playing 
on us very lively, and when we reached the low grounds it was 
quite wet and swampy. I noticed a large water hole. At a 
glance I discovered that, by taking an oblique step to the right. 
I would clear it. When I came to it I took the step as I had 
calculated, and as I did so a shell exploded in our front, and a 
piece of it cut the top of a man's head oft in rear of me. I 
then discovered it was the man from Company B. He had 
crowded the orderly sergeant down and was covering me. For 
a second, perhaps, after the top of the man's head disappeared 
he was still standing; the nerves then relaxed, and he went 
down. In this charge we captured the enemy's batteries, their 
called Fairview, and higher than Hazel Grove hill. Hazel hill 
rifle pits and a number of prisoners, and we had possession of 
Hazel Grove hill, with the enemy on three sides of us. This 
left us in a pocket at the bottom of the pocket and in rear of 
the enemy's main line which was facing east. The enemy was 
making desperate eftorts to dislodge Gen. Mott's brigade on 
our right and finally succeeded. This enabled them to close 



64 THE BATTLE OF CHAXCELLORSVILLE. 

up the mouth of the pocket. Gen. Graham ordered us about 
face and double quick out, while the enemy was firing on us from 
three sides, and when we got out of this hole I found my 
clothing had become so deranged that it was hard work to 
make headway. I turned my company over to my lieutenant 
and stepped to one side of the road between two water holes 
and laid down on a brush heap to adjust my clothing. A sol- 
dier of the I2th corps was filling canteens at one of these 
places, and he gave me a drink of water. I then started for 
the road to follow my regiment. I looked up and saw a shell 
coming straight for me. I stopped and gazed at it, but could 
not move. It dropped enough to .strike an oak sapling 
about six inches through, eight or ten feet in front of me. and, 
being a cap shell, exploded. I heard the explosion, then all was 
blank. How long I lay there I do not know; the next I remem- 
ber was a distant roaring in my head, and the soldier who had 
given me the drink was steadying me on my feet and asked 
me if I was hurt. I told him I had not been touched. He said, 
"You was flat on the ground and dead as you ever will be." I 
then discovered my sword was cut in two. and one piece •f 
shell had struck me on my left side, striking on my blanket 
rgll, and passed between my left arm and body. This is what 
knocked me down, and this is the way it was done. In active 
service, officers and enlisted men group themselves together in 
threes and fours nights; in this way they are able to divide their 
blankets, shelter tents, cookin utensils, etc., and when they 
go into bivouac at night their house, beds, provisions and cook- 
ing utensils are unloaded, and in ten minutes their tents are 
up, and their supper is well under way. It was because of this 
dividing up of these necessary traps that saved my life. On 
this Sunday, May 3d, 1863, I was carrying my blanket and one- 



66 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

half of the roof of the shelter tent. The blanket was rolled 
lengthwise, the tent roof rolled around the blanket, the two ends 
of the package were brought together and fastened with a 
strong cord. We then put our head and left arm through the 
circle; that lets the roll rest on the right^ shoulder and against 
the left hip. I looked up and saw a shell, as I said before, 
coming as straight for me as you could point a gun. ]\Iany 
times before this I have seen shells coming and stepped to one 
side and let them pass. This is no uncommon thing for sol- 
diers to do. but this time I seemed to have lost all control of 
myself. I could not move, believing, in all probability, I would 
not have more than one more breath of life in this world; yet 
I was not able to control myself so as to step to one side, and 
when it struck the sapling, it being a cap shell, the sapling was 
solid enough to explode the shell and had resistance enough to 
part the fragments of the shell, and probably send them each 
side of me. On my left side we know just how close the frag- 
ments came; my sword in its steel scabbard, was cut in two 
just below the lower band fvhile it was hanging by my side; 
another fragment struck on my roll of blankets, which yielded 
enough to protect my body and permit the fragment to pass 
between the body and arm without serious injury to either. I 
now believe, if I had taken one or two steps forward, or side- 
ways, I would have been terribly mangled, if not instantly 
killed. As it was I was badly bruised. When I overtook my 
regiment I fainted for the first time in my life, and I have been 
afflicted in that manner many times later. The officers of my 
regiment persuaded me to keep my mutilated sword. Soon after 
the battle I had an opportunity to send it home, and I now 
prize it very highly, I never knew or heard of an officer who 
had his sword shot in twain while it was hanging by his 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 67 

side, and li>;jg^.. tell how it was done. It was the most mirac- 
ulous escape I ever knew or heard of. Later in the day. as the 
3d corps was gradually being flanked out of their position, 
facing Jackson's old command that had been reinforced, it let 
the enemy in on the flank of the 12th corps and Hancock's 
division of the 2d corps. Here is where Hancock displayed 
his great abilities as a successful general, fighting the enemy 
successfully, for a long time, who had attacked his division on 
three sides, then withdrawing at his leisure (the Union army 
on his right and left, having preceded him), with the loss of 
but one regiment, the 27th Connecticut, which a subordinate 
tailed (who was ordered) to notify them that the division was 
falling back. 

The 3d corps giving away, let the enem}- in on the right 
flank and rear of the 12th and 2d corps, and the struggle for 
them to swing around their right to the rear to keep in touch 
with the 3d corps was a desperate one. 

This was a terrible day and the most desperate fighting the 
army had ever experienced. The nth corps giving away, left 
the enemy in possession of a commanding position for their in- 
fantry, and gave them Hazel Grove hill, high grounds and 
open fields, where they placed their artillery at an angle that 
enfiladed our lines right and left with plunging shell and can- 
ister, which was terrible to stand. While Gen. Hooker was 
leaning against a post of the veranda of the Chancellor House 
a shell struck the post he was leaning against and shattered it. 
The fragments struck and severely wounded him. He was help- 
ed on his horse and rode a short distance to the rear, when he 
got faint and was taken off his horse and laid on a blanket. Ho 
soon felt better and was assisted to mount. As he did so a 
shell came and struck exactly where he had laid, tearing the 



68 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESA' ILLE. 

blankets on which he had laid into shreds. Gen. ®ouch, second 
in rank, then started out to inspect the lines and arrange artil- 
lery to check the fire of the enemy on Hazel Grove hill. The 
battle was raging fiercely on our right front center south and 
southwest of the Chancellor House. 

Gen. Sickles' 3rd corps, southwest or right center, was being 
terribly punished by the enemy's infantry in front and eufiladed 
by artillery on his left flank. He sent Gen. Treemain with a 
dispatch to Gen. Hooker, not knowing he had been wounded, 
requesting support. Gen. Hooker was suffering paroxysms of 
pain and he directed the aide to pass the request over to Gen. 
Meade, who was present, lor his action. Hooker was then 
taken to the rear for treatment. There was at that time available 
in the rear and right flank 37,000 fresh troops, composed of the 
ist, 5th and what was left of the nth corps. Gen. ]\leade was 
in command of that flank. He hesitated and finally decided not 
to act without the express order of Gen. Hooker, who was 
not able to give an order, or sanction of Couch, who was not to 
be found. While this parleying was going on our line in front 
was being pushed back and had to be abandoned for a new po- 
sition farther to the rear. Gen. Hooker intended to use these 
reserve troops when the enemy wore themselves out in his front 
The time had come to strike. Gen. Doubleday says probably 
the reason Gen. ]\Ieade hesitated and finally refused to act was 
he feared Gen. Hooker might come to at any time and assume 
command. If successful, claim all the honoi. If a failure, 
charge it all to Gen. ]\Ieade. 

What selfishness and lack of patriotism. A major-general 
high in rank, who subsequently became commander-in-chief of 
the Army of the Potomac, hesitating when our noble officers 
and men were being driven in and slaughtered by thousands. 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 69 

when he had at his command, being senior officer of that part 
of the line, and the request for support being handed him by 
order of the disabled commander. Gen. !Meade, by reason of 
seniority at that part of the line, could have used the reserve, 
and ought to have done so, to support Gen. Sickles and then at- 
tacked the enemy in flank. It v^as one of the turning points in 
the battle of Chancellorsville, and to save the day required 
prompt action. That hesitating again lost the day's battle. It 
was the propitious time of all others to act promptly. A grand 
victory was in reach of the Union army at this moment. This 
failure at this point and time must be charged up to Gen. Meade. 
Suppose Gen. Lew Wallace, at the battle of Fort Donaldson, the 
second day had waited for orders from Gen. Grant, who was far 
away and could not be found by Wallace's aides, and did not 
know the army had been attacked. Suppose he had waited to 
change front and attack the enemy until Grant ordered it. The 
whole army would have been driven into the Cumberland river 
or disasterously defeated before Gen. Grant could have been 
founl3 or reached the field to give the order. But Gen. Wallace 
did change front without orders, thus changing a sure defeat into 
a grand victory. Gen. Meade could have done the same thing. 
But he refused to act, and for want of support brigade after 
brigade was driven out of position and the day was lost. 

When Gen. Stoneman failed to cross the river, pass to the 
rear of Gen. Lee, cut his communications on the 13th day of 
April, that was a serious mistake and the time frittered away 
from the 13th to the 28th day of April, seems like criminal 
negligence. He could, and a more active general would, have 
gone higher up the river and passed over at some point above 
and been doing his work and not set down and wait fifteen days 
for the water to run past. Promptness and secrecy and rapid 



70 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

movements Gen. Hooker knew were neccssar}^ to our success. 
That is mistake No. i. 

No, 2. The failure of Gen. Howard to change front to 
meet Gen. Jackson, fortify, etc., as ordered by Gen. Hooker. 
And his misleading report to Gen. Hooker when he ordered the 
return of a detachment of the 3rd corps, and said he could hold 
the whole Confederate army if they should attack him, was 
criminal deception, and as the facts developed later, was un- 
doubtedly said for the purpose of deceiving Gen. Hooker and 
defeating the army. He was not surprised. He knew the 
enemy was massing to attack the nth corps' right, and knew 
when they did attack his corps would be helpless. But instead 
of obeying Gen. Hooker's orders to advance his pickets to as- 
certain the position of the enemy and their whereabouts, he 
simply did nothing. Officers of his own corps went out with- 
out orders and discovered the enemy massing on an open plain 
nearly two miles to the right and rear of the nth corps' lines, 
at a point indicating that if they attacked from that direction it 
would be where the nth corps had no defences, no pickets, and 
were not faced in that direction. Had he heeded the warning 
of the officers of his own corps, who at two o'clock p. m. had 
located the enemy, he would then have had four hours to 
change front, throw up breastworks, fell the heavy timber in his 
front, tops out, and so arranged his artillery that he could have 
held Gen. Jackson's disorganized lines that had marched in 
line two miles through a dense forest and necessarily broken 
and disorganized ranks, any length of time, and destroyed 
them before they could have crossed over the felled timber to 
have reached his breast works. Why did Gen. Howard, if he 
intended to be honest, deny that Gen. Hooker had warned him 
of Jackson's movements to his right. A sure thing if a court 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 71 

martial had taken place, as was expected, liis intention was to 
brazenly face Gen. Hooker and with his lone, sanctimonious face 
insist that he never got the order, as he did before the board of 
inquiry that made a whitewashing report. Had he heeded this 
order he would have had eight hours to change his lines, fortify, 
cut the timber in his front, get reinforcement?, if he needed 
them. He could then, as he told the reinforcements that he sent 
away, have held not only Gen. Jackson, but the whole Confed- 
erate army if they attacked him. Taking all the evidence that we 
have produced, does it not prove conclusively that Gen. Howard 
purposely threw away on the 2d day of ]\Iay, 1863, the greatest 
opportunity for crushing the Confederate army under Gen. Lee 
and ending the war, that was ever presented to the army before 
or since. Had Gen. Howard obeyed orders there would never 
have been in history the battle of Gettysburg, Wilderness, Spot- 
sylvania, Cold Arbor, Petersburg or Five Forks. Our victorious 
army under such a brilliant commander as Gen. Hooker could 
never have been checked. All the sacrifice of lives since in bat- 
tle and Southern prisons can and ought to be charged up to 
Gen. O. O. Howard. 

History furnishes but one parallel case, says Gen. Doubleday 
in his book, and that was the massacre of the garrison of Fort 
Sims by the savages in 1813 near ]\Iobile, Ala., soon after a 
negro had been severely flogged by the commanding officer for 
reporting that he had seen Indians lurking around the post. 

Such conduct by a corps commander holding a responsible 
position, as the nth corps held at Chanccllorsville, would de- 
feat the best general and the noblest tried and true army that 
ever trod the earth. 

Xo. 3. Gen. Hooker expected Gen. Sedgwick's 6th corps, 
and ordered him to march at 9 o'clock p. ni.. May 2. from below 



72 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 

Fredericksburg and attack Gen. Lee in reverse at daylight. But 
Gen. Hooker's order was to cross the river at Falmouth. This 
was three or four miles above where Sedgwick's corps laid when 
he received the orders from Gen. Hooker. To comply with 
the order it was necessary for Sedgwick to quietly move his 
corps back to the north side of the river and march to Falmouth, 
and there cross in the night in a dense fog attack and sur- 
prise the enemy in their works, and with his own overwhelm- 
ing force easily brush the enemy out of the way and move rapid- 
ly by the plank road and attack Lee's army in reverse at day- 
light. It was not unreasonable to think this movement could 
be made successfully. The only chance for a failure it seems to 
us was the manner in which Sedgwick failed in carrying out 
the order as Gen. Hooker directed, which contemplated the 
massing of the Union forces on the extreme left of Gen. Ewell's 
thin lines, which was composed of but nine thousand men scat- 
tered along a line of six or eight miles. It was no diliicult 
matter for Gen. Sedgwick to secretly withdraw his forces from 
the south side of the river, three or four miles below Fredericks- 
burg (where most of the enemy were, to watch and keep Sedg- 
wick from turning that flank), in the night, in a heavy fog 
that prevailed, crush tlieir left flank before reinforcements could 
have been brought up from the enemy's right to fill their de- 
fenses. But. as before stated, Sedgwick moved along the Bowl- 
ing Green road, encountered the enemy's pickets all along their 
line of march, who gave notice to their comrades by their ^irin^ 
on Sedgwick's command, which enabled them to move on a 
parallel line and fill their defenses at the point attacked. The 
wonder is that the Union forces ever captured the heights. 
Such bravery as was exhibited by the rank and file of this com- 
mand has rarely, if ever, been exhibited in any army on this 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 73 

continent. If we should attempt to describe the steadiness of 
these charging columns while their ranks were being swept into 
eternity it would challenge the world's admiration. But how 
sad to reflect that those noble men were sacrificed and that no 
good results came from it. We do not agree with Gen. Double- 
day in his comparison of this movement to the history of lost 
nations and empires. This was not a movement of converging 
columns. The army at Chancellorsville was stationary and 
expected to remain so. This order was intended for 
a movement of Sedgwick's heavy column, to be rap- 
idly thrown against a distant slightly defended flank of 
the eneni}-, brush them out of the way, which would 
separate that command from the balance of Lee's main army, 
and then attack Lee in reverse with this heavy column and 
crush the enemy on that flank and unite the Union army 
(not a converging of columns, as Doubleday says) and give 
them a grand victory. Had the spirit of Gen. Hooker's order 
been obeyed by Gen. Sedgwick., it is hafd to see how 
the movement could have resulted otherwise than a grand 
victory. Again we say, it was not a movement of con- 
verging columns at all. There can scarcely be a doubt if Gen. 
Hooker's order to Sedgwick had been carried out in spirit and 
good faith, it is hardly possible to conceive a condition of cir- 
cumstances that would result adversely to the Union army. So 
much has been written that serves to mislead the public relative 
to the battle of Chancellorsville that one would suppose that 
Gen. Doubleday in his memoirs of the battles of Chancellorsville 
and Gettysburg, published in 1882. would have had time enough 
to have cooled ofi sufficiently so that he would be able to have 
weighed all the facts connected with those two great events 
without prejudice to the commander of the Union army. Where 



74 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 

was his reason and fairness when he says on page 44 that Gen. 
Hooker did not know when he gave the order for Sedgwick 
to cross at Falmouth that Sedgwick was on the south side of the 
river, three miles below, etc. I say he did know where Sedg- 
wick was. He knew one of his divisions was the first to cross 
the river to mislead the enemy. It was Hooker's direct order 
for the 6th corps to lead in this movement. It was the plan of 
battle. 

Again on page 53 Doubleday says Hooker felt certain that if 
Sedgwick assailed Lee in rear while he advanced in front the 
Confederate army was doomed. And when the time came to 
co-operate that Hooker failed and let the whole weight fall upon 
Sedgwick. Now let us see what reason there is for this coloring 
of the facts. Everybody knows that Gibbons' division, which 
was temporarily assigned to Sedgwick's command and was to 
co-operate with him in this movement, was at Falmouth, had 
not yet broken camp. Now was there anything unreasonable 
for Gen. Hooker in his order to suppose that Gen. Sedgwick 
would order Gen. Gibbons to cross the river at Falmouth im- 
mediately and then quietly withdraw the 6th corps and se- 
cretly march to Falmouth by the north side of the river and 
cross on the same bridge and unite his whole force for 
the attack of the heights. This was what Gen. Hooker's order 
contemplated. Had this order been carried out to the letter 
and in the spirit of an active commander, and failed," then in 
that instance Gen. Hooker would and could have been held re- 
sponsible for the failure. But we fail to see any justice in an 
attempt to hold Gen. Hooker responsible for this failure, when 
his- orders were not obeyed by Sedgwick. Again it seems 
strange that Doubleday, who, in most instances in his account 
of that great battle is so fair and impartial, should say on page 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSTILLE. 75 

53 that when the time came to carry out the program Hooker 
failed to hold up his end. Doubleday knew that Hooker or- 
dered Sedgwick to attack Lee in reverse at daylight, May 3d. 
At the time Sedgwick should have attacked he was eight or ten 
miles away, and never came nearer than three miles of the 
point he was to attack at daylight, and did not reach this point 
until night, ten or twelve hours later than he was expected. In 
these ten or twelve hours that had elapsed the whole aspect had 
changed and the army at Chancellorsville had enough to do 
where they were without going out to hunt for Sedgwick. How 
unjust it is to infer at this point that Gen. Hooker failed to 
carry out his part of this movement, and for this cause Sedg- 
wick's movement failed. 

If Gen. Sedgwick had struck on Gen. Lee's right and rear 
any time that forenoon, as he could have done if he had moved 
his whole corps on the morning of Alay 3d. instead of two 
divisions, and the movement had been on the north side of the 
river crossing at Falmouth, that move would have been a sure 
winner. That part of Gen. Lee's army at that time of day was 
disorganized and scattered, and the striking of 26.000 or 30,000 
men at that point, under the circumstances, must have scattered 
the enemy more and given the victory to the Union army. 
Every move of the army of the Potomac, from the time it 
broke camp, April 27th, was the most scientific successive strat- 
egic movements in history; the final formations of the Union 
lines and their Dosition was a strong one, which completely 
turned the enemy's fortified camp without loss. This alone was 
a victory greater than was ever won on the continent by so 
large an army over one nearly as large and active, all conditions 
considered; and the success of that great strategic movement 
was finally thrown away by these four corps commanders In 
degree as before stated. 



76 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 

Gen. Howard ought to have been tried by drumhead court- 
martial and shot before the army recrossed the river for wih"ul 
disobedience of orders of a superior in the face of the enemy. 
And the enemy would have shown most wonderful ingratitude 
had they not subsequently erected a monument to his memory 
for the valuable services he had rendered to the lost cause. 
Gen. Meade should have been cashiered for his refusal to rein- 
force Gen. Sickles on the third day, according to regulations 
of the army. He was in command on that wing; he could 
have saved the day if he had acted promptly. Gen. Stoneman 
should have been relieved from command for incompetency, 
which did happen soon after. Gen. Sedgwick should have been 
relieved for taking his command across the river without orders 
from Gen. Hooker, and his failure to carry out in spirit the 
orders he received from Hooker. The failure at Chancellors- 
ville is justly chargeable to these four corps commanders in 
degree as before stated. 

Note: In reviewing this work, and comparing notes, I find 
that I have unintentionally done Gen. Stoneman an injustice, 
and was glad to find among notes in my mem^orandum evidence 
that would cause me to add this note in vindication of that 
gentleman. I knew him and his family when we were boys of 
the same county, Chautauqua, N. Y., and part of the time in the 
same neighborhood. He went to West Point and I to Penn- 
sylvania lumber woods where I lost track of him. When the 
war broke out he was soon made a major general and came to 
command the third corps to which I was assigned, where we 
renewed acquaintances. From our corps he was promoted to 
command the cavalry corps, and I did not see him again until 
after the battle of Chancellorsville, and he had been relieved 
from his command. We met in Washington, D. C. Among 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESVILLE. " 

other things we talked about the battle of Chanccllorsville. He 
blamed Gen. Hooker because he had caused him, as he be- 
lieved to be relieved from his command in the manner he was. 
He said he had a painful disability which came upon h,m some 
tinre before the campaign began, and became chronic, wh.ch 
so disabled hint that he was not able to ride a horse. I learned 
from our conversation that he was a true patriot, and that h.s 
fault consisted in his ambition to make a campaign tor which 
he was physically disqualified. I am glad to be able to add this 

explanatory note. 

On the night of May 4th. Gen. Hooker called a council o. 
war, and after stating the situation, absented himself to enable 
his corps commanders to discuss the matter and not be ham- 
pered by his presence. Gen. Slocum was not present. Gen. 
Reynolds did not act. but said he would agree to what Gen. 
Meade said; Meade voted to not retreat, because he said it 
would be impossible to cross the river in presence of the enemy 
Gen Howard wanted to stay. Gens. Sickles and Couch voted 
,0 retreat. Gen. Hooker ordered a retreat and recrossed the 
river unobserved by the enemy. This again proved him to be 
a superior strategist; although he had been defeated, he took 
his army across a deep river, that had raised to overflow its 
banks, during the battle, and safely into camp, but it was alter 
three days' hard lighting with a terrible loss of life to both 
armies \11 the advantageous grounds and roads that made 
Chanccllorsville a desirable position had been lost, and it was 
Oie proper thing to do. The movement back to camp was a 
sad one. The losses had been terrible, and to look upon the 
thinned ranks of the yomig and vigorous men as they hied into 
camp, seeking new tentmates to take the place of the killed and 
wounded, was in many instances heart-breaking; m some m- 



78 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 

stances brothers as well as tentmates were separated. Not 
knowing w'hether they were killed, wounded or prisoners, that, 
taken with the disappointment of having to go back into their 
old camps instead of moving on to Richmond, as they fondly 
hoped they would do when they so successfully accomplished 
this wonderful flank movement, was truly a very sad disappoint- 
ment. I never saw the army seem so gloomy. Each one was 
trying to find out some cause for our defeat. Some were ac- 
tively engaged in trying to fix the responsibility upon Gen. 
Hooker, but when they were met with the reply that the army 
was never moved as scientifically, his enemies would loolv for 
some other horn to hang on. Gen. Howard soon gave out as 
an excuse that he was surprised, not knowing that the enemy 
was moving on his flank; that he did not receive any notice 
from Gen. Hooker notifying him of the movement of the enemy 
to the right, and when the enemy did strike his men broke and 
ran. and he could not hold them. It was then remembered that 
not long before Gen. Siegal had commanded that corps and that 
the rank and fdc of that corps were Germans, and they had 
resented the removal of their old commander and substituting 
Gen. Howard to command the nth corps. This statement was 
not only unjust, but it was untrue. This corps was not all 
Germans. Fully one-third, if not half, of that corps were not 
only American born, but were not even of German parents, but 
all of that corps were made to bear the disgrace, and was 
made responsible for the defeat of the Union army at Chan- 
cellorsville, and when one of that corps was seen wath their 
badge on passing through the camps or on the highways, 
they were sure to be accosted by soldiers of others commands 
thus: "You fights mit Seigal and runs mit Howard, you tam 
cov.-ards." As unjust as we now know this epithet to be. it was 



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 79 

applied to the members of that corps as long as they remained 
in the army of the Potomac, and I am glad that I am now- 
able to clear up this vile slander of as noble organization and 
true patriots as was ever mustered into the Union service in the 
War of Rebellion, and place their defeat and disgrace at Chan- 
cellorsville, wholly upon Gen. O. O. Howard where it belongs. 
The losses in battle at Chancellorsville were as follows: 

UNION ARMY. 

Killed and 
Wounded. Missing. Total. 

First corps I9- loo ^2,^ 

Second corps i.5-'5 500 2,025 

Third corps 3.459 ^00 4>039 

Fifth corps 399 300 699 

Sixth corps 3.6oi i.ooo 4:6oi 

Eleventh corps 508 2.000 2.508 

Twelfth corps 2.38S 500 ^.883 

12,062 5,000 16,997 

CONFEDERATE AR:MY. 

Early ^5i 500 i-55i 

Hill' -'085 500 3.083 

Colston 1.868 450 2.318 

Rodes ^^^7i 713 -'.891 

Anderson 1.180 210 1.591 

McLellan '• • • 1.379 380 1.759 

Cavalry and artillery 227 227 

10.266 2.753 13-019 

Grand totals 22.j\,6i 30.216 

The Confederate loss is believed to have been much greater 
than reported. 



THR BATTLR 



OR 



QRTTYSBURG 



THE. BATTIaR 



OR 



QKTTYSBURQ. 



CHAPTER I. 

Army of the Potomac. Back to Camp. Near Falmouth, \'a., 
. to Await the Filling up of Ranks. 

After the battle of Chancellorsville, and the Union army had 
resumed their position near Falmouth, on the north side of the 
Rappahannock, they proceeded to make themselves as comfort- 
able as it was possible, so they could get the much needed rest 
after the fatigue of battle and marches in the past few days 
they had heroically endured, and await the tilling up of their 
ranks to take the place of the killed, wounded and prisoners 
lost in battle, and the 30,000 two years and nine months' men 
that had been mustered out on account of the expiration of 
their term of service. Many of the wounded soon returned, 
recruits and drilled reinforcements came in. and the army was 
soon filled up to about eighty thousand, but the question often 
came up in camp as to what caused the defeat of the Union army 
at Chancellorsville. The reply was always, whether the dis- 
cussion was among commissiuned ollicers or enlisted men, that 
it was the cowardice of the nth corps, for Gen. Howard, their 



84 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

corps commander, said they ran, and he could not do anything 
with them. Some of the commissioned officers of that corps 
resigned to escape the unjust disgrace their corps commander 
had thrust upon them, but the poor enHsted men could not 
thus escape their humiliation, and it looked as if they were 
all liable to pass into eternity weighed down to their graves by 
the hypocritical falsehood advanced by their corps commander, 
which was that the corps broke and ran without cause and that 
he could not control them. This is partly true; they did break 
and run; and that their corps commander did rush out and 
tried to stop them is true. But this was at a time when all was 
chaos, and his efforts to stop his corps under the galling fire 
and cheers of a delighted successful enemy who had gained this 
victory without loss, and pressing down, in solid column, on 
front flank and rear. J say it was no credit to the corps com- 
mander. Its tendency was to render the condition of his men 
more chaotic and not to inspire them with confidence in him 
as a commander. Not one of them that did not know, if they 
halted, they would be shot down like dogs, without any show of 
stopping the enemy, or else be taken prisoners, and they chose 
to continue the retreat. But if the truth could have been pre- 
sented to the army at this time, I doubt if the atmosphere in the 
Army of the Potomac would have been a healthy one for Gen.' 
Howard to have lived in. But while this discussion and prep- 
aration was going on in the Union camp the Confederates were 
actively filling up their ranks with conscripts and organized 
reinforcements, and they soon had a force greater than the 
Army of the Potomac and determined on an invasion of Mary- 
land and Pennsvlvania. 



CHAPTER II. 

^Movement of Confederates for Northern Invasion Begun. 
Hooker Going to Attack Hilk Halleck and the President 
Will Not Permit It. 

Towards the latter part of May Gen. Hooker learned by 
spies and prisoners that a movement by the enemy for an inva- 
sion of Maryland and Pennsylvania had begun, and so informed 
the President on ]\Iay 28th. He immediately began sending out 
reconnoissances in force to verify his suspicion. One division 
of Sedgwick's 6th corps crossed the river below Fredericks- 
burg and was attacked with such spirit by Hill that Sedgwick 
reported it was his belief that the greater portion of the 
enemy's force still held their old positions. This division main- 
tained their position on the south side of the river. On June 
5th Hooker detached the 5th corps and posted them at Banks 
and U. S. fords. On the 7th he ordered Pleasanton, with all 
the cavalry of the army and two brigades of infantry, to make 
a reconnoissance in the vicinity of Culpepper to ascertain to a 
certainty if the enemy had begun the movement for an invasion 
to the North. This move of "the cavalry resulted in a hard 
fought and hotly contested cavalry battle and capturing of dis- 
patches from the Confederates that proved to Hooker that 
Longstreet's corps was at Culpepper, 2S or 30 miles from Fred- 
ericksburg, and Ewell had preceded him and was passing 
through Sperryville, Va.. while more than two-thirds of the 
Confederate armv had made this move, leaving Hill 25 or 30 



86 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

miles in the rear. Hooker determined to cross the river in 
iorce and crush Hill and force Lee to return and try to save 
Hill and his communications with Richmond and abandon his 
premeditated mvasion; and he notified Halleck of his intention. 
Both Halleck and the President vigorously opposed this move, 
which compelled Hooker to abandon his plans. The President 
in his letter to Gen. Hooker in opposition to his crossing the 
river said this, by way of illustration: "T would not take the 
risk of being tangled up on the river like an ox jumped half 
over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, 
without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other." 
This letter was dated June 5th, 1863. Hooker's idea was to cross 
the river and crush Hill, then follow up Lee's two other corps 
if they did not return, and dispose of them. This move must have 
resulted in a grand victory if Hooker could have had his own 
way. He had decided on this move before Pleaianton's recon- 
noissance. It is not often that an army becomes so divided as 
to enable an enemy to throw themselves in the breach, leaving a 
margin of 30 miles to operate in, and crush them in detail, but 
this was Lee's condition at this time. He was fortunate in hav- 
ing Halleck and the President to interpose in time to save him 
and his army from the most signal victory for the Union army 
ever won on this continent. 

There had never been a more favorable opportunity to crush 
the Confederate army. Ewell with his corps led in this move- 
ment and halted at Sperryville, followed by Longstreet, who 
halted at Culpepper, which was 30 miles from Hill, while the 
Union army lay along the north bank of the Rappahannock in 
a position that they could cross on pontoons, between Hill and 
Longstreet, and destroy Hill's corps before Longstreet could 
returp to support him. At the same time the Union army was 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 87 

stationed at the fords so as to detain Ewell and Longstreet, if 
they attempted to move on Washington, until Plooker had dis- 
posed of Hill. But inasmuch as Hooker was not allowed to 
attack Hill, the movement of the Union .army to the rear 
parallel to Lee was begun, and the base of operations cf the 
Union army was changed from Aquia to Orange & Alexandria 
railroad. 



CHAPTER III. 

The Union Army Changes Its Base June 13th. Left the Rap- 
paliannock to Follow Up the Enemy on Their Northern 
Invasion. 

Hooker finally gave up his position in front of Fredericks- 
burg, June 13th, and ordered Sedgwick's 6th corps on the south 
side of the Rappahannock to recross the river and follow, thus 
leaving Hill to follow Ewell and Longstreet, without being 
molested. And the march for Gettysburg was fairly begun. 
That Hooker guided the enemy where he desired them to go 
is proven by Gen. Butterfield, who says, after the movement 
from Fredericksburg begun: "Gen. Hooker said to me. 'They 
blame me for not trying to prevent Lee from crossing the 
Potomac and going into Maryland from Pennsylvania. Why, 
he said to me, 'that is what I want him to do. I would lay 
the bridges for him and present arms to his forces, rather than 
they should not cross.' He then took a map of Pennsylvania, 
pointing to it, said to me: 'Gen. Lee will repeat his cam- 
paign of last year, cross the Potomac here' (pointing to Will- 
iamsport on the map) ; 'we will guide his march after he 
crosses and keep him to the other side of the ridge' (pointing 
to the range of mountains, laid down on the map, extending 
from the Potomac to the vicinity of Gettysburg) ; 'and we will 
fight the battle here' (pointing to Gettysburg). 'We will have 
every available man in the field, and if Lee escapes with his 



THE BATTLE OP GETTYSBURG. 



89 



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ri-,.,^. o piiHiea aclclrcss at reun on at 

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drilled soldiers, which Hallprl- .(, , . 

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te„,poran,v ,o Gen ,11 '™'^' "^'«"^'' '""^ '-°P3 
HooXe,- had ,„,o„.n ,„„„.„- ,„ be a aLi^ " ""^' 

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villc and his checkmnto nf T • , • ' ^'^^"cellors- 

sfeerin, ,.„ i o , : /rV,: '■;:;.'-:-"' °' '■--" and 
P-iden. confidence ii; T, , "^^ l""'^, ';- «^-" "- 

-m.v. HooK-e,-. a.tacl. on Hi, f u, rT"""^- ''"''' "- 
-i.c it, n„,st „ave resumed in t, o, ,' ■ "V''"'"'"^' '° 
corps and would I,ave eon,„elledL '''""'""" °' ^'"'^ 

«o trv and sav'e Hid a 1 "'""' '"""^diately 

.•a.led .0 accon,, ,s," r,. :;:,d iV °"'"""-^- """'^ "-^ 
viiic to RiCnnond , ,t„ P e ' I.r'T''^' ^ ''^ ^°^^°- 

'I'e only safe course left to Lee f H t , """'''.'■^'ve been 
'° ."ove on Hi,l, as be a „H n d 7 " ■ """ "'""''''' 

™.^o ,b,bba.dar:d:i.:-ri:rr-:! 

'.■"<! and lennsylvania or atte„,pte<l to unci- \\- i • 
And here comes a test or , Washington, 

-^oner, and ,h J , , ''"'' '""''' ""■ "'^- "^ "°' -^'"^ 
..itutionallv Tl ""'' '■""''"''■'"' S---'™"'ent, con- 

''-' •" "H- army. „„t „,e Secretary „f XV:„, as „o,v p„c. 



10 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSL Ur^G. 

ticed; and there it stops. This is wrong: it should define his 
powers as to what extent he could command the army in the 
field in times of war or else it should provide that no man 
should be President who had not been bred a soldier. The 
persistence of the President in directing the movements of the 
Union army in the field while he remained in Washington, D. 
C, is wrong, and the politicians who were by him made major- 
generals to rank men who, by education both practical and 
theoretical, were competent to command, as I have said be- 
fore, was a source of weakness in the Union army and caused 
r.uich dissatisfaction and discussion as to the merits of the 
presidential power. This subject was frequently under dis- 
cussion among the o£icers, and no one I ever knew was able 
to give good reasons why the President, who had no military 
education, should assume to dictate the movements of the army 
in the field and override the field commander, a bred soldier, 
an acknowtedged strategist, one of the most aclive. most brill- 
iant soldiers of the United States. 

We ask why a system is continued in tlic United States, 
vesting the President with pov/crs in the army. t!ie details of 
which he is not familiar with, over bright men who have made 
the subject a life study and practice. Hear what Gen. Butler- 
field has to say about the President's declaration of the move- 
ments of troops in the field in active campaign: 

Gen. Butterfield, chief of staff, in a dispatch to Gen. Ingals. 
chief cjuartermaster, June 17, 8:20 p. m., at Washington, asking 
him (Ingals) to get reliable informatiQ.n relative to the num- 
ber of Confederate cavalry in Maryland and Pennsylvania and 
damages they were doing, added this: '"Since we were not per- 
mitted to cross the river and whip Hill, while Longstreet and 
Ewell were moving through Culpepper and Sperryville. we have 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 91 

lost the opportunity of doing a thing we knew to a certainty 
we could accomplish," etc. So there can be no doubt Hooker 
was ordered by Halleck not to attack Hill; but Hooker man- 
euvered the right of his army to cover the fords and defend 
Washington against an attack of Ew.ell's and Longstreet's 
corps, the Confederate advance. Lee kenw full well that Hill 
could not last long if attacked vigorously by the left wing of 
the Union army. Nor could he get away from Hooker. All 
he could do would be to try and hold out until Lee could 
relieve him, which would not have been possible for Lee to do. 
Gen. Lee made this grand play knowing the risk he took in 
such a movement in front of such a vigilant commander; but 
in war as well as in other business men take chances, depend- 
ing upon certain conditions which may or may not make their 
enterprise successful. The conditions that Lee depended upon 
were the duplicity of Halleck and his influence with the Presi- 
dent, and it was a winner, not because Lee was a greater gen- 
eral than Hooker, but it was because Hooker was handicapped 
by the duplicity of those who never should have ranked him, 
but the following general orders and official dispatches, coupled 
with their being countermanded by Halleck. will show the 
most determined disposition to either drive Hooker from his 
command or defeat the army, it seems to us, that was ever 
attempted upon any general commanding an army. 



CHAPTER IV. 

V 

Official Orders From the President. Ilalleck and Secretary 
Stanton to General Hooker. 

Notes from oflicial record, dispatches, orders and reports 
and correspondence between the President. Gen. Halleck. Sec. 
Stanton and Gen. Hooker, relative to the movements of the 
Army of the Potomac prior to the battle of Gettysburg, from 
June 5 to June 27, 1863. Date of order relieving Gen. Hooker 
from the command of the Army of the Potomac. 

June 6, 1863, Hooker, at 8 p. m., telegraphs Halleck, asking 
co-operation of Heintzelman's and other forces. 

Halleck replies to Hooker's telegram by order of the Presi- 
dent: "Any movement you may suggest of these commands 
(Heintzelman, Dix and Schenk) will be ordered if deemed prac- 
ticable."'— Vol XXVn, Part I, Page 31. 

June 5th. President wrote Hooker relative to being tangled 
up on the river like an ox jumped over a fence with dogs tear- 
ing in front and rear, etc. 

Plooker advises Stanton, secretary of war, of the concentra- 
tion of 20,000 of enemy's cavalry in Culpepper county. June 5. 
1863.— Vol. XX Vn. Part i. Page 31. 

June 6th. Hooker reports to Halleck severe engagement of 
Union cavalry with rebel cavalry. 

June loth. Hooker to President Lincoln, urging movement 
at once on Richmond and enemy's rear. — Vol. XXVH. Part i. 
Page 34. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 



93 



Halleck to Hooker, June lo, 1863, 6:40 p. m.: -The Presi- 
dent fears ill results from uncovering Washington." 

NOTE. 

The above dispatches explains and confirms the fact that 
Gen. Hooker, after Gen. Pleasanton had captured such dispatches 
of the Confederates that proved conclusively the enemy had be- 
gun the movement for a Northern invasion, and that Ewell's 
and Longstreet's corps had passed to our right, that Long- 
street was at Culpepper, and that Ewell had passed or was about 
to 'jass into the Shenandoah valley. Hooker's dispatch to the 
President. June loth. was for the purpose of getting permission 
to attack Hill.— See general orders. 

Dumfries, June 13. 1863.— Field orders. June 14. 1863.— Staf- 
ford. C. H. Gen. Hancock. Gen. Hooker says, hold Banks 
Ford stoutly to the last. Butterfield chief of stafT. 

Dispatch from Hancock to Butterfield. June 14. j8()3. 8 p. m.: 
'•Lee. with Longstreet and Ewell, and about 70.000 men about 
Culpepper yesterday. Hill at Hamilton's crossing with between 
20.000 and 30.000 men and 60 pieces of artillery. 

Halleck to Hooker. June 13, 1863, 2 p. m.: ••Vnur army is 
entirely free to operate as you desire against Lee's army, so Ion- 
as you keep his main army from Washington." 

June 16. 1863. 7:30 1). m. Hooker to Halleck: '-Gen-in- 
chief. In compliance with your direction. I shall march to the 
relief of Harper's Ferry." 

Hooker to the President. June ]6, 1803, 9:40 i). m.: "My 
orders are t.ut to march at 3 o'clock tomorrow morning. It 
will likely be one of vigor and power." 

Hooker to Halleck, Fairfax Station. June 17. 1863: "As 
soon as the intentions of the enemy are km.wn to me I shall be 



94 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBTRG. 

able to advance with rapidity." — Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 48. 
Butterfield to Gen. Stahel, Fairfax Station, June 17, 1863: 
"We have tonight a corps at Drainsvillc, one at Guilford Sta- 
tion, one on Goose Creek, near Trap Rock, one at Gum Springs, 
one at Centreville, one at Songsters Station, one at Fairfax 
Station. The cavalry at Aldie."— Vol. XXVII, Part III, Page 
176. 

Gen, Hooker to Hallcck, June 17, 1863, 2 p. m. : "Advice 
of the abandonment of Harper's Ferry renders forced marches 
unnecessary to relieve it." — Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 49. 

Hooker to the President, June 21, 1863, 5 p. m.: "Pleasan- 
ton's cavalry and two brigades of Meade's infantry were di- 
rected to attack Stuart's cavalry this morning. The fight com- 
menced about 7 o'clock and for severa 1 hours raged with- 
great violence."— Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 54. 

Dispatches and general orders by Halleck relative to the 
co-operation of placing other troops temporarily under Gen. 
Hooker's command to co-operate with the Army of the Poto- 
mac. 

June 22, 1863. Ffalleck to Hooker: "Orders placing all 
that part of the 8th corps and the middle department east of the 
Cumberland under your immediate command . The President 
directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable." 
—Vol. XXVII, Part I, Pages 54 and 55. 

Hooker to Halleck, June 22, 1863, 4:30 p. m.: "Yes; pro- 
vided same authority is continued to me that I now have to give 
orders direct to the troops in the departments of Generals 
Schenk and Heintzclman."— Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 55. 

Headquarters, June 22, 1863, 9:30 p. m.: "President, my 
latest advice from Gen. Pleasanton, dated 4:30 p. m., tke 21st: 
At that time he had driven the rebel cavalry through Upperville, 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 95 

capturing some of his artillery, and still pursuing. Appearances 
favoral)lc." Joseph Hooker, Major-General.— Vol. XXVII. 
Part I, Page 54. 

DISPATCH. 

Hooker to Halleck. June 24. 1863: "Cannot Icarn the 
strength of Heintzelman's and Schenk's commands, nor where 
they are stationed. Hence I send my chief of staff. Butterfield, 
to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain, and also to start 
out a column of about fifteen thousand men on the National 
road as far as Frederick City."— Vol XXVII. Part I. Page 56. 

Butterfield reports as follows: 

Headquarters, A. P.. June 27, 1863, Poolsville, ]\Id.: Report 
in part of Major-Gen. Butterfield. complying v/ith Gen. Hook- 
er's instruction of June 24: "I called immediately upon Tvlajor- 
Gen. Halleck and stated the object of my visit. Halleck replied 
that no troops could be spared from the defences of Washing- 
ton. Receiving no assurance from Halleck I called upon his 
-excellency, the President. The President said to me I had heard 
Halleck's views that it was impossible to get any more troops 
from Washington. I was unable to find Gen. Heintzclman or 
any of' his stafif at his headquarters. Therefore I could get from 
him no report of the forces in and about the defences of Wash- 
ington. I then proceeded immediately to Baltimore and laid 
my orders before Major-Gen. Schenk. who freely accorded to 
me authority to take from his command whatever troops could 
be used for the purpose of my instruction. T took all the avail- 
able troops, about 2,500 strong, put them on the road in accord- 
ance with my instructions, leaving a small garrison for the City 
of Baltimore, consisting chiefly of New York militia, and in 

accordance with your instructions returned to headquarters." — 



96 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

Vol. XWII. Part III, Pages 33? and 358. 

Dispatches hert- intervened between Gens. Hooker and Hal- 
Icck, Hooker nrging the necessity of attaching the troops 
around Washington to the Arnn ot the Potomac, and how use- 
less they were there, the enemy's army having passed far 
beyond, and hnally sent the foliowing dispatch: 

Hooker to Halleck, Poolsville, June 27. 1863: ""^^ly whole 
force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed 105,000."' — Vol. 
XXVn, Part I, Page 59. 

Halleck to Hooker, June 27, 1863, 10:30 a. m.: "Maryland 
Heights have ahvays been regarded as an imp-ortant point to 
be held by us, and much e.\i)ense and labor has been incurred in 
fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment, except 
in case of absolute necessity." — \'ol. XX\'I, Part I, Page 59. 

Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863. 2:55 p. m. Hooker to Halleck: 
"I find 10.000 men at Harper's Ferry in condition tu take the 
field. Plere they are no earthly account. They cannot defend 
a ford of the river. And as far as Harper's Perry is concerned, 
there is nothing in it. As for the fortifications, the work of the 
troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy 
will ever take possession of them, for them. This is my opinion. 
All the public property could have been secured tonight and the 
troops marched to where they could be of some service. Now 
they are but a bait to the rebels. Should they return I beg that 
this may be presented to the Secretary of War and his excel- 
lency, the President." 

Hooker to Halleck, Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863, i p. m.: 
"My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry 
and Washington. I have now imposed upon me in addition an 
enemy in my front of more than-my number. I beg to be un- 
derstood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to complv 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 97 

^vith this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestlv 
reque>t that I may at once be rehe\ ed from the pcsition I oc- 
cupy." Joseph Hooker, Major-General.— \'ol. XX\'II, Part I. 
Page 00. 

General Order No. 196, War Department, Adjutant Gen- 
eral's Office, Washington, June 2-], 1863: By direction of the 
President ]\Iajor-Gen. Joseph Hooker is relieved from the Army 
ot the Potomac and Alajor-Gen. George G. .Meade is appointed 
to the command of that army ar.d the troops temporarily as- 
signed to duty with it by order of the Secretary of War. — E. D. 
Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General. — \'ol. XX\'n, Part 
ni, Page 369. 

It is currently reported and never contradicted that Gen. 
Hooker asked to waive his rank and be assigned the command 
of the corps of his successor, but it was refused and he was or- 
^'.ercd to report at Baltimore for duty. 



CHAPTER V. 

Hooker Planned to Fight at Gettysburg. Movement of the 
Army to Force the Enemy to Fight at that Place. Hooker's 
Order Countermanded by Halleck. Hooker Asks to be Re- 
lieved, which was Promptly Complied With, and George G. 
^leade Succeeded Him. 

I here present so many dispatches and orders that passed 
between the president, Gen. Halleck and Gen. Hooker in order 
to show that certain troops had been placed under Gen. Hook- 
er's command, by orders of the president through Hallock. and 
in all honor and military regulations were a part of Hooker's 
comm.and as much as any corps of the army of the Potomac, and 
Hooker was no more obliged to ask Halleck's permission to use 
those troops than any other corps of his army. In ail histories 
of the battle of Gettysburg I ever saw they state that Hooker 
asked to use troops over which he had no control, and asked 
to be relieved from his command because Halleck would not 
assign troops to him that did not belong to his command. I 
am plea>ed to furnish official orders and dispatches that prove 
their mistake, and that Hooker had no other alternative — either 
be relieved or submit to seeing his whole plans neutralized, and 
then be held responsible for the results. 

The refusal of these troops at this time was a crushing blow 
to Gen Hooker. It will be seen by official dispatches I have 
copied in this work that Gen. Hooker had been promised that 
these troops should be attached to his command; in fact, they 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 99 

were turned over to him by order of the president, hence he 
did not feel the disappointment he would otherwise on account 
of his being denied the privilege of attacking Hill. Having 
command of these extra troops, he expected to accomplish his 
work later, and in his conversation with Gen. Butterfield it 
shows he depended upon Heintzclman's and Schenk's forces, 
and his plans were to destroy Lee's army before they could 
reach Virginia again, but when he saw. on the eve of the great 
battle, that fully one-fourth, if not one-third, of the forces he 
had depended upon to accomplish this great work had been 
snatched from him, for no reasonable cause, he was discour- 
aged. His coup-de-main for the destruction of Lee's army 
seemed dashed to earth, never to rise again. He had exhausted 
every reasonable argument to secure the co-operation of this 
force that had now passed into an inert army of observation. 
His ambition, pride and heart was broken. 

If permission of the president had been given HtDoker to 
cross the river with all the force he could command, or so 
much as was necessary, and crush Hill, who commanded all the 
rebel forces in front of the Union army. Hill's entire force was 
not more than 20.000 or 30,000 troops, and his nearest support 
was Longstreet, who was thirty miles away. This would make 
it sure that Hill could not have defended himself against the 
Union army two hours after they attacked him; and no one 
knew this better than Gen. Lee, but he depended upon the 
timidity of the president and his advisers at Washington, be- 
lieving that his movement, with his two corps and cavalry, to the 
right of the Union army would so menace Washington and 
Baltimore that such pressure would 'be brought to bear by the 
powers at Washington that Hooker would be forced to leave 
the Rappahannock and bring his whole force to the defense of 



100 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

Washington and Baltimore. Lee's was a most desperate move, 
for the reason he so uncovered his base of supplies that the 
force left was powerless to defend them one hour against the 
Union army if the Union army attacked Hill. Lee would 
either have to attempt to return to save Hill's small army, or 
else continue his raid and let Hill take care of himself as best 
he could. In either case, if Gen. Hooker had been permitted 
to act, as a general having knowledge of strategy should have 
been permitted to act at this time, it is hard to imagine condi- 
tions that would have saved Lee's army from an inglorious 
defeat, if not total destruction, but Gen. Hooker was handi- 
capped in his desire to strike the enemy a crushing blow here, 
as well as later, and Lee's army, through the constant blunder- 
ing at Washington, was permitted to continue its raid into the 
Northern states and return at its leisure. 

Hooker felt that there was a studied determination to handi- 
cap and defeat any successful movement he might suggest, and 
asked to be relieved from the command of the army of the 
Potomac. It was always Gen. Hooker's plan, after he got com- 
mand of the army, to so maneuver his command as to destroy 
Lee's army and end the war at one dash. His move on Chan- 
cellorsville would have resulted with that end had his plans 
and orders been honestly executed, and now, when he again 
had succeeded in getting the enemy out of his entrenched lines 
and into states of the Union where almost every citizen was a 
Union man, ready to report the movements of the enemy to 
him, he felt sure the end was near. Well might he become so 
elated as to use the expression that with the superior force he 
would have when the reinforceinents were placed at his disposal 
that had been assigned to him, that if he did not destroy the 
Confederate army, tlic public wa? entitled to. and ought to, have 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 101 

liis head for a football. And he so maneuvered his army after 
he crossed the Potomac to cut off Lee's communications with 
Richmond and compel him to fight at Gettj'sburg, but when 
Halleck refused the co-operation of the army corps in and 
around Washington and Baltimore that had been assigned to 
him, he felt that although some of his army was within twelve 
miles of Gettysburg, the place he had planned to fight the battle, 
and headquarters were at Fredericksburg, and the battle of 
Gettysburg must be fought within two or three days, that Hal- 
lock was bound to cripple and defeat him. He was out of 
patience, and asked to be relieved from ihe command of the 
army, which was promptly done. Hallock was always in the 
way, and seemed delighted to say "No" to department com- 
manders. He exhibited his evil disposition to a high degree by 
placing Gen. Hooker under arrest as soon as he arrived in 
Washington. This act, more than any other, should have 
shown the president the animus of the man. Hallock, for evil 
to the service, and the president should have relieved him from 
his responsible position. As commander-in-chief of all the 
armies, he had showni in every instance, from the time he was 
called by the president to Washington to take command, that 
he did not possess the strategic ability to become a leader of a 
great army, nor did he possess any executive abilities that 
would make him useful to the administration. He failed to 
support McClellan on the peninsula. He failed to furnish suit- 
able transportation to rapidly remove the army of the Potomac 
from the peninsula to the support of Pope, and kept a large 
portion of the Potomac army at Alexandria waiting for two or 
three days for wagon trains to carry their supplies forward, 
while Pope and kis army were suffering for the want of the 
co-operation of this force that was wrongfully kept from him, 



102 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBTRG. 

and for this reason this large portion of the army of the Poto- 
mac was not able to take part in the battle of Second Bull 
Run. The Potomac army's cavalry was kept from Pope for a 
similar reason, an arm of the service he so much needed. Hal- 
lock was far more responsible for Pope's defeat than Fitzjohn 
Porter. Gen. Burnside claimed that Hallock agreed to have 
pontoons at Fredericksburg as soon as the army could reach 
there, so they could cross the river immediately on their arrival 
but instead of that the army had to wait about one week for 
the pontoons to arrive. These failures, it would seem, ought to 
have been enough to have satisfied the president, and he ought 
to have interfered to prevent his defeating Gen. Hooker's plans, 
who had shown himself to be a great strategist. It was not 
unreasonable for Gen. Hooker to ask that Gen. Schenk's corps, 
stationed at Baltimore, Harper's Ferry, etc., together with Gen! 
Heintzelman's corps, stationed at Washington, should be at- 
tached temporarily to the army of the Potomac, even if they 
had not already been ordered there, to aid it in repelling the 
invasion of the Confederate army. And more especially'' was 
the reasonableness of his request apparent when it is known that 
Gen. Hooker, by his superior stratagem, forced the enemy's 
invading army into the valley and to cross the Potomac at 
Williamsport, and that they passed on beyond Washington and 
Baltimore. So these two corps were no longer needed to pro- 
tect those two cities, and at this juncture of affairs it would seem 
strange that one could be found pig-headed enough to oppose 
uniting the two corps temporarily to the army of the Potomac. 
Hooker expected the co-operation of all forces in and around 
Washington and Baltimore, and when he said to Gen. Butter- 
field that if Gen. Lee got back into Virginia with the Con- 
federate army, the public would be entitled to, and ought to, 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYlSBURG. 103 

have his head lor a football, it was not unreasonable lor him to 
use the strong language he did. 

The movement of Dix's force caused great consternation at 
Richmond for the r:;ason that Lee had taken nearly all the 
available troops out of Virginia with him to Pennsylvania and 
left Richmond in a helpless condition. This move had a good 
effect in aid of the Army of the Potomac. It compelled all the 
forces that could reach Richmond to rush to that city and re- 
main there in its defense, and Lee to halt and await develop- 
ments. 

Ewell's corps crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, June 
22d, Longstreet and Hill crossed the former at Williamsport, the 
latter at Shepherdstown, June 24th, and united their columns 
at Hagerstown the next day, thus supported Ewell, marched to 
Carlile, which he occupied June 27th. They immediately sent 
out the foraging parties to prey on the farmers and small 
towns. July 27th Longstreet's and Hill's columns reached 
Chambersburg and began their work of despoliation and rob- 
bing of farmers and townspeople, on a great scale. And on the 
evening of June 27th, Early, after damaging the Northern 
Central railroad quite extensively, marched into York. Forag- 
ing parties preceded these columns and did a thirving business 
foraging supplies for their armies, giving in exchange in many 
instances Confederate notes. Early at York did not enact the 
farce of exchanging Confederate money for supplies; he made 
a levy on the city for a hundred thousand dollars cash, 200 bar- 
rels of flour, 30,000 bushels of corn, one thousand pairs of 
shoes, etc. He got his contributions and moved on. From the 
time the Confederate's movement began north it was no part 
of Gen. Hooker's plans to form the Army of the Potomac 
for a parallel race into the Northern states, then fight a drawn 



104 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

battle on ground selected by the Confederates and then to exe- 
cute the same parallel movement back into Virginia again, 
permitting the enemy to take with them the wealth they had 
plundered from the Northern states, as had been done before; 
but he intended to change the entire program, knowing, as he 
did, that the strength of the two opposing armies was nearly 
equal numerically, and if a difference existed it was in favor 
of the Confederate army: and if the Union army gained any 
decided victory it must be gained by some strategy thai would 
give the Union army a decided advantage. He began to man- 
euver his army for the advantage sought. The time came to 
strike, when Lee left Hill in front of the Union army, thirty 
miles from any support, but Halleck and the president would 
not permit Gen. PTookcr to strike the blow that must have 
proven a great success, and when Gen. Hooker was foiled in 
this he began to plead with Halleck and the president that the 
isolated corps be temporarily attached to the Army of the 
Potomac, such as Dix's command at Fortress Monroe. Heint- 
zelman's at Washington and Schenk's at Baltimore. Harper's 
Ferry, etc. This request was granted. (See general orders of 
Halleck. June 5th and June 22d.) Telegraphic dispatches to Gen. 
Hooker, when it was settled that these corps should be directed 
by Gen. Hooker. He directed the movements of the Army of 
the Potomac, so that those dififerent commands v,-ould co- 
operate so as to strike a crushing blow to the Confederates 
and insure a lasting victory for the Union army. 

The first thing necessary for him to accomplish was to 
secure the co-operation of these detached forces before named. 
This having been done (see dispatches from Halleck to Hooker, 
June 5th and June 22d, he asked Halleck to direct Gen, Dix, 
at Fortress Monroe, to march on Richmond with his whole 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 105 

force and place himself firmly on Gen. Lee's communication?. 
Hal'cck had no confidence in this move and ordered Gen. 
Dix to make a reconnoisance to Riclimond. This was done 
in a feeble way. The force for this movement was landed at 
Yorktown and marched to the White House. They were then 
divided into two columns. Gen. Getty, in command of one 
column, of about seven thousand men, moved, June 13th. to 
Hanover Junciion, with orders to destroy the bridge over the 
North and South Anna and railroads in that section. At 
the same time Gen. Keys, with another column of about five 
thousand men. moved to Bottom's Bridge on the Chicka- 
hominy. On the 15th. the head of Keys' column reached New 
Ketit court house, fifteen miles from Richmond. Notwith- 
standing the decorum this large body of troops maintained 
towards this weak and defenseless city in maintaining the mag- 
nificent distance of fifteen miles from the head of their colmun 
for a short time, it struck the Richmond' government with con- 
sternation. At first their fears knew no bounds. They dis- 
patched every station for reinforcements, and all authorities 
agree that they had in contemplation ordering Gen. Lee's re- 
call. But it vv'as soon discovered by the Richmond authorities 
that this move of the Union army was a harmless reconnois- 
sance and that they would soon return to their intrenchments, 
and as they made no attempt to come any nearer the Rich- 
mond government calrned down and" awaited reinforcements 
from, the Carolinas and other Southern states. And Lee went 
forward on his raid. The result of this reconnoissance shows 
that if Gen. Dix. with his whole force of fifteen thousand or 
more well drilled soldiers, had made a sudden attack on Rich- 
mond. It would have resulted in the return of Lee's army 
or the fall of that city, one or both. It will be remembered that 



106 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

the head of Lee's invading column (Ewell's corps) did not cross 
the Potomac until June 22d, seven days after Dix's column had 
made its appearance at New Kent court hou^s^e. This seems 
plain to us, if Dix had attacked Richmond vigorously, Lee's 
army would have been recalled and instead of their invading 
Maryland and Pennsylvania, it would have been a race between 
them and the Union army for Richmond. Hooker knew the 
man he had to deal with was a great general and was not rash 
enough to permit* a powerful enemy to establish themselves 
between him and his base of supplies, and every attempt to do 
this would make Lee turn and fight to keep open and protect 
his communications. Dix's weak effort failing, Hooker deter- 
mined to use the same strategy later under his own supervision. 
The time came. Longstreet and Hill, rear of Lee's army, 
crossed the Potomac, united at VVilliamsport June 24th, Hagers- 
town, June 25th, moved on into Pennsylvania by the Cumber- 
land valley, their objective point being Harrisburg and Phila- 
delphia. Hooker crossed the Potomac river with the Army of 
the Potomac, June 25th, paying no attention to Stewart's cav- 
alry Lee had left behind to harrass the Union army, and 
moved rapidly to Frederick. He then ordered the 1st, 
nth and 3d corps with one division of cavalry, all under the 
command of Gen. Reynolds as the left wing of the army, to 
advance. The nth corps to Boonsboro, the ist in front and 
the 3d corps in rear of Middletown. So they would be in 
readiness to hold either Crump's or Turner's gaps. The 2d, 
5th and 6th corps came to Frederick, on June 26th, to be at 
hand to support the ist, lith and 3d. The 12th corps was 
ordered to Harper's Ferry to unite with the garrison at that 
place, of ten thousand men, then to move forward into the 
Cumberland valley in rear of but in supporting distance of the 




The Country R-oia the Potomac to Harrlsbnrg; 



108 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

rest of the army, thus cutting all communication between Lee's 
army and Richmond and holding the gaps, which would keep 
up communications with the main body and block that of the 
Confederate*. The Union troops were moving on the east side 
of the South Mountain to Gettysburg, this being the order of 
march, the ist, 3d and nth corps and one division of cavalry 
was ordered in advance. Gen. Reynolds in command. And on 
the night of June 28th the ist corps halted at Fairfield, the 
nth at Emmettsburg, other corps to follow in supporting dis- 
tance. June 28th Lee learned from a gentleman of the country 
that Gen. Hooker*s army had crossed the Potomac and had 
advanced to Frederick that night. He sent dispatches to his 
whole army to fall back to Gettysburg; thus both armies were 
in motion at the same time, for the same objective point: 
Lee to save his communications with Richmond and Hooker 
to bring on the engagement at Gettysburg and defeat Lee, 
cut off his communication, and retreat to Richmond and de- 
stroy his army before it could return to Virginia. While it 
will be seen that Gen. Hooker's strategy worked as he had 
planned, which was that as soon as Gen. Lee found that his 
communications with Richmond were liable to be broken, he 
would turn and fall back, to protect it, this would compel 
the Confederate army to attack the Union army on grounds 
of their own choosing, and on the defensive, which gives them 
very much the advantage man for man. The result of the battle 
shows that, if Gen. Hooker's plans had been carried out, it 
must have ended in a disastrous defeat of the Confederate arm}^ 
but Gen. Hooker was doomed to disappointment. Halleck 
was in the way. It will be remembered that by order from 
Halleck to Hooker, of June 5th and June 22d, the isolated 
departments had been temporarily placed under Gen. Hooker's 



THiD BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 109 

comirand. as will more fully appear in the order of the 22d, 
and Hooker's reply, as follows: 

June 22d. '6^. Halleck to Hooker. Orders placing all that 
part of the 8th corps and of the middle department east of 
Cumberland under your immediate command. * * * 'p^^ 
President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be 
agreeable. Vol. XXVH., Part i, pages 54-55. 

Hooker to Halleck, June 22d. 4:30 p. m. In reply I have 
to state yes, if, provided the same authority is continued to 
me that I now have, which is to give orders direct to the 
troops in the departments of Gen. Schenk and Heintzelman. 
Vol. XXVH., Part i. 

Now the sincerity of the men is put to a test. As before 
stated, Hooker ordered Gen. Slocum, commanding the 12th 
corps, June 26th, to move to Herper's Ferry and uniting his 
corps with the gasrison at that place cf 10,000 troops, and with 
a detachment of cavalry push forward up the Cumberland 
valley and hold the gaps, harass Lee and intercept all convoys 
and dispatches to and from Lee to Richmond and cut off his 
retreat if defeated by the Union army. This order of Hooker's 
Halleck countermanded. He would not permit the troops sta- 
tioned at Maryland heights to be united with the Army of the 
Potomac to aid them in repelling the invading army. Gen. 
Hooker used all the arguments at his command to persuade 
Halleck to consent. He told him the troops were indispen- 
sable to the success of the Union army; that where they were 
stationed they could not so much as guard a ford and were of 
no earthly use; that all the public property could be moved 
to a place of safety that night; ihat the earth works could be 
left temporarily without any risk to the government and tho 
troops marched to where they can be of «onie service. Xow 
they are but a bait for the rebels should thev return. I beg 



110 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

that this matter may be presented to the secretary of war and 
his excellency, the President. 

It does seem as though nothing could be more reasonable 
than Gen. Hooker's order and request, as he said the troops 
now, where they were, were of no earthly use, and it would 
seem that the administration would desire, in view of the fact 
that the enemy had sacked several large towns and cities in 
Pennsylvania, as well as a large tract of rich agricultural dis- 
trict, and was about to strike Harrisburg and Philadelphia — 
and it would seem that at this crisis no one could have been 
found that w^ould withhold any means at their command to 
repel the invader. And it does seem as though the arguments 
of Gen. Hooker were so reasonable and convincing that they 
should have convinced any honest patriot; and if any one can 
see a good reason and that it was for the best interest of the 
service to withhold the troops from Hooker, I confess I can 
not. It looks to me, in view of w'hat followed, that the object 
was finally attained. And that was to drive Hooker to such 
desperation that he would ask to be relieved from the command 
of the army or else to defeat him at any cost, life or treasure 
not considered. And we think Hooker took the same view 
of the situation. After exhausting all arguments he could think 
of, with Halleck, he in desperation sent the following dispatch: 

Hooker to Halleck. Sandy Hook, June 27th, 1863, i p. m. 
My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry 
and Washington. I have now^ imposed upon me, in addition, 

an enemy on my front of more than my number. I beg to be 
understood respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to com- 
ply with this condition with the means at my disposal and 
earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the posi- 
tion I occupy, Joseph Hooker, Major-General. of^cial quo- 
tations. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. Ill 

Bear in mind these troops that Hooker was pleading with 
Halleck to have sent forward was a part of Hooker's com- 
mand, having been temporarily assigned, and Halleck's order- 
ing them not to obey Hooker was equivalent to his halting a 
part of the old army and telling the balance to go on and 
fight Lee. It was a childish exercise of power for a purpose. 
And what purpose will soon appear by the following corre- 
spondence: 

Hallock to Hooker. Washington, June 27th, 1863, 8 p. m. 
Your application to be relieved from your present command 
has been received and referred for executive action, etc. 

Halleck must have certified to the President Hooker's re- 
quest to be relieved, in strong language, for all appearances 
go to show that the President did not take much time for 
deliberation. His order to relieve Gen. Hooker must have 
been issued immediately on the receipt of Hooker's request. 
The following is a copy of the President's order: 

G. O. No. 194. War Department, Adjutant General's Ofifice, 
Washington, June 27th, 1863. By direction of the President, 
Major General Joseph Hooker is relieved from the command 
of the Army of the Potomac, and Major General George G. 
Meade is appointed to the command of that army and of all 
the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it. By order of the 
Secretary of War. E. D. Townsend, Asst. Adjutant General. 
Vol. XXVn., Part HI., page 369. 

It has been stated by some writers that the President waived 
his constitutional rank as commander-in-chief of the Army of 
the Potomac temporarily to Gen. :Meade when he placed him 
in command of the army, which would infer that Gen. Meade 
had been clothed with greater powers than Gen. Hooker pos- 
sessed when he was in command of the army. This is not true. 



112 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

The fact is that Gen. Hooker had been vested by the President 
with power to command the departments of Dix, Heintzehnan 
and Schenk, and middle department east of the Cumberland. 

See official orders from Halleck to Hooker, June 22, 1863. 
and Hooker's reply, 4:30 p. m., same date. 

When the time came that Gen. Hooker wanted to use these 
troops he complained to Halleck, June 24, 1863, as follows: "I 
cannot learn the strength of Heintzelman's and Schenk's com- 
mands, nor where stationed. Hence I send my chief of staff, 
Butterfield. to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain, and also 
to start out a column of about 15,000 men on the National road 
as far as Frederick City." 

See the official dispatches in preceding pages; also see But- 
terfield's report on same pages relative to his visit to Wash- 
ington. He was not able to get any report of the strength of 
Heintzelman's corps, and Halleck positively refused to permit 
any of that corps to go to aid the Army of the Potomac in 
driving the invading Confederates from Pennsylvania and Mary- 
land. Gen. Butterfield then appealed to the President in per- 
son and got for reply: ''You have heard what Halleck says." 
This places the President in rather an awkward position. It 
had long been acknowledged by our best military men that Hal- 
leck did not possess strategy necessary to enable him to success- 
fully command a large army. And it was a common expres- 
sion among the officers of the army that he was wonderfully 
deficient in executive abilities and moral character. See follow- 
ing quotations: 

Secretary Stanton said to McClellan that Halleck was the 
greatest scoundrel and most barefaced villian in America. See 
McClellan's book, page 137. 

Gen. Butler, in his book, page 871, says: "I have learned 



THE I^ATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 113 

his character, which I find to be that of a lying, treacherous, 
hypocritical scoundrel, with no moral sense." 

McClellan's book, page 539, says: "Halleck perjured himself 
before the congressional committee on the conduct of the war."' 

This is the kind of a man the President selected and stren- 
uously held in power as his chief military advisor. 

Gen. Hooker had learned from his former experience since 
he had been in command of the army how tickle Gen. Halleck 
was. And inasmuch as he had not been able to get any reports 
from the departments that had been assigned to his command, 
sent Gen. Butterfield. his chief of staff, to ascertain the facts 
and report. See Butterfield's report in ofificial orders on fore- 
going page. Gen. Butterfield was a major-general in the vol- 
unteer army and a graduate of West Point, and was looked upon 
as one of the very brightest officers in the Union army. His 
social standing as a citizen was second to none. Doubtless 
these considerations were the cause of Gen. Hooker's selecting 
him for the mission, as a last resort, thinking his high standing 
and known ability would influence Halleck and cause him to 
see the necessity for the co-operation of the troops of these 
departments and cause the president to give the matter a more 
serious consideration. But Hooker w^as unfortunate in this ac- 
tion, as in all others, when the crisis came. Halleck was sure 
to be where he could block his operations. And in this in- 
stance he had influence enough to use the the president for thc^ 
same purpose, who said: "You have heard what Halleck says."" 
(Sec Gen. Butterfield's report, among official records, and tele- 
grams on foregoing page.) Still Gen. Hooker had not lost 
all hope. For when Gen. Butterfield called on Gen. Schenk at 
Baltimore. Schenk promised all the aid to Gen. Hooker from 
his department in his power. (See Butterfield's report.) Whh 



lU THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

this Gen. Hooker seemed encouraged, and he ordered Gen. Slo- 
cum with the 12th corps to proceed to Harper's Ferry and unite 
with the 10,000 troops stationed there of Schenk's command and 
march, as before stated, up the Cumberland valley in conjunc- 
tion with the balance of Hooker's command who were to move 
on the east side of South Mountain to Gettysburg and fight Lee 
there, as he had planned and expressed himself to Gen. But- 
terfield some days before. The army crossed the Potomac, but 
here he was again doomed to disappointment. While Gen. 
Schenk had assured Hooker, through Gen. Butterfield, that he 
would render all assistance in his power. (See Butterfield's 
ofificial report.) Halleck stepped in and countermanded Hook- 
er's order and would not permit the troops to leave their forti- 
fications, although the troops were of Schenk's command, thus 
banishing the last hope of Gen. Hooker. With this disappoint- 
ment all hope of the success- of his plans fled, and being con- 
vinced that he was to be hampered and that the president would 
stand by Halleck. as he had at all previous tests, he concluded to 
apply one more remedy. Hooker knew the battle must be 
fought in three or four days at the furthest, and if the same illib- 
eral policy was to be continued towards him to the end the com- 
ing battle must result in either a drawn battle or perhaps worse 
for the Union cause. And inasmuch as the idea had for a long 
time become potent to Gen. Hooker that some drastic meas- 
ures must be pursued towards the Confederates if the rebellion 
was ever put down and that the garrisoning of cities or the 
attacking the enemy in their intrenched camps by the front was 
not the true policy, but to draw them out and crush them in one 
great battle, was his idea. That would have been the result 
of Chancellorsville if his plans had been honestly executed. He 
now proposed, with a greater force, in an open country, under 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 115 

his persona! supervision, to determine, if troops were not with- 
held that had hcen promised him, to crush Lee's 
army here in Pennsylvania. That Hooker was suspicious 
that Halleck would interfere with him, and to make sure of 
his premises he sent Gen. Butterfield in person to Halleck and 
the president. Butterfield got an answer direct that no troops 
should be taken from Washington. That, of course, meant Heint- 
zelman's corps. But this corps, it will be seen, was one of the 
corps named, as official dispatches show, that was placed tem- 
porarily under Hooker's command. It will be seen by Butter- 
field's official report that no objection was made to taking any 
portion of Gen. Schenk's command, for he proceeded from 
Washington direct to Baltimore and Gen. Schenk immediately 
detached 2,500 men from Baltimore and all the aid in his power 
at that pomt to Gen. Hooker. Gen. Hooker had asked that 
15,000 men should be sent out from Washington on the Na- 
tional road to Frederick. Butterfield got 2,500 from Baltimore 
and Hooker found 10,000 men at Harper's Ferry. This gave 
him nearly the number of men he had asked for originally. And 
these troops at Harper's Ferry being isolated and of Schenk's 
corps, not in a position to defend either Washington or Balti- 
more, the enemy having passed beyond those cities. Hooker 
ordered them, as he had a right, to march up the Cumberland 
valley with the 12th corps to cut Lee's communications. This 
was a proper thing to do and Hooker was satisfied, although 
the troops at Washington had been refused to co-operate with his 
army. The troops which he found at Harper's Ferry were satis- 
factory to him and he gave the order for them to march. Hal- 
leck countermanded the order, and he was blind and deaf to the 
reasonable arguments Hooker could advance. Halleck attained 
the object he sought. He goaded Hooker on to the last ex- 



116 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

treme to where his intelligence and manhood could not stand 
any more. The end came as Halleck had planned. Hooker 
was driven from the command of the army and one of Halleck's 
pets took his place, and the army and country by this act of 
Halleck's met a loss that was never restored to them. 

I want to go on record right here and now as saying, and 
don't believe any one will ever attempt to gainsay it, that Gen. 
Hooker was one of the greatest strategists the War of the Re- 
bellion developed on the Union side, and the only one from 
start to the finish of the war that was able to out-general Lee. 
This is proven by his movement of the Union army to Chan- 
cellorsville without loss and the ability he showed in check- 
mating Lee in every movement he ever made from the time he 
left the Rappahannock until he forced him to face about and 
forego the sacking of Harrisburg and Philadelphia and fight 
at Gettysburg, the grounds Hooker had selected. The rank and 
file of the army who had left their comfortable homes voluntarily 
to save the Union, their friends and citizens at home, had a right 
to the services of the man who had developed the abilities this 
man had shown. And if patriotism and love -of country had 
prevailed, instead of an unworthy desire to rule arbitrarily, Gen. 
Hooker would have fought the battle of Gettysburg and had 
the force he desired. Had that been done it would have been 
the last battle and Gen. Lee would never have gone back with 
his army into Virginia. June 28, 1863, the order relieving Gen. 
Llooker from the command of the Army of the Potomac and the 
appointing of Gen. George C. Meade to the command, was pub- 
lished to the army and of all troops temporarily assigned to 
duty with it. So it will be seen that the troops assigned to Hook- 
er by general orders were turned over to ]Mcade, and he was not 
not given any greater power than Gen. Hooker possessed. No 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 117 

more, no less. Gen. Hooker took leave of the officers assembled 
at headquarters, read to them his farewell address, which was 
published later to the whole army. We again repeat, it was 
reported and never contradicted that when Gen. flooker re- 
ceived the order relieving him from the command of the army 
of the Potomac, that he asked the president to assign him to 
the command of a corps under his late subordinate. His re- 
quest was refused. That act shows him to have been a true 
patriot, unselfish to a degree that challenges comparison 
in history. It was a sad day. when the news spread 
through the army that Gen. Hooker had been relieved from 
the command. The general expression with the rank and file 
was that it was a great mistake to relieve an army commander 
on the eve of a great battle and place one in command who 
had not had any experience in handling a large army. June jSih 
Gen. Meade, commander of the fifth corps, assumed commar.d 
of the army of the Potomac, and as was stated in the order, 
relieving Hoooker, and appointing him to the command also of 
all the troops temporarily assigned to that army. Gen. Meado 
was a man of bright intellect, a brave soldier, whose experience 
in the army had been such as gave him the reputation of a 
brave officer, but it could not be said that he had won any 
victories that would entitle him to rank as exceedingly brilliani. 
Xor had he met any reverses. The army, from the major- 
generals commanding corps to the private soldiers, were de- 
termined to drive the invaders from the states of Pennsylvania 
and Maryland or die in the attempt. Gen. Meade was a favorite 
wiili Hallock and the administration, as will appear later, but it 
cannot truthfully be said that Gen. Meade was deficient in con- 
ceit or self-esteem. As soon as Hooker turned over the com- 
mand to him he abandoned all movements against Lee's line 



118 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

of retreat and ordered Slocum's twelfth corps that was in the 
valley to rejoin the arm}-, and all the troops to concentrate in 
Frederick where he proposed to have a grand review. To this 
proposition other officers made a vigorous protest. Among the 
most persistent ones was Gen. Butterfield, Hooker's chief of 
staff. He argued this would cause much dela}' and give Lee 
time to cross the Susquehanna and capture Harrisburg and 
Philadelphia. Meade finally concluded to let Hooker's orders 
stand, with some very material changes. But what surprised 
everybody was that Meade would exercise the hardihood which 
he did to order the garrison at Harper's Ferry to be broken up 
and march to Frederick; this, too, without any protest from 
Washington. These same troops Halleck had refused Hooker 
less than forty-eight hours previous. To some this may seem 
strange, but to us, after the investigation we have been com- 
pelled to make in order to get material for this work, and the 
personal knowledge we experienced of men and measures in the 
army, we learned that men, no matter what their stations are 
in life, are human, not saints, and sometimes politicians were 
wonderfully politic in the War of the Rebellion. We had poli- 
ticians in the army as well as in congress or the White House. 
These politicians knew Hooker was a brilliant, daring corps 
commander, who had justly earned the title of Fighting Joe 
Hooker, but had never suspected he w^as the great strategist 
his movement of the army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville and 
his checkmating Lee at every turn, from the time he left 
Fredericksburg, Va., until he passed up the Cumberland valley 
to Chambersburg, Carlisle and York, demonstrated; and when 
the enemy was about to reach out and capture Harrisburg and 
Philadelphia he was surprised to learn from a countryman that 
Hooker's army was following close on his rear and about to 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 119 

cut his communications with Richmond. He immediately or- 
dered his army to turn and fall back on Gettysburg, just exactly 
as Hooker had planned. Now the objective point of both ar- 
mies was Gettysburg, with Hooker practically directing the 
movements of both armies when he was relieved; and the 
sequel shows that if Hooker had not been relieved when he 
was that the Union army would have reached Gettysburg first 
and, with the isolated commands that had been assigned, closed 
up to aid the Potomac army. The movement must have re- 
sulted in one of two things; either the surrender or the annihila- 
tion of the Confederate army. Had this result been obtained, 
"the final result of this great victory would have been that 
Hooker would have been looked upon, as he deserved to be, as 
the greatest general in America, and the popular clamor would 
liave demanded that Halleck's vacillating dictation to the army 
must cease, and that Hooker take his place; and it may have 
gone further and made Hooker the nominee for the presidency 
instead of Mr. Lincoln's second term. If there was no selfish 
motive for the removal of Gen. Hooker, why was he handi- 
capped at every turn? Why was Gen. Dix ordered to make a 
reconnoisance with a part of his command in the vicinity of 
Richmond, and then return to camp instead of moving his 
v/hole force, as Gen. Hooker recommended, attack that city, 
and if not able to capture it, to besiege and cut all communica- 
tions with the city and Lee's army? The result of this re- 
connoisance proves that although the column did not approach 
Richmond nearer than about fifteen miles, that Lee's army 
halted and the Richmond government was about to, and would 
have ordered his return, but they soon discovered that the city 
was in no immediate danger from that column, and Lee pro- 
ceeded on his march, and the Richmond government depended 



120 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

on reinforcements from Southern garrisons for their defense. 
The sequel proves that if Dix had made an attack on Richmond 
and carried out Hooker's plans, Lee would have returned to 
raise the siege, and there would not have been any invasion of 
Pennsylvania and Maryland. If naught but patriotism governed 
the administration and Halleck in their actions towards Gen. 
Hooker in this campaign, why did they permit department 
commanders whose commands by general orders had been tem- 
porarily assigned to him, refuse to report their numbers, and 
where stationed to Gen. Hooker. (See general orders, dispatches 
and official reports, etc.. on foregoing page.) Why did Hal- 
leck refuse any troops from Washington after the enemy had 
passed that city, and why did the president say to Gen. Butter- 
field, "You have heard what Halleck says." (See Butterfield's 
official report.) If the administration and Halleck were not 
governed by some selfish motive or personal prejudice to Gen. 
Hooker, why did Halleck interfere and countermand Gen. 
Hooker's field order to troops that had been assigned to his 
command, and insist on holding them in a position where they 
were of no use, and keep them from Hooker, where their 
services were indispensable to the army of the Potomac in the 
great battle soon to be fought? And why, after he had been 
driven to the last ditch, where his pride would not permit him 
to stand any further humiliation, he turned as a last resort, 
thinking the authorities would yield, and asked to be relieved 
from the command of the army, giving his reasons, which must 
be apparent to all fair-minded persons? Why was his request 
so promptly accepted and his successor appointed and Hooker 
ordered to report to Baltimore for orders, and when he went 
forward to Washington to explain to the president, did Hal- 
leck promptly place him under arrest? And again we ask if 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 121 

there were no undue inHuences at worlc to drive Hooker from 
the eoniniand of the army and humihate him. why was Hooker's 
suecessor, as soon as he took command, permitted without a 
protest to break up the same garrison and order them to join 
him that Halleck had refused Hooker? All of these successive 
acts of Halleck happening within a few days of each other, 
make a bad record; but whether those things were simply errors 
or done with a malignant purpose, it makes no difference now 
to the principal actors, or the rank and file of gallant heroes 
who were unnecessarih' sacrificed to save the Union. But it is 
due the living heroes who survived not only the shot, shell and 
canister of the enemy, but endured years of camp life and 
marches, and their friends at home, North and South, that the 
whole truth be told, so the actors, the rank and file of the 
army, will realize the sacrifice they have made, and that society 
generally will appreciate the wonderful service these heroes gave 
their country. It being true, as we have said, that Hooker 
was the only man who ever commanded the arm}' of the Poto- 
mac that was a match as a strategist for Gen. R. E. Lee, the 
result of his removal from the command of that army was that 
the Potomac army was never able to deal the enemy a crush- 
ing blow in any one battle, but was forced to fight many useless 
drawn battles at great sacrifice of life, and finally wear the 
enemy out, in spite of the blunders of incompetent commanders 
placed over them. That there was a conspiracy, composed of 
Halleck and some of the corps commanders of the army of the 
Potomac, I think we have shown to exist to thwart the best 
efforts of Gen. Hooker and defeat the army. The corps com- 
mander> at Chancellors\ille, each for themselves, Howard and 
Sedgwick, either one of them if they had obeyed Hooker's 
orders, the result would have been a urand victorv for the 



122 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

Union army. Meade's failure to use the large and idle force at 
his command to reinforce Sickles and strike the enemy in flank 
at the time Gen. Hooker was paralyzed by the explosion of a 
shell was an act hard to explain as consistent with a brave, 
patriotic corps commander. The animus of the man was 
more fully exemplified when he was appointed to command the 
army in his determination to change the order of march and 
battle Gen. Hooker had ordered, and the persistency with which 
he opposed fighting at Gettysburg, and the efforts he made to 
aliminate every semblance of Gen. Hooker's plans goes very 
far to explain why he did not put his force into action at 
Chancellorsville. 



CHAPTER VI. 

Meade Opposed Fighting at Gettysburg. The Battle was 
Fought there by the Combined Eflforts of Corps Command- 
ers, in Spite of Meade's Opposition. 

Meade, as has been said before, had no idea of fighting at 
Gettysburg, but continued to move his army slowly in that 
direction, with the different corps marching in separate col- 
umns on different roads east of South Mountain, so that the 
formation was much in the shape of a fan spread out. This is 
in the same order in which Hooker was marching the army 
on this side of the mountain, with this difference: Hooker's 
objective point was Gettysburg and Meade's idea was that when 
one of the advanced corps struck the enemy they were to 
fight and fall back and all concentrate on a line he had caused 
to be laved out and entrenched, running from Mechanicstown 
on the left east crossing the Monocacy river, thence via Pipe 
creek to the vicinity of Taneytown, making a line of twenty-five 
or thirty miles long. The object in selecting this line for the 
battle instead of Gettysburg I cannot see. It did not cover 
Washington and Baltimore as well as Gettysburg; its disad- 
vantages consisted in the fact that the line was more than twice 
as long as was necessary to have at Gettysburg, for the reason 
that all the main roads from Chambersburg. Carlisle and York 
to Baltimore and Washington centered at Gettysburg, and from 
Gettysburg these great highways spread out in a northeasterly 



124 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

direction north of Gettysburg, and southwesterly direction to 
Baltimore and Wasliington, the great coininercial cities, so that 
an army stationed at Gettysburg, their flanks would be protected 
largely from a flank attack by the enemy, for the reason there 
are no traveled roads in that direction over which an enemy 
could pass a heavy attacking column rapidly enough to make the 
movement successful. This made Gettysburg a strong position 
to fight a defensive battle, but Gen. Meade was not inclined to 
take this view of the situation. If he had favored Gettysburg 
as the battle ground, it would have been just as easy to have 
concentrated the Union army at Gettysburg June 30, ur even 
on the night of the 2gth, as it was to wait until the night of 
July I. On the 30th ^Meade learned to a certainty from scouts 
and advanced cavalry pickets that the enemy had turned his 
whole column and was marching on the three converging roads 
from Chambersburg, Carhsle and York to Gettysburg, and so 
informed his corps commanders, but he gave them no orders to 
move forward, nor did he do so July i. If Meade had ordered 
the army to march to Gettysburg on the night of June 30 or 
early morning of July i, the whole Union army, except possibly 
the fifth and sixth corps, would have been resting in Gettysburg, 
and in easy supporting distance when the Confederate army 
approached the town. It was understood by Meade that when 
any of the advance corps met the enemy they were to show 
fight and fall back to Pipe creek. 



CHAPTER YU. 

The Battle of Gettysburg, First Day Gen. Reynolds Killed. 

Gen. Plesanton, commanding cavalry corps, ordered Buford. 
commanding division of cavalry, June 29th to march to Gettys- 
burg on the morning of the 30th and hold that place until 
relieved by the infantry. The sequel of Gen. Plesanton, Rey- 
ii^olds, Buford. Hancock, Sickles and Slocum's movements on 
Gettysburg- goes to show that they had no such idea, as will 
appear as we go along, of falling back on Pipe 
creek. Gen. Buford was m advance on the left 
wing. This wing of the army was composed of Buford's 
cavalry, the first, third and eleventh corps, all under the imme- 
diate command of Gen, Reynolds. Buford attempted, June 30. 
to march direct to Gettysburg to carry out Plesanton's order, 
his direct route being through the mountain at Fountaindale 
Gap. where he found a brigade of Confederate infantry. This 
caused him to turn back and take the route by way of Emmets- 
burg, but he arrived at Gettysburg early in the day, and fully 
established- his lines. His pickets were advanced almost to 
.Ca>htown and Hunterstown. He posted Gamble's brigade across 
Chambersburg pike and Devm's brigade across the .Mumsburg 
road. Buford's main lines were about one mile west of Gettys- 
bm-g. well over the ridge. His first or picket line was extended 
beyond Willoughby's run, a branch of the ^lonocacy river. The 
country here is broken and rough surface, largely covered with 



126 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURO. 




GETTTSBtTRG.— Final Attack of the First Day, and Battle of the Secxmd Day.* 

The first day's battle is represented north of the Fairfield and Hanuvcr roads. The 
second day's battle south of the same roads. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 127 

timber, making the position well adapted for defensive opera- 
tions, and this is the position the cavalry occupied during the 
night of June 30th. In the morning of July ist the enemy 
started on the diverging roads for Gettysburg, and very soon 
came in contact with the pickets Buford had placed in advance 
on main roads the night before, and skirmishing began in earn- 
est. It had been arranged by Buford and Reynolds that when 
the enemy advanced in force that three cannon shots should be 
fired in quick succession as a signal. At this signal Gen. Rey- 
nolds ordered the first corps to go forward to the support of 
the cavalry, and ordered the eleventh corps to follow. Just 
why he did not order the third corps forward at this time I 
never knew, for that corps was assigned to his immediate com- 
mand, the same as the eleventh corps. It has been stated that he 
suggested or in some way recommended that it should come 
forv>ard. This I very much doubt. There must be some mis- 
take about this report. I was a member of the third corps from 
its first organization; so was Gen. Sickles, the corps command- 
er, and I know him to be one of the bravest, most patriotic and 
brilliant ofificers that ever drew a sword in the defense of his 
country, and if he had got a hint that his services were needed 
the first day he would have marched the third corps to Semi- 
nary Ridge and placed therrt in line of battle as soon as their 
strength would have permitted them to have made the march. 
He was no sluggard, nor was he ever known to sulk in his 
tent. Quite likely the reason the third corps was not ordered 
up early on the first day is that Gen. Reynolds was killed about 
eleven o'clock a. m. before he had got the first division of the 
first corps all in position. The second, third and twelfth corps 
could, if they had been ordered up early in the morning, have 
been on the ground by twelve o'clock noon, readv to go into 



128 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

action, and with the aid of either one of these corps, had ihey 
come upon the field by 2 o'clock p. m., would have changed 
the result of the first day's battle from a defeat into a general 
victory for the Union army. The fall of Gen. Reynolds, hap- 
pening at the time and under the circumstances, was a great 
loss to the army, the country and its cause. He was a West 
Point graduate, had seen service in the Mexican war and on the 
frontier and War of Rebellion from the first, a Pennsylvanian, a 
gallant ofhcer. none more patriotic. He said to Gen. Double- 
day: "We must fight the enemy as soon as we can find them, 
or the}- will ruin the stale of /'cnnsylvania." Tie had no idea 
of fighting and falling back. If he had lived he would have 
made haste to order up Sickles* third corps and requested Gen. 
Slocum of the twelfth corps to conic to his su])port. who was 
not more than five miles from Gettysburg. Sickles was under 
Reynolds' immediate command at that lime, and lie liad a 
right to order the third corps forward; and his high standing 
in the army was such that his request of Gen. Slocum to 
assist him would have been sufficient to have promptly brought 
that corps to his assistance. But he fell while he was aiding 
in the formation of the first division. Gen. Doubleday was in 
command of a division of the first corps, and when Gen. Hook- 
er placed Gen. Reynolds in command of the left wing of the 
army, Revnolds turned over the command of the corps to 
Doubleday, and on the morning of July ist. Gen. 
Reynolds was encamped with the first corps at 
Marsh creek, and when Gen. Buford's cavalry com- 
mand fired the three successive cannon shots, the signal that 
had been agreed upon as a notice that the enemy had attacked 
the cavalry, and that Gen. Revnolds v.-as to move the infantry 
forward to their support, he promptly ordered \\'adsworth to 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 



129 



move at once, and Doubleday to call in the pickets and put the 
two other divisions, with artillery, etc.. on the road to move 
forward as rapidly as possible. He then ordered Howard's 
eleventh corps, to march to Gettysburg-, then mounted his horse 
and rode to the front to consult with Gen. P.uford. whom he 
found in the bell tower of the theological seminary which stands 
on top of the ridge west of Gettysburg, known as Seminary 
Ridge. This position gave them a splendid vicv.- of the enemy's 
firing line, who were pushing the cavalry in front and Hank. It 
also gave them a view of the approaching troops of the first 
corps. The head of Wadsworth's division came up. and he 
descended to the ground and directed them where to move into 
line. At this time one of Gen. Howard's aides rode up and 
asked for orders for the eleventh corps. Reynolds told him 
to say to Howard to halt his corps on Cemetery ridge and 
form them there as a reserve. He then went forward to assist 
in placing Wadsworth's division in position to check the over- 
whelming force that was forcing back the dismounted cavalry 
on the Chambersburg pike. At this time Doubleday had got 
the two last divisions of the first corps well on their wa\- to the 
front, galloped ahead and overtook Meredith's brigade, which 
was the last or left of W^idsworth's division on the Fairfield 
road. Just as they were moving forward on to the firing line, 
he halted and sent an aide over -to Reynolds, who was on a high 
wooded ridge on the Chambersburg road on the east side of 
Willoughby's run. This position gave him a good front view. 
as well as to the rear, the direction in which reinforcements 
were coming. He said to the aide. "Tell Doubleday to watch 
the Fairfield road and left flank and T will hold on to this road." 
But his lines were weak at this point, and the enemy was over- 
lapping them, and there was danger of their turning his flanks 



130 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

before the other divisions could reach him. He ordered up 
more artillery, and m his anxiety lor the arrival of reinforce- 
ments kept turning his head, looking back. This he repeated 
several times. At last, when he turned his head to look back, 
a minie ball struck him in the back of the head, passing straight 
through, coming out just over his eye, killing him instantly. 
So far the attacking column was Hill's corps. It is well to 
understand here the organization of the two armies. They were 
about equal numerically. The Confederates had three corps, 
while the Union army was composed of seven corps. One of 
the Confederate corps was equal to two and three-sevenths of 
the Union army's corps. Divisions and brigades in the same 
ratio. When Reynolds fell, the command oi the left wing of 
the army devolved temporarily upon Gen. Doubleday, who 
distributed the balance of the first corps very ingeniously as they 
came up, and the first corps, under his command July ist, won 
prodigies of valor, holding back from 9 o'clock a. m. until 
three p. m., a force equal to three or four tu their one. But 
they were so favorably posted that the enemy could never have 
forced them back by a front attack. Their danger consisted in 
the enemy's getting on their dank and subjecting them to a 
cross fire. This often happened during the day. The enemy's 
numbers being so much greater, they could swing to either 
flank and subject the Union army to a murderous cross fire, 
which caused the Union army as often to change front to meet 
these flank attacks. It requires a cool commander and the 
coolest soldiers to successfully change front under a heavy flank 
fire. The Union soldiers performed this feat several times dur- 
ing the day. The report of killed and wounded tells how des- 
perate and destructive was the fire of the enemy. Gen. Wads- 
worth reported one-half of his division either killed or wounded. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. I'U 

Gen. Rowley's division, one-half killed and wounded; Gen. 
Stone's division lost two-thirds killed and wounded. Nearly 
every field officer killed or wounded. Gen. Robison's brigade of 
2,500 men for duty lost 1,667 nien killed and wounded. 

The 24th Michigan, commanded by Col. Marrow, had five 
color bearers killed. The colonel then seized and held them 
up, but was immediately wounded. A private then seized them, 
who soon got a mortal wound, but he firmly held the regi- 
ment's colors in place. While this terrible fighting was taking 
place on the left center by the ist corps with six small bri- 
gades, who relieved Buford's cavalry and were opposed by 
eight large brigades of Hill's corps, Howard rode forward in 
advance of his corps, arriving on the ground about 11:30 
a. m. Seeing the desperate fighting being maintained by the 
ist corps against Hill, he dispatched an aide to the nth corps 
to hurry up double quick. He then learned of the death of 
Gen. Reynolds and by reason of his rank assumed command 
of the left wing of the army. He sent a dispatch to Meade to 
notify him of the death of Reynolds. He requested the 12th 
corps, commanded by Slocum, resting at two taverns about 
five miles from Gettysburg, to come forward and take part m 
the battle. This Slocum refused to do without orders from 
Gen. Meade, and Mead^ was at Taneytown, fifteen miles away, 
but knew on the afternoon of the 30th that Lee's army wa- 
marching on Gettysburg; that Buford's cavalry was west of that 
town; that the ist corps rested that night within six miles, 
and the nth would move forward the next morning, and that 
the I2th corps was resting five miles south of the town, and. 
in all probability, a battle would be fought the next day. Still 
Meade did not consider the matter of importance enough to 
ride forward so as to keep in easy communication with the 



J 32 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

advanced columns, Slocum had been ordered by Meade to tlic 
position he occupied within easy sound of the battle with no 
one at hand with power to order him forward to aid the ist 
corps, and Buford's cavalry in their desperate struggle against 
an enemy very largely outnumbering them. When Gen. Meade 
learned that Reynolds had fallen he ordered Gen. Hancock to 
go forward and assume command of the left wing. The head 
of the nth corps arrived at Gettysburg at 12:45 and the last 
division at 1:45. Howard having assumed command of the 
left wing of the army, turned the command of the nth corps 
over to Maj.-Gen. Carl Shurz. who turned over the command 
of his division to Gen. Barlowe. Schimmelpfenning's and Bar- 
low's divisions were immediately put into action on the right 
of the 1st corps, on Seminary Ridge. The other division, that 
of Steinwchr, was placed in rear, on Cemetery Ridge, together 
with the artillery, that was- not in action, as a reserve. Stein- 
wehr utilized his time in strengthening his position wherever 
rocks and stone fences did not afford the necessary shelter from 
the enemy's fire for his command, and strengthened the posi- 
tion generally. At 2:45 it was discovered that Ewell's corps was 
close at hand on the Carlisle road. This heavy column of the 
Confederates coming from that direction would strike the right 
flank of the Union line. Gen. Doubleday, on receiving this in- 
formation from Gen. Buford, sent an aide to Gen. Howard, 
telling him if he would direct the nth corps to keep in check 
Ewell's colmun, he would try to hold Hill. Howard caused 
Barlowe's division of the nth corps to change front to meet 
Ewell and Early. When they executed this movement Deven's 
brigade of cavalry, that had been covering this position, fell 
back and took a position to the right and rear. The fighting, 
was desperate all along the lines from left to the right of the 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 133 

Union lines. In the morning the Confederates thought they 
onl}' had raw militia to contend with and were careless about 
their movements and met some heavy losses in the fore part 
of the day. On that account they expected that they would 
only meet militia and that the advance division, Heth's, of 
Hill's corps, would march into Gettysburg without a halt. But 
Gen. Plcasanton. in command of the Union cavalry corps, one 
of the most brilliant major generals in the Union army, ordered 
Gen. Buford, on the 29th. to occupy Gettysburg on the 30th 
and hold it until the infantry of the Army of the Potomac 
came to his relief. Thus it will be seen he realized the im- 
portance of this position to the future success of the Union 
army, and if it had not been for the efforts of Generals Hooker 
first, then Pleasanton and Reynolds and Hancock, the battle 
would never have been fought at Gettysburg, and Lee would 
have marched his army into Gettysburg with no more opposi- 
tion than he first anticipated — that of the militia. But after 
the iitii corps had changed front and Schimmelfenning's and 
Barlowe's divisions were fighting desperately with Ewell's col- 
umn, on the Carlisle road, Early's division at 3:30 p. m. came 
up on the York road which struck Barlowe's division on their 
right flank. Tliis heavy column was too much for them. No 
changing front or thro.wing forward light reserves could check 
them. This practically decided the first day's battle in favor 
of the Confederates. Here was the time the 12th corps should 
have been in position to meet Early. This would have insured 
a victory for the Union army the first day. Here the corps 
commanders, who was determined the battle should be fought 
at Gettysburg, made their first failure, in not having some one 
in advance if misfortune should overtake Reynolds, who would 
have been respected enough that their request for reinforce- 



134 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

ments would have brought forward the 12th and 3d corps. 
Then the Union victory would have been complete; but, no 
reinforcements being at hand, the two divisions of the nth 
corps were compelled to fall back, retreat to Cemetery Ridge. 
Barlowe was wounded, Von Amburg's brigade was nearly all 
captured, the two divisions of the nth corps, or what was left 
of them, made a hasty retreat to Cemetery Ridge, where their 
reserve was stationed. This left the ist corps, under Double- 
day, in a very critical situation. A very heavy reinforced line 
of the enemy was steadily bearing down on the weakened lines 
of the I St corps, but the enemy had learned in the early part 
of the day that it did not pay to try to crush that corps in a 
rapid front attack, but the great danger to the 1st corps con- 
sisted now in the headlong movement of Ewell's corps on both 
their right flank and their rear, threatening their total destruc- 
tion. About this time, Doubleday says, he sent aides at two 
different times to request that Gen. Howard send him reinforce- 
ments from the reserve on Cemetery Ridge, but it was refused. 
Doubleday says for a long time he saw the perilous condition 
the I St corps was getting into. The enemy was overlapping 
them on either flank, and thinking Howard would see this 
when his attention was called to their situation by repeated 
calls for reinforcements, he -would order them to fall back to 
the reserve. But he insists that Howard, never gave the order. 
Howard claims he sent an aide with an order to fall back. 
Doubleday says the order never came, but when the situation 
became so desperate that it was doubtful if he could save his 
artillery he gave the order, on his own responsibility, to fall 
back. One piece of artillery was abandoned, because the horses 
that hauled it were shot, and there was no time to unhitch 
them and three broken caissons were abandoned on the field. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 135 

The different brigades began the movement to the rear, slowly 
and coolly, taking advantage of every favorable position, to 
re-form. And as the enemy would approach, both infantry 
and artillery would open a murderous fire. This made the 
enemy very cautious and gave most of what was left alive and 
sound plenty of time to take their place in line on Cemetery 
Ridge, which was some time between 3 and 4 o'clock p. m. Han- 
cock claims to have arrived on the ground at 3:30 and took com- 
mand of the left wing of the army by order of Gen. Meade. 
There seems to be considerable difference in time at this point 
from different reports. It is agreed that Early's attack on Bar- 
lowe's right occurred at about 3:30. Much time must have 
been consumed after Early's attack and the nth corps falling 
back to Cemetery Ridge, and Doubleday's sending aides at two 
different times to get reinforcements or permission to fall back; 
and then, after all this, really retreated two miles, to Cemetery 
Ridge, on a slow walk in this interval; much time must have 
intervened. Then Doubleday says he found Howard surrounded 
by his aides at the main gate of the cemetery, who gave him 
orders, etc. Hancock claims he came on the ground and took 
command by order of Meade at 3:30 p. m. Howard says 
Hancock did not take command until 7 p. m. Doubleday is 
inclined to think Hancock correct. It looks to us as though 
Howard was nearest correct. I was in the 3d corps. 'We came 
up and took our position on the left at Cemetery Ridge before 
sundown. There had not been any fighting for some time 
previous to our arrival except light skirmishing. If this differ- 
ence in time could be settled it would go very far in settling 
the question that has been raised between Howard's and Han- 
cock's friends as to which of those gentlemen, or if either of 
them, selected Cemetery Ridge as the final battle ground. 



136 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

It i? evident that Hancock was highly pleased with the ridge; 
that he was very active in establishing the line; then rode back 
that night to Taneytown and persuaded Meade to order np the 
balance of the army and come forward himself at the same 
time. 



CHAPTER VITI. 

Battle of the Second Day. Hancock Persuades Meade to Come 
to Gettysburg and Order Up the Balance of the Army. 
Lee Order an Attack. Is Defeated, Meade Objects to 
Fight at Gettysburg. 

Hancock turned over the command of the left wing of the 
army to Gen. Slocum. Gen. Sickles', commanding the 3d 
corps (all but two brigades), went forward without orders. It 
and the 12th corps arrived on the ground about sundown. The 
2d and 5th corps came during the night and were assigned 
position in line. The 6th corps arrived in the after- 
noon of July jd. having marched over 30 miles that night. 
and was placed in rear of little round top in reserve. Gen. 
]\Ieade arrived on the ground about i o'clock a. m. of July 2d 
and established headquarters at a frame dwelling on the Taney- 
town road, near Ziglar's grove. At dawn he began massing his 
forces with a view of attacking Lee's left, but Gen. Warren, of 
Meade's staff, and some of the corps commanders opposed the 
movement, and it was abandoned. Meade was dissatisfied with 
Gettysburg as the battle ground, and at one time placed the 
cavalry in position to cover the retreat to Pipe creek, the place 
he had selected to fight Lee; but the corps commanders 
pleaded for Gettysburg, and Meade reluctantly yielded to their 
decision, but insisted on assuming the offensive. His plan of 
attack was to strike a crushing blow on the enemy's left and, 
as before said, ordered his forces massed on the L^nion rierht 



138 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

for that purpose, but Gen. Warren and Slocum both reported 
that the plan was impracticable, and Meade abandoned the 
project. He then turned his attention to the enemy's right, with 
a view to attacking them on that flank. Attacking the enemy 
on their right would have been a far better movement for the 
Union army to have made for two reasons: First, if the attack 
had been successful it would have resulted in forcing the 
enemy north and west and firmly placing the Union army be- 
tween the Confederates Baltimore and Washington, and placed 
the Confederates' force in danger of being cut off from all 
future supply of ammunition. This would mean certain dis- 
astrous defeat to the Confederates if not immediately remedied. 
An army is compelled to move with a limited supply of artillery 
cartridges. Pitched battles and constant skirmishes is a constant 
drain on this supply that must be replenished only from their 
base where large amounts are constantly kept stored for that 
purpose. Once that base is cut an army commander will make 
great haste to restore his communications with his base of 
supplies, so that safe convoys can frequently reach them. If 
these convoys fail to reach an army, especially in artillery car- 
tridges, that army is doomed to a disastrous defeat. This was 
why Hooker insisted on having the Harper's Ferry f^arrison 
broken up so as to give him sufficient force to enable him to 
effectually cut Lee's communications and compel him to turn and 
fight him on his own chosen ground in open country. Lee's am- 
munition would soon give out, and disastrous defeat of his army 
would have followed. This Lee knew as w'ell as Hooker, and 
that knowledge caused him to immediately face about, retrace 
his steps as soon as he learned of Hooker's movements to cut 
his base, but if Meade's proposition he first advanced had pre- 
vailed and he had succeeded in breaking down Lee's left, its 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 139 

result would have been, in the first place, to have weakened 
the line of the Union army on their left. If the attack had 
been successful, which I doubt very much, its tendency would 
ha\e been to weaken the Union line, and especially on their 
left, while the reverse would be true with the Confederates. 
Their columns would be turned towards their base, and the 
Union army's base would have been in great danger. Further 
than this, the army acting on the defensive, on either side, had 
decidedly the advantage for the reason that, as the armies were 
drawn up in line on each side of Gettysburg on high, command- 
ing ridges, which ran parallel to each other, the Union army 
facing west and the Confederates east, separated by a valley of 
about one mile in width in which is situated Gettysburg. All 
roads in this vicinity radiate from this town. So its appearance 
is something like a wagon hub with its spokes running in 
different directions. So an army stationed as above described, 
one could not move a heavy attacking column suddenly on 
the flank of the other, and if a flank movement was attempted 
its operations must necessarily be slow because no roads lead 
in that direction. This will explain why the Confederates' 
attempts on the Union army's flank, w'ere no more successful. 
There is scarcely a doubt if ]\Ieade had made the attack on the 
Confederates on either flank, as he desired, disastrous defeat 
awaited him, but there is no knowing what the result would 
have been. The topography of the country, as above described, 
gave the defense much the advantage, while Meade was debating 
as to which flank of the enemy he would attack, and not giving 
any attention to the strong formation of his own lines. The Sth 
corps came up tired and footsore at i p. m., July .2nd, and was 
placed in the rear on the right center, in reserve. The 6th corps 
arrived at 3 p. m., and was placed in reserve on the left, in 



140 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

rear of Little Round Top. This corps was forced to march in 
lieat and dust over thirty miles that day, and. of course, was in 
no condition to be put into action until they had some rest. 
But not much time was given those tired soldiers for rest. 
]\Ieade had blundered by placing those two corps so far away; 
so they must suffer because of his mismanagement. A consulta- 
tion of corps commanders was held at headquarters in the after- 
noon of the 2nd, and the unanimous voice was to fight at Gettys- 
burg. It is a little singular that the corps .commanders of both 
armies should agree so well as to the line of action both should 
pursue. Longstrcet was positive that Lee should take up a po- 
sition and hold it and compel ]\Ieade to attack him, while the 
Union corps commanders were united that the best course for 
the Union army to pursue was to assume the defensive. The 
L'nion corps commanders were successful in persuading their 
commander. Longstreet was not. Lee ordered an attack on 
both fiianks of the Union lines at 9 o'clock a. m., July 2nd. 
Ewell on the Union right and Longstreet on the left, while ITill 
was to keep up a demonstration on the center to prevent any 
rc-cnforcing of the Union flanks from the center. It is very 
evident that Lcc had not stopped to consider the natural bar- 
riers that would beset his corps commanders at almost every step 
of the con^'crging roads and rottgh, broken country, fences, 
roads and ravines over and through which thej'' had to pass or 
else he would have ordered the movement to have taken place 
the night before in order to give the attacking cohimns the whole 
night to get into position, or else ordered the attack to have 
taken place mitch later in the day. The seciutl proves two facts 
very conclusively. First, that the commanders of either army 
did not take into consideration the disadxantage the attackmg 
column must labor under in passing to the flanks of the enem}^ 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 141 

in the direction of whicli there was no roads passing, and that 
the movements of the attackin.f^ cohimns must be made far to 
the rear to avoid the view of the enemy, aild to prevent a coun- 
ter movement by them. If he had taken those conditions into 
consideration lie would never have ordered the attack on l)0th 
flanks of the Union army at 9 a. m.. for he would have known 
that it would be an impossibility for his corps commanders to 
comply with his order. It is true Long'street delayed his move- 
ment some time, in tlie morninp;. in order to let Law's brigade 
coitie up. which was some distance in the rear; and after it 
came up and was ready for action, there was the marching to the 
rear of ridges and ra\ines in order to a\-oid exposing its move- 
ments to the \'iews of the L'nion army, but after Longstreet's 
wait for a portion of his command to come tip. he was able to 
bring his corps into action several hours before Lwell could 
reach the L'nion lines to dcli\er the blow he was ordered to 
strike at 9 o'clock a. m. The Confederates, after the battle, 
blamed Longstreet for not lu'inging on the engagement earlier 
in the day. We claim great injustice has been done those corps 
commanders. They had the natural and artificial obstructions 
to overcome. No man could, in advance, accurately measure 
the time it would require to accomplish the work that had been 
assigned them. But before describing the attack of the Confed- 
erates, it will be best to give some idea of the position the Union 
army had assumed at this time, for it can hardly be said after 
the evening, or night, of July ist that any one general was re- 
sponsible for its formation. That night, when Hancock had 
ordered the different corps into line as they came up. their for- 
mation was somewhat in the shape of a crescent. The right 
of the T2th corps rested on Powers Hill. Thi>^ hill, called 
Powers Hill, is situated on the west bank of Rock creek, and 



]42 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

this creek is the east branch of the Monacacy river, which unites 
with the west branch about ten or twelve miles south of Gettys- 
burg. From this point it is known as the Monocacy river. So 
it Will be seen Rock creek is quite a stream, and the rough 
nature of the ground and timber made it more difficult for 
the Confederates to reach this flank of the Union army with a 
well organized force of artillery at Powers' Hill. The right 
of the I2th corps, the Union line passed along the ridge of said 
creek north to Gulp's Hill. Here one division, Wadsworth's, 
of the I St corps, was stationed. Here the line turned west, leav- 
ing Rock creek, to Cemetery Hill, on which was stationed the 
nth corps, the left tlank of that corps turned south, along the 
ridge, and was joined on their left by two divisions of the ist 
corps. On their left was the 2nd corps. Then came the 3rd 
corps, their left resting at the base of Little Round Top, so- 
called to distinguish it from a larger spur that shoots up far 
above the surrounding ridges. Little Round Top, I would 
judge to be about two hundred and fifty feet high, from its base 
to the top. while south of this one-half or three-fourths of a 
mile is Big Round Top, which is fifty or seventy-five feet higher 
These two spurs were the key to the whole situation, so far as 
the Union army was concerned. Once in the hands of the Con- 
federates they could place artillery on the crest of these spurs, 
and the Union lines, as strong as they were, if attacked in front, 
could not have been maintained against the enemy a moment. 
So, too, if it had been decided from the first by the Union com- 
mander that this was to be the battle ground, these two spurs 
would have been crowned with all the batteries and infantry that 
could have been placed to advantage, on the night of July ist. 
If this had been done, Longstreet's attack on the 2nd would 
have resulted in a disastrous defeat to the Confederates, and the 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 143- 

3d corps would not ha\c been driven from its position on the 
Eninietsburg- road. Peach Orchard and Dexil's Den, as will ap- 
pear by a glance at the map. The force and facts of this statement 
will appear more fully %& we proceed with this narrative. As 
before said, the corps commanders were invited by Meade to 
head(inarters for a conference on the afternoon of July 2nd, 
and by the unanimous voice it was decided to hold the positioti 
the Unio!i army occupied: and when this conference was in ses- 
sion the Confederates under L,ongstreet attacked the 3rd corps, 
and when Gen. Sickles mounted to ride over to his corps, which 
was being attacked. Gen. Meade rode with hiu], and it is said 
that Meade objected to the position the 3rd corps was placed in; 
but inasmuch as the engagement was on, and Longstreet was 
forcing the fight, that it was better to permit the line to remain 
where it was. This may or may not be true. Gen. Sickles says 
that he made an effort to get Gen. Meade to direct the position 
the 3rd corps should be placed in. That the ridge, about one- 
half or three-quarters of a mile in advance of the ridge the 3rd 
corps occupied on the night of July ist. along the Emmetsburg 
road running southwest and turning, as it finally did. 
at the peach orchard and running southeast, the left resting at 
or near Little Round Top, was the better position. Gen. Meade 
did not give the placing of this line his personal attention, but 
sent a statT otilcer. Gen. ]{unt. chief of artillery, approved 
of the position, and the corps was finally placed where the battle 
was fought. It will be seen that this part of the Union line 
had been neglected by Meade. The line, as finally posted, was 
crude to excess. There was no force to protect or support its 
left flank, and the high, commanding round tops that ranked 
so high and commanding above the surrounding country, was 
occupied otdy as a signal station. Soon aflj?r Longstreet'^ at- 



144 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

tack un llic 3rd corps began, the 5tli corps came forward and . 
formed in the rear of Little Round Top, Crawford's division, 
on the right, and ad\anced in supporting distance of tlie 3rd 
corps formation, and while the battle was raging furiously on 
the left of the 3rd corps, where Hood's division of Longstreet's 
corps had formed heavy columns to strike the left flank and 
rear of the Third corps, composed of Ward's and DeTrobriand's 
bi'igades of Birne\"s di\ isi(jn. Gen. Warren, chief engineer of 
Meade's staff, rode to the crest of Little Round Top to view 
the result of the great shock of Hood's attack, and at once dis- 
covered that the left Hank of Ward's brigade was bound to be 
turned, and the enemy's intentions were to possess themselves of 
Little Round Top. which had no force in position to defend it.' 
lie saw Barne^■ division of the 5th corps forming at the right 
for a charge, and about to go to the relief of DeTrobriand. who 
was being sorely pressed. He also saw the enemy making 
straight for Little Round Top. the key to the whole battle 
field, and no troops to defend it. Li an instant he grasped the 
situation. Tf the enemy got possession the victory was theirs, 
and the Union army would be compelled to abandon the field. 
Gen. Warren v.lK-eled his horse and galloped over to Barnes' 
di\i>ion, and hurriedly detached Gen. Strong Vincent's brigade 
from Gen. Barne>' division, who went on double (juick to the 
crest, none to soon, for the enemy was there in force; and not 
having time to load, they gave the enemy the cold steel, and 
forced them down the hill. But it was at a terrible sacrifice of 
precious lives. \'incent soon found that he was confronted with 
an overwhelming force, and called on Gen. Barnes for re-en- 
forcements, who sent a battery and the one hundred and fortieth 
Xew York regiment. This was the most hotly contested point 
in the whole battle, or of anv on the continent. It was the turn- 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. l-lo 

ing point of the day. If the Union rirmy was driven from this 
point the result would be a defeat, if not a di-aster. to tlie Union 
army. The Confederates saw the defenseless condition of this 
commnading position, and started for it with a rush, and it 
can truthfully be said that if ever Proxidence did intervene to 
aid one anny. or prever.t the other from the deslrnetion of their 
opponents, this is one of the instances where the theory 
could be applied that the Allwise guided the hand that smote the 
enemy and sa\-ed the Union army from defeat. Whetlicr it was 
Providence that caused Gen. ^^'arren to gallop to the crest ^^f 
Little Round Top at this time or not, his efforts on this occa- 
sion made it possible to record the battle of Gettysburg — second 
day — in history, as a Union \ictory. But the possession of these 
wonderful slrategetical points was finally saved to the Union 
army, at a great sacrifice of life. Generals \'incent and ^^'eede 
both fell on the crest. The struggle on and around this strate- 
gic point was desperate. The ground was fought over, back 
and forward, and was very reluctantly al)andoned by the Con- 
federates. T cannot refrain from going back o\er the ground 
again to ask why the commander of the I/nion army, or some 
one for him. did not see to it tliat these wonderful strategetical 
points. Little aiid Big Round Tops, were not seized, fortified 
and manned, either on the night of July ist. or early morning 
of the .2nd. Here they were, separate mounds, standing about 
one-half mile apart, tou-ering about three hundred feet above, 
and commanding the surrounding country as far as artillery 
could reach. General TTood, who commanded the division on 
the right of Longstreet's corps, when he marched that division 
south of«thc base of Big Round Top in order to strike the left 
Rank of the .^rd corps. ntu>t have been surprised and highly 
gratified' to find that batteries had not been placed by the L"^nion 



14(5 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

army on that high accessible lower that would sweep his division 
from right to left Hank, and when he moved on a half mile fur- 
ther and found Little Round Top not belching forth iron and 
lead hail to the destruction of his command, he ordered the 
right of his command to change front and pass to the rear of 
AVard's brigade, which was on the left of the 3rd corps" line, 
and capture Little Round Top, and this was the movement 
Warren discovered that caused him to rush on double quick 
the first bragade he came to on the crest of the mountain. 

Since I began the narrative pertaining to the movement on 
this flank of the army. I have wondered and asked why, the 
necessity being so apparent to everybody, that these strategctical 
])oints were not seized by the Union army and fortified. To me 
now it is plain. Meade protested against fighting here from 
the start, and no one knew, until after the conference of the corps 
commanders with Gen. Meade, at his headciuarters. whether the 
battle, on the Union side, was to Ijc fought on the offensive 
or defensive, or whether they would fight at Gettysburg at all. 
But while this conference was taking place. Lee solved the 
question by "bringing on the engagement on the left, a point, 
unfortunately foj; the Union army, that had received no atten- 
tion from Meade, and very little from any one else. But when 
the enemy attacked, on July 3rd, the center of the Union lines 
lie found Little and Big Round Tops fortified and covered with 
plenty of artillery and troops. This artillery, although it was 
long range, raked picket lines from right to left, and did much 
to demoralize Wilcox and others that Pickett expected would 
support his charge. We repeat, if the Round Tops had been 
fortified and mounted with artillery the same the second day 
when the enemy attacked that tlicy contained the third day, the 
3rd corps would never have been driven from their position. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. H"; 

Nor would anyone ever have heard anytliing about the weakness 
of the position of ihe 3rd corps July 2nd, although Little 
Round Top, the key to the situation when the battle began, 
was not fortified, nor was there an armed man on it. And when 
the Confederates made a dash for it and passed the left flank and 
rear of Ward's brigade in large force, together with the heavy 
force in his front, his position on his left became vulnerable, 
that part of the 3rd corps line was gradually forced back, but not 
until after the most desperate struggle by Ward and DeTro- 
briand's brigades. Reinforcements were put into this breach 
of two brigades of the 5th corps, and later two brigades of the 
Second corps, but they were not able to stay the onset of the 
overwhelming force Longstreet was able to throw into the 
breach. They swung to the right, resting on the ridge to the 
right of Little Round Top. By this time the 5th corps was in 
line, their left resting on and rear of Little Round Top and ex- 
tending along the ridge to the right, towards the cemetery, and 
two brigades of the 6th corps came up and went into line to the 
left of Little Round Top. Longstreet then gave up any further 
attempts to break through at this point of the Union line. 
but the entire line originally occupied by Birney's division of 
the 3rd corps at the beginning of this battle, was abandoned, 
because it had been so completely turned on its left fiank that 
the position was untenable, but in addition to the loss of gen- 
eral officers already mentioned in this struggle on the L'nion 
side, was killed Cross and York; wounded. Sickles, from which 
he lost his leg; and Gen. Graham severely, who was taken pris- 
oner. The right of the 3rd corps, up to this time, composed of 
the second division, commanded by Gen. Humphreys, had not 
been actively engaged, and when Birney's division fell back 
to the ridge east of the Emmetsburg road. Sickles, having been 
wounded, left Birney in command of ihe 3rd corps. 



148 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

Humphreys' division was still on the Emmetsbnrg road. At 
this point the road runs southwest. The other division of the 
3rd corps, now commanded by Gen. Hobart Ward, was resting 
on the ridge in ihe rear, whose general direction was north 
and south. This left the right of Ward's division about a mile 
in rear of Ilumidircys' left, a position, if it had been attacked 
from the left, could not have been maintained for one minute. 
Birney ordered Humphreys to fall back in prolongation of 
Ward's line. This clianging of front to the rear is a beauti- 
ful movement in brigade, division or corps drill, but when it 
comes to excculing it under a severe artillery and infantry Hank 
and fron.t fire, coupled with the charge of Andersons division 
in front and Barksdale's brigade of McLav/'s division on the 
left llank, as ihcy were at this time, it is different, and reciuircs 
the coolest veteran to successfully execute this beautiful mo\-e- 
ment under such conditions. But tliis is just what did happen. 
Humphreys' division coolly took up their position on the pro- 
longation of the 3rd corps' nev,- line, and at the same time de- 
livering stunning blows to their assailants. Three brigades of 
Anderson's division. Wright, Wilcox, and Perry, immediately 
followed up Htniiijhreys with a furious charge. Il will be re- 
membered we haN'C stated in the foregoing pages that the forma- 
tion of the two armies were such that a brigade of the Confed- 
erate army was eqtial r.umerically to a division of the Union 
arniy. and so on up and down through their organization. The 
cause of this dilTerence in the organization (;f the army, and its 
effect on the Tfnion army. I will discuss later. The three brig- 
ades cf Anders(;n"s di\-ision that led in this charge were expect- 
ing the stipport of tliree other brigades as soon as they became 
engaged, but the supporting brigades, for some reason, failed to 
come forwar<l. Anderson made a heroic charge. On and on 



THE r>ATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. ]40 

they came. Wilcox on the right. Perry in the center and Wright 
on the lefl. \\'rig-!rL struck the 2nd corps and actually broke 
through the main line, capturing sevel'al pieces of artillery, and 
turned them on the Union forces, who rallied their forces and 
cliargcd back, recapturing: their lost guns, and drove the enemy 
from the field. Perry, in the center, did not succeed as well. 
The concentrated fire on his brigade was too much for him, 
and he fell back before reaching the main line. This left 
^\'right and Wilcox brigade's flanks unprotected, and the con- 
sequence was the innlading; fire was terrible, and they were 
driven off. with great slaughter, v.h.ich v.ould liave been saved to 
tliem if Posy. }.Iahone and Pender's brigades had followed up 
in 'support of the charge as it !iad been arranged they should do. 
Pi v/as a streak of good luck for the Union army that it hap- 
pened so, for there is no knov.-ing where this powerful column 
would have been cliecked. Tt is quite sure they v.-ould have 
gone through the first line, and might have caused the Union 
army to have retreated. This ended th.e battle on the Uni(jn 
army's left for July 2nd. Perhaps I may |->e pardoned if I s:iv 
something of my own personal experience the secon.d day cm 
the left at the peach orchard. My regiment was the 57th Penn- 
sylvania vols., and was in Graham's brigade. When the bri- 
gade was forming to the right of the peach or- 
chard, an order came to the regiment • to detail 
fiileen picked men and send them to the front as skir- 
mishers. Col. Sykes ordered me to fill th.e detail, which I did. 
and placed the detail in charge of Lieut. Crosley. who imme- 
duitely deployed the men an.d moved forward to a clump ot 
1)ni!dings to th.e right of the pcacli orchard; and among the 
buildings was a brick house. The l)uiklings were standing on 
the \'.( -I <i(le of the Kmmetrsburg road. S(M">n the whole bri- 



ICO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

gade moved forward, and my regiment halted in the rear of the 
buildings, where they were soon engaged with the enemy same 
as the rest of Birney's division. When the enemy broke 
through on our left, near Little Round Top, regiment after regi- 
ment was doubled back from the left and passed in rear of us 
and to the right on the Emmetsburg road. Nearly all the regi- 
ments on our left had passed us, when I became very anxious 
about the detail I had sent forward, and the last I saw of them 
ihey were taking shelter, under a J-iot fire from the enemy, in the 
brick house and out buildings. I walked up to the colonel, and, 
pointing to the retreating regiment, said: "Tt looks as though 
we will soon have to move out of here, or be captured." He 
turned his head to the left, and seeing the regiments near us on 
the left, going to the rear, said; "Yes, I think we will go now." 
I remonstrated with lum. saying that many oi the regiment had 
taken shelter in the buildings, and that we ought to make a detail 
who would rush around to the several buildings, and warn the of- 
ficers and men and the detail I had sent out as skirmishers, that 
we were going to fall back, but he insisted on taking the regi- 
ment out then, replying that I could stay and get as many out 
as I could. I turned the company over to the second lieutenant. 
and started on a run from one building to the other. The roar 
of artillery and bursting of shells and musketry was such that it 
was necessary to take hold of and shake a man to get his at- 
tention. This made slow work, for one man. to get over the 
ground. When I had made the rounds of the outbuildings 
and got the men started to the rear. I then went to the main 
building, and, looking down to the left and seeing that no ad- 
vance was being made on our west front, thought the enemy 
was far enough away so I could make a run through the house, 
up-stairs and down, and get^a good many out before the enemy 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 151 

would reach me. The entrance to the house was from the 
north, into a hall that led upstairs. I ran up the stairs and 
from one room to the other, and started them to the rear as 
fast as I could get them to understand what I wanted of them. 
I then started down stairs to notify those in the lower part of 
the house. When I reached the hall, I thought I would look 
down to the left, where the enemy first broke through our lines, 
to see how far tiiey had progressed in my direction. I had al- 
ways said I would never be taken prisoner as long as I could 
fight or run. There was nothing I dreaded so much as to be 
taken prisoner. But when I looked out, and there, horror of 
horrors, the enemy was in the yard in large force not fifty feet 
away. They saw me as soon as I did them, and ordered me to 
surrender. I saw .at a glance that they were in a bunch, and 
but few of them could shoot without endangering themselves. 
So I thought I could run quartering past them, and possibly 
escape. I took the chance, and made the dive past them, then 
firing began. Either their aim was poor, or else I outran their 
shots, for they never touched me. As each shot would whiz/ 
past me it increased my efforts. There was some kind of a yard 
fence around the buildings, how high I do not know; what I do 
know is, that I did not touch it; nor did I ever make better 
time on a railroad car than I did until I got out of range of these 
gentlemen wlio were so anxious to introduce me to their 
Southern friends. Of course, the soldiers I had started on 
ahead had quite a long distance the start of me, but I soon over- 
took them. While we were passing to our new lines in the 
rear, we were in range of shells that were thrown by the Con- 
federates at the Union soldiers who were forming their new 
line, and the shot was traveling on the same line with our squad, 
and what I want to call attention to. is that a man was killed 



152 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

by a shell that never touched him. It was this way. The men 
that I had started ahead of me were following: up the rejziments 
in an irregular form, and were men of many regiments who had 
joined our squad, and shells were dropping in quite thick. At 
this i)oint in particular one passed very close to me; so close 
that there was not much room to spare between me and the 
shell. A man in front I thought was in range, and feared it 
would strike him square on the back of his head, but instead 
it just missed him. but he dropped as dead and limp as though 
his head had been cut ofif. T know he was not touched, for I 
rolled him over, and there was no bruise on his head or face. 

As I said when we started ofif on this chapter, that Gen. Lee 
ordered the Union' lines to be attacked on br»»;h flanks at the 
same time,, nine o'clock a. m. Longstrect's corps, which was 
to strike the Union army on their left, was not able to deliver 
the crushing blow until near four o'clock p. m.. nearly seven 
hours later, but he was fully three hours ahead of Ewell. who 
was ordered to attack the Union army on their right at the 
same time. This proves what we said about Gettysburg being 
a strong position on which to fight a battle on the defense, but 
weak for ofifensive movements. The reason is. as before said, 
that all roads from all cities, north, south, east and west, con- 
verge at Gettysburg. All roads lead to this center, and none to 
the flanks or around Gettysburg to the fianks of the army. 
Longstrect's attack was near being successful, because the 
Union army had made but little if any preparations on that 
flank, and had neglected to occupy and fortify the key to the 
whole battle field. Little and Big Round Tops. When Long- 
street's furious attack had been repulsed, at every point, and all 
sound quieting down at that llank, strange as it may seem. Gen. 
Meade ordered Gen. Gearv. commanding a division of the T2th 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 153 

corps, which was intrenched on the extreme right of the Union 
army, to leave his intrenchments and report to Gen. Sykes, at 
Little Round Top; and what is still more strange, Gen. Slocum, 
commanding the 12th corps, to which Gen. Geary belonged, pro- 
tested that the enemy in heavy column was advancing on his 
corps, and begged to have Geary's division remain where it 
was. But Meade would not yield, and Geary moved his division 
out of his intrenched line, where he was needed, to Little Round 
Top, where he was not wanted, while Ewell's corps was, as Slo- 
cum had reported, moving into position to strike the Union line 
on their extreme right. Johnson's division was swinging 
around on the Confederates' extreme left for that purpose, and 
attacked furiously about sundown. The Confederates were 
defeated at every point where the Union men were in line, and 
were driven back, but the trenches that Gen. Geary's di- 
vision had been ordered to vacate were easily taken possession 
of. This gave Johnson a strong, fortified position, not only 
on the right flank of the Union army, but, on account of the 
horseshoe shape of the Union line, they held a commanding po- 
sition in their rear, and quite close to headquarters, where the 
artillery, anmiunition and other trains were packed. Fortunately 
for the Union army, darkness overtook the enemy, and they 
were compelled to rest here until morning. The time this strug- 
gle ended was nine p. m. This success of the enemy would 
never have been if Meade had left Geary's division where 
it was needed, instead of ordering it to a part of the field where 
it was of no use, and it would not have been necessary for Gen. 
Geary to have sacrificed the many precious lives he did the next 
morning to get possession of his works, and drive Johnson oiit. 
Soon after Johnson's attack on the Union right began, Early's 
division composed of four brigades, one of hi? brigades, how- 



154 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

ever, that of Smith, was sent to support Johnson; but three, 
those of Hayes, Hook and Gordon, supported by Rhodes and 
Pender's divisions, began an attack on Cemetery hill. Before this 
advance struck the Union lines, a vigorous artillery fire, by the 
Confederates from Benner's hill was kept up for some time, 
but this part of the Union lines had been fortified with great 
care, so the Union men and artillery were well protected. And 
when the Union guns opened in reply they soon silenced the 
Confederates" guns. Then the enemy's infantry moved forward 
and struck the position occupied by Von Gilsa's brigade on the 
right and Anus' on the left. These brigades were posted at the 
base of the hill behind stone fences. In their rear were posted 
Rickett's and W'cidrick's batteries. On higher ground, further 
to the rear still was Steware's, Reynold's and Stephen's batteries, 
and as the enemy came in range all opened on the rebels' left 
such a terrible fire that they fell back, but their right being shel- 
tered by rough ground, came on and charged through Von 
Gilsa's brigade infantry line, and captured some of their guns 
in rear. Darkness favored the Confederates in this movement. 
If the battery men could have seen to have kept the range of the 
eneiny, they would have cleaned the ground, by use of double 
canister, of c\ cry living Confederate. As it was, the battery men 
stood by their guns and fought them as long as they were able 
to fire, and v/hen the enemy rushed on so they could not load, 
they fought hand to hand with rammers, hand spikes and 
stones — anything they could lay their hands on. Re-enforce- 
ments came from the 2nd corps; also from Gen. Shurz's di- 
vision, who charged the victorious Confederates and drove them 
down the hill pell mcll. This gave the artillery another oppor- 
tunity to open a murderous fire on the retreating enemy, and 
nothing but the smoke of battle, which settled down, and dark- 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 155 

ness, saved this attacking column from total annihilation. As 
it was the enemy on this front suffered great slaughter. As a 
sample the Louisiana Tigers, on which the Confederates doted 
(their name was expected to strike terror to the hearts of the 
Yankees), went into this engagement with 1,750 men and came 
out with only one hundred and fifty men, and, it is said, they 
never attempted to organize this command again. This closed 
the fighting for the second day, with the defeat of the Confed- 
erates at every point. It is true Johnson had walked into some 
of the Union vacant entrenchments and had the privilege of 
resting in them over night, but he was isolated from the balance 
of the Confederate army, and although Lee determined to re- 
enforce him, he failed to do this in time to save him from defeat 
in the morning, he being attacked at daylight by Geary's di- 
vision, who returned that night. The reason Johnson was not 
re-enforced in time to save his defeat by Geary in the morn- 
ing, was the converging roads running into Gettysburg, making 
it necessary for the Confederates to travel so far to reach him 
that they were not able to get there in time. Then the Union 
line being formed something in the shape of a horse shoe, or 
fish hook, rather, gave them a short distance to travel to re- 
enforce either fiank or center on short notice. On the night of 
July 2nd a council of war was held at Meade's headquarters, and 
the corps commanders voted unanimously to stay and fight it 
out where they were. Meade reluctantly acquiesced in their de- 
cision. He said this was no place to fight a battle. But here 
was Johnson's division holding a position that was a dangerous 
one to the Union army if he should be re-enforced in time. 
Hence it was necessary to attack hirn early in the morning. For 
that purpose batteries, as before stated, were placed at every 
point, to rake his lines, that were possible. When Geary came 



156 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

up with his division about twelve o'clock that night he formed 
his lines on the flank and front of Johnson. Then waited for 
daylight to appear for the final attack. In the meantime Geary's 
division was reinforced from other commands, which the short 
distance from one fiank to the other enabled the Union army 
to do rapidly without endangering any other part of their lines. 
Gen. Early was determined to reinforce Johnson, and hold on 
to the advantageous ground as a basis from which to rout the 
Union army. And his best efforts failed, because he was not 
able to reach Johnson in time with re-enforcements, but as soon 
as the first ray of light made its appearance, the Union artillery 
opened an enfilading nre on the Confederates. They did not 
bring any artillery with them because of the roughness of the 
country, and no highways over which they could transport it, 
and where troops have no means of defense except musketry 
it is hard to hold them very long under this kind of artillery 
fire. In Johnson's case there was but one of two things to do. 
Either charge the enemy in front and secure a better position, 
or fall back to cover for his men. He chose the former and 
ordered a charge, led by Stonewall Jackson's old brigade. They 
met Kane's brigade, who had never permitted the enemy to 
run over them. Here the contest was a most desperate one for 
four hours on the rough ground, among the rocks and trees. 
Finally the Union forces were working around on the enemy's 
flank and rear, .vhich compelled Johnson to order his men to 
fall back in time to save them from being taken prisoners. This 
ended tLe fighting of infantry on the Union right and the Union 
lines were coinpletely restored. This last fighting was wholly 
caused by the great blunder of Meade in ordering Geary to leave 
his entrenchments where he was needed, as before stated, and 
where the enemy was known to be moving for an attack, and go 



THE BA.TTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 167 

to a point where he was not needed. When the fighting on the 
right had ceased, which was about ii a. ni., all was quiet, and 
the men in the Union army were seeking rest in some reclining 
position, and pretty generally drawing their rations of whiskey, 
which had been ordered issued, and never were they more ap- 
preciated. I was in command of my regiment, the 57th Pa. 
Vols., by reason of being senior captain. The major was cap- 
tured the day before, and the colonel being wounded in one of 
his fingers after he left me at the brick house, and I did not see 
him again in five months. I instructed the adjutant to send in 
the report of the morning before, July 2nd. on which we would 
draw whiskey rations. Although we had been reduced so we 
did not have more than one-third of that number, I believed 
it was right then, and have never changed my mind. Within 
two hours of the issue of whiskey my brigade was required to 
make a double quick march for a mile and a half or two miles 
in the hot sun to the right to meet Pickett's charge, and we 
accomplished it without a single straggler. With the men in 
the vv'orn-out physical condition the 3rd corps was July 3rd, I am 
sure they could not have accomplished that march on such good 
time without this stimulant. T don't consider this any argu- 
ment in favor of guzzling whiskey ordinarily, but to show how 
an exhausted body of men can be stimulated to perform almost 
superhuman acts, while the stimulant lasts. When we had made 
this double quick march the whiskey was so well worked out of 
the command, that they were in excellent trim for a charge. It 
was a great disappointment to Gen. Lee and Gen. Ewell that 
Johnson's division was driven out on the morning of the 3rd 
from the trenches he had captured the night of July 2nd. If he 
could have been re-enforced in time to hold his position and 
had succeeded in it. there is not a doubt but what the Union 



J 58 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

army would have been defeated at Gettysburg. How disastrous 
the defeat would have been no one can tell, for no one could 
tell how many more such blunders Meade would have made. 
The ordering of Geary out of his trenches by Meade at a time 
when he knew, from the report of Slocum, one of the most 
reliable officers in the army, that the enemy was near and about 
to attack this point, it was at least childish and a pettish thing to 
do, entirely unnecessary. The Sixth corps, one of the strongest 
corps, was in reserve nearer to Little Round Top than Geary's 
division. One of their divisions, or the whole corps for that 
matter, could have been ordered to take the trenches. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 



159 




Diagram of the Attack on the Left Centre. July :i,l. 



CHAPTER IX, 

Battle of the Third Day. Steward Tries to Secure a Position 
to Rear of Union Lines. Was Defeated. Pickett's Charge 
ond Defeat. Corps Commanders Desire to Make a Counter 
Charge. ]\Ieade Not Inclined to Do It. 

Geary had left and the great sacrifice of human life that 
was made to regain the trenches would have been saved, to say 
nothing of the chance of losing for ever a commanding position 
that would force the Union army to abandon the field, or subject 
themselves to a disastrous defeat and the only reason they were 
not compelled to choose between these alternatives was there 
were no direct roads, and the country was so rough that rein- 
forcements could not reach Johnson in time to enable him tc 
maintain his position. The driving of Johnson out of Geary's 
tranches takes us up to eleven o'clock, July 3d. All the morning 
the Confederates had worked industriously to move troops to 
reinforce Johnson. At the same time Lee was planning and 
organizing a storming column that w'ould strike the right center 
of the Union army with great force, while at the same time 
Johnson with his reinforced columns, as Lee expected, would 
come forward with all his force to meet the storming column 
in front. The result of this move could not be doubted. But 
by the prowess of the rank and file of this noble band, the 
grandest army on earth, who offered themselves a sacrifice that 
the Union might live, this little plan was spoiled. Johnson was 
not m position to aid h's Confederates. For this the thanks 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 161 

of a reunited nation should be extended to the rank and file for 
all time, but the Confederates' storming columns that were ex- 
pected to strike the right center f the Union line had been 
organized and taken their places for the onslaught. Now the 
chances for their success had been materially lessened by t'.ie 
defeat of Johnson. He was no longer in position to aid them. 
The situation was being narrowed down on the part of the 
Confederates to the alternatives of going forward with the 
charge that had been planned, notwithstanding the changed 
conditions, or to retreat on Richmond. If tic latter course should 
be adopted the Confederate army and the whole Confederacy 
would be humiliated beyond reparation. It was conceded by 
the Confederate government that the fall of Vicksburg was 
only a question of time, and unless Lee's invasion of the North- 
ern states was a success, so as to counteract the fall or Vicks- 
burg, that the credit of the Confederacy would be gone and all 
foreign credit and sympathy would be destroyed. Thus Lee 
was goaded on to almost desperation, and he determined to 
make the charge of July 3d, 186:5. The judgment of his corps 
commanders was opposed to any further offensive movements 
on their part, but Lee was obdurate and would not yield. Pick- 
ett's division was the only one In the Confederate army that 
had not suffered to any great extent at this time. So they were 
early in the day marshalled for the fray in the timber and broken 
ground to the right of the Seminary, but with all their precau- 
tion it was known that the Confederates were massing for some 
purpose. The Union lines had been strengthened at every 
'point. The two Rdund Tops had been entrenched and crowned 
with as much artillery and men as could be used. Just a: they 
should have been on the morning of July 2d. and Gen. Hunt 
chief of artillery, ordered up as many gun- as could be placroiii. 



162 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

position to work to advantage, along the Union line, which was 
eighty. The Confederates brought in line to oppose these one 
hundred and fifteen guns. The reason the enemy could bring 
more artillery into use was their line was much longer, on 
account of its concave formation, while the Union line being 
convex, made their line present a shorter front to face any given 
point on the enemy's line. While the enemy could arrange 
guns to bear on the Union front from any point on their lines, 
the Union convex line in passing from right to left would turn 
so much that it would soon take the guns out of range of the 
Confederate center. The Union line was much more convex 
than the Confederates was concave. The preparations for the 
third day's struggle was going on up to near one o'clock p. m. 
After Johnson had been driven out of the position he occupied 
the night before it became necessary to supply his place in rear 
of the Union line, if possible, with some Confederate force 
that would be in position if Pickett's charge was successful in 
breaking through the Union lines to charge from the rear, and 
aid Pickett to maintain his position and strike a stunning blow 
on the right flank of the Union army, where the breach had 
been made by Pickett for this purpose. Stewart's cavalry was 
hastily thrown in. hoping they would gain a position of ad- 
vantage that would to a great extent compensate for the one 
Johnson had been driven out of earlier in the day. Stewart went 
forward and struck the Union cavalry commanded by Gen. Mc- 
Gregg, at White's creek, where it crosses the Baltimore pike. 
Here was fought one of the most desperate cavalry battles dur- 
ing the war. There were charges and counter charges on each 
side successively, of the most desperate nature. The indi- 
vidual daring exhibited in this battle lias never been excelled in 
any war. Stewart claimed if Pickett had succeeded he was in a 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 163 

position to cut off the Union arm3's retreat. But wc don't 
see how the army was in much danger from him if he was not 
able to get away with Gregg's division of cavalry, aided only by 
Custers brigade, for he was driven back. In the evening Stew- 
art fell back to guard the left flank of Ewell's corps. This was 
looked upon as the turning point of the war. All in the Union 
army looked upon this as the turning point, and hoped to end 
the war before the enemy could reach Virginia again. The 
time came for the final test, the enemy had, it is claimed, seven- 
teen thousand troops massed for this charge. Supported on 
the left by Pettigrew commanding Heath's division, and Pend- 
er's division and in rear of Pender was Wright's brigade. 
Pickett was supported on his right by Wilcox's brigade and such 
other support as Longstreet could send forward for that pur- 
pose. It did not require much time for the Union army tn 
form to meet the attack of the Confederates. Their lines were 
so formed they could reinforce any point in less than one half 
the time it would take the Confederates to reinforce theirs. 
One o'clock p. m. was the time set to open fire by the Confed- 
erates, and promptly at that time the first gun was fired. In 
no time the whole one hundred and fifteen guns were paying 
their respects to the Union army by dropping their bursting 
shells among them in every direction. The eighty Union guns 
immediately replied and soon ihc ground was being torn up and 
fragments of shells was sweeping the ground in every direc- 
tion. Gun carriages and limber boxes were knocked into 
smithereens. Caisons filled with ammunition were blown up 
in every direction, destroying every living thing near them. 
Fully twelve of those monster amnnniition wagons were blown 
up on the Unio" side and about as many more of the Confed- 
erates, Each one would make the ground tremble something 



164 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

like an earthquake. For two long hours this terrible fire was 
kept up without cessation. It really seemed much longer to 
the troops that were supporting the artillery. No more trying 
position can be found to place a soldier in than supporting bat- 
teries when there is no enemy near, so they can use their own 
guns. A duel of artillery so-called, like this, for two hours 
renders a great many guns unserviceable. Some that had been 
injured by some parts being broken by reason of their having 
been struck with shots from the enemy's guns and all more or 
less useless by heat, after two hours steady firing. General 
Hunt, chief of artillery, ordered his men to cease firing and 
immediately ordered all disabled guns out of line, and replaced 
them with guns from the reserve that had not been in action, 
and the whole line was then replaced with serviceable guns and 
cartridges. This allowed the hot guns that had not been broken. 
time to cool ofif. This stop deceived the Confederates. They 
thought that they had so disabled the Union guns that they could 
not be used any more and that their charging columns would 
have an easy walk-over, until they came in range of the in- 
fantry fire. We have stated that Gen. Longstreet was opposed 
to fighting at Gettysburg an offensive battle. Alexander Steph- 
ens, vice-president of the Confederacy, says in his history of the 
War of Rebellion. "When the time came for the charge July 
3rd, Picket waited for Longstreet's order to move. When the 
signal gun was fired at headquarters for the column to start, 
Pickett rode over to where Longstreet was and not getting 
orders to start, said to Longstreet, T shall go forward, sir,' to 
which he got no reply, but Pickett gave the order to move." 
The distance the attacking column had to travel to reach the 
Union line on the crest of Cemetery Ridge, was at least a mile 
and a half. Most of that distance was an open plain. As soon 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 165 

as the Confederate column cleared the timber on Seminary 
Ridge, the Union artillery opened fire on them, first with solid 
shot and then shell, and as soon as they came in range, with 
double canister. The guns on Little Round Top did ex- 
cellent service, raking the enemy's columns from right to left. 
The enemy's guns were not idle all this time. As soon as the 
Union batteries opened on Pickett's charging column, the Con- 
federate guns opened on them. They had to be cautious about 
their fire and kept out of range of their own columns, but the 
Union batteries were tearing great gaps through Pickett's 
charging columns which would immediately close up. Never 
slackening their forward, headlong march but once, when the 
head of their column was near the Emmetsburg road, they 
coolly haulted and in spite of the canister shot that was plow- 
ing great gaps through their columns, they changed front ob- 
liquely to their left, then rushed forward. Their last course 
brought them up against the 2nd corps, but it seems to us this 
last move was a bad one, for two reasons, it separated Pickett's 
column for a long distance from Wilcox's brigade, which did 
not change to follow Pickett's movement, and permitted a bri- 
gade of the 1st corps, they missed by this oblique movement, to 
swing around on their right flank and rear and pour in volley 
after volley in their closed columns, and exposed their right to 
the fire of the ist corps as tiiey passed in range of them, so 
that when they reached the 2nd corps they were too badly shat- 
tered to make any serious impression upon that corps, but they 
were desperate and pushed forward, even breaking through the 
first line and General Armstead leading what was left of his bri- 
gade, in a mad. crazy fit of desperation, took off his hat and 
put it on the point of his sword, waved it in the air, shouted, 
"Come on. give them the cold steel." and rushed up to and 



166 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

laid his hand on one of the Union guns, where he was shot 
down, while this broken mass of men were desperate and rush- 
ing headlong into certain death, the great mass in their rear 
were being taken prisoners or scattered and retreating. Gen. 
Armstead, it is said, fought on the Union side at the first battle 
of Bull Run, but for some cause went over to the Confederates, 
which he doubtless regretted afterwards, for in his death strug- 
gle, he signalled .^ome one to come to him, and in a weak voice, 
said, "Tell Hancock I have wronged him and wronged mv 
country." When this charge of Pickett's was over and the 
enemy was straggling to the rear demoralized, the officers of 
Graham's brigade to which I belonged, was wondering if we 
would be put in on a counter-charge. We knew we had run a 
mile or more to our right, while Pickett's charge was going on 
and saw other troops moving to the same point. We all knew 
the 6th corps, one of the strongest in the army, had not been 
engaged. If any man but Meade had been in command that 
corps would have been placed in position as well as the 12th 
corps, which was still strong, and in rear of ist and 2nd corps, 
where Pickett's columns were steering for. This preparation 
ought to have all been made when Pickett first developed his 
movement. Gibbons sent an aide to Meade to notify him of Pick- 
ett's advance, thinking probably that he would ride to the 
front so as to be where he could direct his columns in a counter- 
charge, for it seems that all the officers were expecting some- 
thing of this kind. The Confederates, for two days in succes- 
sion, had made desperate efforts to break the Union lines, and 
if this, rhe third effort failed, it was expected every available 
man would be massed to be ready for a counter-charge, which 
would crush the enemy. Hancock was wounded and laying irf 
an ambulance in rear, wrote a note to Meade urging him to 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 167 

mass his forces and make a counter-charge before the enemy 
had time to rally. All the officers knew that in the attacks 
of the second and third day, that the enemy would exhaust 
themselves so they could make but feeble resistance if a counter- 
charge should be made by the Union army, but if the Union 
army waited until the Confederates had time to reinforce their 
shattered lines and dig trenches, the chances for success would 
be materially diminished if not nearly impracticable. But Gen. 
Meade did not make any arrangements for a counter-charge, 
nor did he have any idea of such a movement. In fact he took 
but little interest in the battle of Gettysburg from first to last. 
His greatest effort was to prevent the battles being fought 
there. When the artillery firing began July 3rd. his headquar- 
ters were invaded by the enemy's shells, to the txtent that a 
horse or two belonging to his aides were killed, and others 
struck uncomfortably close. He then moved Headquarters over 
with Gen. Slocum at Power's hill, and gave little, if any, personal 
attention to the battle. It was unfortunate for the army that 
a billions cholic or some other serious attack of sickness could 
not have seized Meade on June 29th, so he would have been 
compelled to have been taken to Washington and held there 
in hospital until about the tenth or twelfth of July. If this 
had happened and either Reynolds, Sickles. Sedgwick, Slocum. 
Hancock, Pleasanton. or, in fact most any of the corps com- 
manders, had taken his place, they would have moved the army 
so they would all have been in supporting distance at Gettysburg 
July 1st, which would have saved the ist corps from almost anni- 
silation by an overwhelming force of the enemy on that day. So, 
loo. would they in all probability have fortified Little and Big 
Round Tops, and been prepared to fight a successful battle at 
Gettysburg each day. and not one but what would have ordered a 



168 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

counter-charge July 3rd. Here is where some optimist will 
say, "any one can criticise after it is all over, but very few, if 
any can forsee the events that are to take place." and then re- 
peat the trite saying of Henry Ward Beecher about his fore- 
sight not being as perfect as his hind sight, etc., and when they 
have said this think they have produced an argument which is 
not susceptible of further discussion. But I want to say to 
those gentlemen that all military movements, if the army has 
a competent commander, are governed by perfect scientific prin- 
ciples, among which are these: When an army is moved against 
the enemy, the commander knows what the enemy must do to 
counteract his movement and each watches the other, and having 
well developed plans of battle in case a battle takes place. Every 
general who is fit to command an army has well matured plans 
of all great battles he engages in before the battle takes place. 
Hooker's plan of the battle of Gettysburg was fully developed 
long before the army crossed the Potomac. When ]\Ieade took 
command his first acts were to obliterate all of Hooker's plans 
as far as possible. One of Hooker's plans was to fight at 
Gettysburg. This ]\Ieade determined should not be. although 
he finally yielded to the judgment of his corps commanders, 
for the reason he could not help it. the battle was on when l\e 
arrived. He seemed to act like a stubborn child, as though 
he did not care whether the battle turned out to be a defeat 
or a victory. Corps commanders on the third day, when the 
enemy's movements developed, advised the concentration of all 
available troops on their right center, where it developed the 
enmy would strike, for two reasons, first was. if the enemy 
broke through the lines that had been formed to receive them, 
that the concentrated forces would be at hand to crush their 
shattered forces, and the second reason was that thev would 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 



169 



be at hand to n.akc a counter-charge. By all the rules of war- 
fare this should have been done. Meade has said he intended 
to attack the enemy on their right flank, with the 5th corp. 
Doubleday says he does not beh'eve Meade intended to attack 
the enemy on their right July 3rd. for he says he converged 
with a corps commander the next morning, July 4th. who had 
just left Gen. Meade, and he said Meade says he thinks he can 
hold out here part of another day if the enemy attacks This 
shows Meade to have been a very timid man, unfit to lead a 
gallant army like that of the Potomac, to operate against a 
brave, energetic strategist like Robert E. Lee. This was the 
situation: the enemy had made two unsuccessful attacks on both 
flanks of the Union army, and having met with great slaughter 
and defeat, with net one division or brigade of their army but 
what was badly crippled, while the Union army had three corps, 
the 5th, 6th and 12, that were comparatively fresh. The 6th 
had not been engaged, and the balance of the army although 
they had fought desperate battles in the past three days, would 
have rejoiced to have learned that the enemy was going to 
make the third attack on Cemetery Ridge. Yet the commander 
of that gallant army, looking across the valley or plain of a mile 
and a half, at an enemy whose ranks had been broken, shat- 
tered and discouraged. Not one of its divisions but what had 
suffered great loss in the past three days. Some completely 
disorganized. One can hardly bring themselves to believe that 
the commander of this gallant Union army could be brought to 
make the humiliating statement that if the enemy attacked he 
might be able to hold on there for only a half day longer, and 
yet the evidence is of such a reliable character that he did say 
this, that we are compelled to give it credence, and his manage- 
ment of the army later. prr^Pc he meant what he said. But his 



170 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

failure to profit hy the advice of his corps commanders, and pre- 
pare to make the counter-charge on the third day was a mis- 
take that permitted the enemy to fortify their shattered lines and 
enable them to begin their retreat to Virginia, which they be- 
gan as soon as their heavy train could be moved in that direc- 
tion. When Pickett's charge failed, the officers of the Confed- 
erate army were surprised that the Union army did not follow 
Pickett's shattered columns up with a counter-charge. Hear 
what they have to say: Gen. Longstreet says, "When Pickett's 
charge failed I expected, of course, the enemy would throw 
themselves agiinst our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I 
sent my stafT officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, 
and hurried to our line of batteries, as the only support I could 
give them. I knew if the army was to be saved these batteries 
must check the enemy. For unaccountable reasons the enemy 
did not pursue his advantage." 

Colonel Alexander, chief of Longstreet's artillery, says: "'I 
have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest op- 
portunity they ever had for routing Lee's army by a prompt of- 
fensive—is it necessary now to add any statement as to the su- 
periority of the federal forces or the exhausted and shattered 
condition of the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in 
their very center to show that a great opportunity was thrown 
away. I think General Lee himself was quite apprehensive that 
the enemy would, and it was that apprehension whicli brought 
him alone out to my guns, where he could observe all the in- 
dications." 

The above was a communication to the Southern historical 

papers. 

General Triumble who commanded a division of Hill's corps 
which supported Pickett in his charge, says: "By all the rules 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 171 

of warfare the federal troops should, (as I supposed they would), 
liave marched against our shattered columns and sought to cover 
oOT army with an overwhelming defeat." 

Colonel Simms, who commanded a Georgia brigade, wrote in 
a letter to General Crawford, of the Union army, as follows: 

■"There was much confusion in our army so far as my obser- 
vation extended, and I think we would ha\e made but feeble 
resistance if you had pressed on on the evening of the 3rd." 

General Doubleday says: "General Meade, however, over- 
come with the great responsibilities of his position, still clung 
to the ridge and fearful of a possible disaster would not take the 
risk of making an advance, and yet if he could have succeeded 
in crushing Lee's army then and there, he would have saved 
two years of war with its immense loss of life and countless 
evils. He might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's corps. 
^vhich had not been actively engaged in the battle, for even if it 
had been repulsed the blows it gave would leave the enemy 
little inclination to again assail the heights. 

It should have been known to Meade and probably was, 
that the enemy's artillery cartridges were exhausted, and on ac- 
count of the long distance it would have to be transported, and 
reports that came to the Union army of the capture of convoys 
of ammunition and when firing ceased on the Confederate side 
they barely had twenty rounds of artillery cartridges left to each 
gun, and there was a mile from Hill's right to Longstreet's left. 
That there were no troops to fill their trenches and Longstreet 
tells us that he knew if the Union army made a counter-charge 
and the Confederate army was saved, it must be by the use oi 
their artillery, which he went to arrange in the best position 
for that purpose. How desperate must have been the situa- 
tion of the Confederates. The general officers rushing from 



172 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

one point to another, encouraging their commands, trying to 
arrange them in a position to make the best defense possible, 
knowing it must be feeble if the Union army followed up their 
advantage, but were happy when night put an end to the day's 
carnage. The difference in the situation of the two armies 
when Pickett's charge on the evening of July 3rd failed, the 
Confederate officers from Gen. Lee down, were united that if 
the Union army made a counter-charge and followed Pickett's 
shattered command up closely that the result would prove dis- 
astrous to the Confederates and they were aiding their com- 
mander to try and avert the coming disaster to their army. 
Whereas the Union under officers, were trying to urge upon 
their commander the necessity of arranging a reserve to be ready 
in case of Pickett's defeat, to go forward in a counter-charge. 
But their advice was not heeded. Meade seemed to act as 
though his army was the only one in danger and if he saved 
them from annihilation by the Confederates and caused the 
enemy to retreat back into Virginia, he had done all that was 
required of him. At 6:30 o'clock p. m., firing on both sides 
ceased and the battle of Gettysburg was practically ended. 



CHAPTER X. 

The Confederate Army Retreats To Virginia Soil With Very- 
Little Inconvenience Caused By General ^Meade. 

On the night of July 3rd, Lee sent for his trusted officers, 
and, as one of them writes to the southern historical journal 
(copied into Stephens' history), they arrived at headquarters 
some time in advance of their chief, and when he rode up he 
dismounted and without saying a word leaned over, placing 
his arms over his horse's neck and his head resting on his arms, 
remained in that position, it seemed, half an hour. No one 
spoke, the reverence which they held for their chief prevented 
any con\'crsation on their part. After the lapse of this time, 
he lifted his head and said: "It is all my fault, no one is to 
blame for this defeat but myself. We have got to retreat, go 
back to Virginia." Me then gave orders for each one to execute, 
etc. Lee's anxiety seemed to be how he was going to get his 
army back into Virginia with their long train of wagons, which 
would stretch out over thirty miles. This was a problem no 
one could solve. Meade held the key to the situation, and re- 
solved to use ii with such due decorum as would enable 
Lee to get back into Virginia with the least inconvenience to 
himself and his army. On the 4th of July, the Confederates 
began their retreat, preceded by a large portion of their train. 
The outposts reported the Confederates were retreating. It 
was hard to make Meade believe this. He thought it was a 
trick Lee was playino; to draw him out, a trap set. He sent 



174 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

the cavalry out to ascertain where the enemy was. General 
Birney, of the 3rd corps, advanced a reconnoitering party, who 
found the enemy moving in the direction of Fairfield, to all 
appearance in a big hurry and retreating. Birney's advance 
opened fire on them with a battery, but Meade checked this ad- 
vance and cautioned them that on no account to bring on an 
engagement. When this reconnoitering party returned, as they 
were ordered, we talked with some of the ollicers and they were 
indignant to think they were not permitted to pursue the enemy. 
Meade ordered the ca\alry to follow in the direction of Fred- 
erick. It got on the llank of the retreating army and dashed in 
at different passes in South Mountain cutout and destroyed 
large blocks of the ^.nemy\< train on the 5lh of July. It was 
known to a certainty that tlie enemy had left their lines of en- 
trenchments in front of the Unicjn army and was in full retreat. 
General Meade ordered Sedgwick, of the 6th corps, to follow the 
enemy up. No other corps was ordered to move. The 6th 
corps came up with the rear guard of the enemy at Fairfield 
Pass July 6th. This column of the enemy was commanded by 
General Early. He was in great trouble trying to get his 
train out of the mud, which was badly tangled up. Sedgwick 
started a harmless artillery fusilade which was kept up for some 
time. He then retired and reported that the position was too 
-Strong to be carried. 

Gen. Doubleday thinks differently. He thinks Sedgwick 
ought to have attacked Early and the whole army should have 
been brought up, that this pass was two miles wide and if Lee 
had turned back and formed line to prevent Meade's progress 
against Early it would leave his wagon train more exposed, and 
the Union cavalry reinforced by the troops that marched out 
from Washington and Baltimore, could have annihilated Lee's 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 175 

train, and on account of a great rise in the Potomac and Lee's 
pontoons having been destroyed, could ha\e intercepted tlie 
enemy's convoy of artillery cartridges and with reinforcements 
that were near could and doubtless would have destroyed the 
Confederate army. He expected help frum militia that were 
forming in Pennsylvania. 

Doubleday's ideas and reasoning was all right, but his plans 
were based upon the supposition that the Uniun army would 
be commanded by a dashing, daring generl, who would take ad- 
vantage of all th.e conditions that were favorable for the Union 
army. But General Meade was not that kind of a general. 
His whole career, from the time he took command of the army 
until Lee surrendered, is proof against probable success, and that 
}>Ieade could not be relied upon to make an active, brilliant 
campaign; his opportunities were many while he commanded 
the army, but in no instance did he take advantage of a single 
one whereby he could, had he been a brilliant army com- 
mander, have destroyed Lee's Confederate organization. Time 
and the results of the campaign go to pro\e that if Meade 
had followed the campaign Hooker had planned, Lee'.- army 
would never have reached Virginia. But in order to please 
Halleck, his first official act was to change Hooker's plans as 
far as he could with the acquiesence of his corps commanders 
and stafT. By doing this he failed to ha\e his army massed at 
Gettysburg, on or before July ist, in early morning, result, for 
want of proper support the first corps was so badly cut up as to 
nearly ruin it, and the nth corps was badly crippled for the 
same reason. These two infantry corps and Gen. Buford's 
division of cavalry were compelled to fight, unaided, four times 
their numbcT. It is true this small command by their un- 
exampled valor, held this overwhelming enemy, unaided, from 



176 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

nine o'clock a. m. until near six p. m.. when they were rein- 
forced by the arrival of the 3rd and 12th coros. The result 
of this day's battle was that this small Union force by their in- 
domitable prowess saved Cemetery Ridge, which has gone 
down in history as the ground on which was fought the second 
and third days' battle of Gettysburg. But the usefulness of 
those corps had been too much impaired by reason of their not 
having been supported in time the first day, and of course, af- 
fected materially the result of the three days' battle and all be- 
cause Meade was determined to so change Hooker's plans that 
the battle would not be fought at Gettysburg, and as a further 
result of Meade's determination to change Hooker's plan of 
battle which worked adversely to the final success of the Union 
army was his ordering the force which Hooker had placed in 
the Cumberland Valley, to vacate that position. This accord- 
ing to an old trite saying left the enemy a clear and unencum- 
bered highway by which they did, after their defeat, fold their 
tents and quietly steal away behind their entrenched camps into 
Virginiaj with little or no opposition, also left those great high- 
ways open by which they were enabled .to replenish their much 
needed and exhausted supply of artillery cartridges. It will be 
remembered that after the third day's battle the enemy only 
had twenty rounds of artillery ammunition left for each gun. 
which, if their source of supply was cut ofif would soon be ex- 
hausted and they would then be in a helpless condition. But it 
now stood this way, the avenue was left open and when the 
enemy retreated he was left to pursue his course comparatively 
peacefully, and soon met his artillery cartridge convoys, from 
which a full supply was obtained. This was the direct result of 
changing Hooker's plans which made the enemy's escape into 
Virginia possible. About noon Saturday, July 4th. it began to 



THE BA.TTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 177 

rai 1, in fact it poured and continued until late, or near Sunday 
morning, July 5tli. TIk country here is mostly clay loam, and 
as soon as the army hegan to move artillery and heavy wagons, 
horses and troops, the mud was worked to a fearful depth and 
it is a wonder the enemy ever got through with their thirty 
miles of wagon train, and if they h;id heui hurried they could 
never have made it. On July 7th, the SJlh. i F4th and 141st Penn- 
sylvania regiments were temporarily consolidated by order of 
General Hobart Ward, commanding the division. By this order I 
was placed in coriimand of the three regiments. This was done 
because the three regiments had become so used up in battle 
the second da}- that it was thought best to consolidate them in 
order to make a respectable appearing command. The regi- 
ments went into action July 2d. with from ^~s ^<^ 500 guns each. 
My recollection is when they were united. July 7th, the whole 
command could not muster but 375 guns, and not a field officer 
left in either regiment. This consolidation did not last more 
than a week or ten days, or until the sick and wounded officers 
and men returned to their commands. T(j that extent so each 
regiment was again enabled to assume their separate regimental 
duties on Tuesday, July 7th. The whole Union army was in 
motion, very slowly following up the Confederates. Our fol- 
lowing was not in rear urging the enemy out (^f the country, 
but was a parallel movement at a respectful distance on the east 
side of South Mountain. The Confederates were on the west 
side, 15 or 20 miles apart on parallel lines. The Confederates' 
objective point was Williamsport. and Falling Waters, where 
they expected to cross the Potomac river into \'irginia. To 
reach this point they would have to march about forty-five miles 
to reach Falling Waters, or forty miles to reach Williamsport. 
On Tuesday. July 7th. the main body of the Confederate army 



378 THB BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

was at Hagerstown. five miles from Williamsport, or ten miles 
from Falling Waters, but here their trouble began. The river 
had raised so as to overflow its banks and General French, 
whose division had been stationed at Frederick, sent out an 
expedition to Williamsport and Falling Waters, that destroyed 
all the enemy's pontoon bridges. They were in a bad condition 
if an active enemy had been pushing them, but the Confederates 
began cutting timber for a bridge, replenished their artillery 
cartridges and built strong earthworks from Williamsport to a 
point five miles below Falling Waters, where the right of their 
army rested and in one of the strongest natural positions that 
could have been selected. I don't believe they could have been 
driven from it if a determined resistence had been made by foin* 
times their number. The time had passed for the Union army 
to strike a crushing IjIqw in thi^ campaign. If, as General 
Doubleday says, the Union army had followed up and attacked 
vigorousl3' Sunday. July 5th. or Monday, the 6th, while the 
enemy was on the move, their artillery cartridges nearly ex- 
hausted, a long wagon train to look after and get through the 
mud, there is very little doubt but. what the Union army would 
have gained a great victory, possibly the destruction of the 
Confederate army would have followed, and quite probably il 
the troops at Washington, Baltimore and Harpers' Ferry had 
co-operated, but what is the use in speculating in what would 
be the result, wdiile General George G. Meade commanded the 
army. The press and even the president became restless, and 
the president ordered Meade to attack. But when the Union 
army finally started in pursuit it took a route 25 or 30 miles 
farther than the Confederates had to travel to reach their cross- 
in-. So when the Union army started to follow- the Confed- 
-erates up July 7th, they were 65 or 70 miles from Williamsport. 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 179 

or Falling WatcM's, the point at which the Confederates must 
cross into Virginia. While the Confederates were only ten 
miles from their crossing. The Union army, after marching five 
days, came up with the Confederates in their entrenched camp 
around Falling Waters and Wiliamsport, Sunday, July 12. The 
rank and file of the Union army expected, and desired to at- 
tack the enemy immediately, but the day was used up in get- 
ting into position. The next day. }>Ionday, July 13th, was set 
lor the attack. .\I1 day was spent in reconnoitering and getting 
into position. The next morning was set as a sure thing. The 
3rd corps was on the left of the army, below Falling Waters, 
and closed up to the enemy's works in easy range of their rifles, 
on open ground. No guns were fired. Tuesday morning. 
July 14th, all were up and had breakfast over by daylight and 
were anxiously waiting for the general order, forward. Soon 
after sunrise skirmishing began on our right, which did not 
last long. Then came a cheer from tjie skirmishers. \\'e 
knew the cheer came from Union men and hoped that the Con- 
federates had surrendered, and while we were thus speculating, 
the news came down the line to us that the enemy had com- 
l)leted the construction of their bridge on the slight of Monday. 
July 13th and all had succeeded in getting across the river safe 
on Virginia soil, except about fifteen hundred, the rear guard. 
who had been captured. This was sad news to the rank and 
hie of the Union army. \^ery few were disposed to boast of 
their victory at Gettysburg. They had hoped to end the war in 
Pennsylvania. It is hard now to find language at this late day 
to express the disappointment of the rank and file of the Union 
army at the result of this campaign. They were as sanguine of 
their success in this campaign as their commander. Gen. Hooker. 
v;-.s. They knew the two last days' fighting at Gettysburg had 



180 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

been very disastrous to the Confederate army, and as a result the 
Confederate organization had been greatly weakened, and should 
have been destroyed before they could again have reached Vir- 
ginia, and wondered why it was not done. All were hopeful 
this would be the final result, until the Confederates finally 
crossed the Pctomac river on the night of July 13. Then did 
the rank and tile of the Union army realize for the first time 
since the battle began that a great victory had slipped from 
them through the timidity, over-cautious incompetency of their 
present commander. Lee had out-generaled Meade and got 
away. There was nothing left for the Union -army to do but 
move on a parallel line to the Confederates and protect Wash- 
ington. They were soon in motion; slowly but sadly they wended 
their way to Harper's Ferry, where they crossed into Virginia. 
It was more like a funeral procession than the proud army 
that marched into Pennsylvania and fought one of the most 
desperate battles that was ever fought on this continent. All 
realized that their new commander was too timid and for the 
balance of the year the army settled down to the humiliat^fig 
position of an army of observation, but Halleck_ and the ad- 
ministration seemed to be perfectly satisfied with Meade as a 
commander of the army of the Potomac. Probably for the 
reason that he was not liable to become brilliant enough to be 
a dangerous rival to either. 

General F. W. Pelfry, who wrote for Scribners' Sons, one of 
a series of pubhcations known as Antietam and Fredericksburg^ 
has this to say of the army of the Potomac: "It would be too 
much to say that there are no sadder stories in military history 
than that of the army of the Potomac, but its story is sad 
enough, always better than its commanders, always ready to 
stand in the evil hour and having done all, to stand. It marched 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 181 

and fought, and hungered and thirsted for four long years, 
hardly ever animated by viclory. It showed in all it endured 
and achieved that it was an admirable instrument for the hand 
that knew how lo wield it. but it never had the good fortune 
to be commanded by a soldier who was worthy of it. It fought 
through to the end. It did its work and gained its crown, but 
its path was long and rough and seldom cheered, and one of its 
saddest and sharpest experiences was its brave, hopeless effort 
at Fredericksburg." 

The above wc most heartily endorse, except in one instance, 
and one paragraph. That one instance is in relation to the com- 
mander of the army ot the Potomac. It once had a commander 
who was worth}' of it. and that one instance was in General 
Joseph Hooker. General Pelfry did not know how Hooker 
was handicapped while he had command of the army, for all 
the facts had not come to light when he wrote the foregoing, 
for if they had I am sure he had the courage and independence 
to have given that gallant commander credit for his masterly 
cftorts of the battle of Chancellorsville, the truth of which 
has never been written nor was it known to Comrade Pelfry 
that Hooker was about to cross the Rappahannock and crush 
Hill, whose nearest support was thirty miles away, but was 
stopped by the president and Halleck. Nor did he know when 
the foregoing was written by him. that the troops of Dix, Hint- 
zleman, Schenk and the Middle department had been assigned 
to Hooker's commancT by order of the president, and when tlic 
time came that Hooker could use some of these troops to crush 
the Confederate army then in Pennsylvania, he issued the order 
placing them in line on the eve of a great battle. Halleck 
seated in his comfortable ofilice in \\'ashington, countermanded 
the order and was backed up and sustained by the president, and 



182 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

on account of successive rebuffs. General Hooker was driven 
from his command. If Comrade Pelfry could have seen Hook- 
er's order to Howard, of Hooker to Sedgwick. If he had 
possessed the knowledge of the fact that Meade, in command 
of 37,000 fresh troops, refused a request from General Sickles 
for reinforcements, Hooker being at this time paralyzed by 
the explosion of a shell. This and Sedgwick's unnecessary rc- 
crossing the river, if we believe Gen. Howe, one of his division 
commanders, who said it was unnecessary. All this makes a 
different story. We thank General Pelfry for his kind and 
truthful words for the army of the Potomac, and hope he and 
all other writers of the War of Rebellion will hereafter do justice 
to their grand old commander, Gen. Joseph Hooker, who was 
the victim of a most wicked and powerful conspiracy. The sad- 
dest misfortune of the army was when he was relieved from the 
command. Pie was a strategist, more than a match for General 
Lee. His being removed and Meade substituted, compelled the 
army of the Potomac to wear the enemy out by main strength 
in spite of the incompetent commanders who were placed over 
them. No army ever accomplished as much under such ad- 
verse conditions, a grateful people should never fail to recog- 
nize this primafacie fact and try even at this late day to do those 
noble heroes the justice and give them the credit for crushing; 
the greatest, best organized rebellion the world ever knew, in- 
stead of lavishing all the praise for this work upon incompetent 
commanders who happened to be placed Over them. Let merit 
not rank, be the basis for our gratitude in the future. W^ill the 
time ever come? God knows, I hope so. 

The killed and wounded in the battle of Gettysburg, taken, 
from Alexander Stephens' history, which, we think, is nearly- 
correct, is as follows: 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSHURG. 18.1 

ConfcdcraUs. Union. 

^''■^'^^ 5.00O 2,834 

Wounded ,3 000 13,523 

hissing 8,000 6,643 



Total 



36.000 23.000 



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